Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

4-1-2014

The Great Writ Hit: The Curtailment of Habeas Corpus in Georgia
Since 1967
Donald E. Wilkes Jr.
University of Georgia School of Law, wilkes@uga.edu

Repository Citation
Donald E. Wilkes Jr., The Great Writ Hit: The Curtailment of Habeas Corpus in Georgia Since 1967 , 7 John
Marshall L.J. 415 (2014),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/987

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

THE GREAT WRIT HIT: THE CURTAILMENT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IN GEORGIA SINCE 1967
DONALD

E. WILKES, JR.

"Its history and function in our legal system and the
unavailability of the writ [of habeas corpus] in totalitarian
societies are naturally enough regarded as one of the
decisively differentiating factors between our democracy and
totalitarian governments."'
Capt. Jeffrey T. Spaulding (Groucho): We'll go to court, and
we'll get out a writ of habeas corpus.
Signor Emanuel Ravelli (Chico): You're gonna get rid-a
what?2
ABSTRACT

A welcome development, the landmark Georgia Habeas
Corpus Act of 1967 modernized and vastly expanded the
availability of postconviction habeas corpus relief in the
Georgia court system. Since the early 1970s, however, there
has been an unfortunate trend of imposing crippling restrictions
on use of the Georgia writ of habeas corpus to obtain
postconviction relief. Six restrictive Georgia habeas statutes,
enacted between 1973 and 2004, have, among other things,
reduced the number of claims which may be asserted in
postconviction habeas proceedings, curtailed appeals of
postconviction habeas decisions denying relief, and created a
maze of procedural barriers to obtaining postconviction habeas
relief. Moreover, in a dispiriting manifestation of lack of
Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Georgia School of Law.
1. Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953).
2. ANIMAL CRACKERS (Paramount Pictures 1930).
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appreciation for Great Writ, five lamentable Georgia Supreme
Court decisions, handed down between 1975 and 2012, have
severely limited postconviction habeas corpus, both
substantively and procedurally.
Part II of this Article examines the six statutes curbing
Georgia habeas corpus, while Part III explores the five Georgia
Supreme Court decisions. Part IV points out the current
weakened condition of the Georgia postconviction habeas
remedy, deplores the sinister success of the law enforcement
establishment in denigrating and politicking against
postconviction remedies, and offers suggestions and strategies
for restoring the habeas remedy to its former greatness as our
legal system's most efficient protector of personal liberty.
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INTRODUCTION

The Georgia Habeas Corpus Act of 19673 was a landmark
statute, which modernized the availability of postconviction
habeas corpus in the Georgia court system.4 Among other
things, the 1967 Georgia Habeas Act greatly expanded the
number of cognizable claims for relief and swept away
numerous procedural rules which stood as irksome obstacles to
obtaining relief.5 The 1967 Act made claims of violations of
3. 1967 Ga. Laws 835. The key provisions of the 1967 Act were
borrowed from the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act of 1949, as can be
seen by comparing the two statutes. The text of the Illinois statute is
reprinted at 9 F.R.D. 365-66 (1950). Unlike the Illinois statute, however,
Georgia's 1967 Habeas Act did not grant a right to postconviction counsel
for petitioners seeking relief under the Act. (In the context of postconviction
litigation, the right to postconviction counsel is the right of an indigent
applying for postconviction relief to an appointed attorney.).
4. See generally Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Postconviction Habeas Corpus
Relief in Georgia:A Decade After the Habeas Corpus Act, 12 GA. L. REV.

249, 249 (1978) (discussing the narrow availability of habeas corpus relief in
Georgia) [hereinafter Postconviction Habeas Corpus Relief in Georgia];
Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., A New Role for an Ancient Writ: Postconviction
Habeas Corpus Relief in Georgia (PartII), 9 GA. L. REV. 13, 52-57 (1974)

(examining the history of the Georgia Habeas Corpus Act of 1967)
[hereinafter A New Role for an Ancient Writ Part II); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., A
New Role for an Ancient Writ: Postconviction Habeas Corpus Relief in

Georgia (PartI), 8 GA. L. REV. 313, 319 (1974) (expressing various reasons
why the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967 expanded protections of the writ in
Georgia) [hereinafter A New Role for an Ancient Writ Part I].
5. A New Role for an Ancient Writ Part II, supra note 4, at 52-57. Under
the 1967 Georgia Habeas Act, superior courts are the only courts vested with
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rights, rather than claims of lack of jurisdiction, the usual basis
for granting postconviction habeas relief, and made it unlikely
that a petitioner's claim of a violation of a federal constitutional
right would be rejected for purely procedural reasons.6 The
1967 Act was enacted in response to federal court decisions
widening the availability of the federal writ of habeas corpus for
state convicts. 7 Indeed, the Act was enacted at a time when the
federal writ of habeas corpus was at its apogee,8 a time when "a
strong interest in upholding the Constitution usually outweighed
principles of waiver and finality, so that a federal court was
jurisdiction to hear postconviction habeas corpus petitions, i.e., habeas
petitions filed by persons restrained of their liberty under sentence of a state
court of record. See 1967 Ga. Laws 835, § 3 (current version at O.C.G.A. §
9-14-43 (West, Westlaw through 2014)) (granting jurisdiction to hear
postconviction habeas corpus petitions to superior courts in Georgia).
6. 1967 Ga. Laws 835, § 3.
7. PostconvictionHabeas Corpus Relief in Georgia, supra note 4, at 267;
A New Role for an Ancient Writ Part II, supra note 4, at 39-52. Georgia was

not the only state to do this. In the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's, numerous
states modernized their state postconviction relief machinery in response to
the expansion of federal habeas corpus for state convicts. See 1 DONALD E.
WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK 3645 (2013) (discussing the modernization of state postconviction relief
throughout history) [hereinafter STATE POSTCONVICTION 2013].
8. From DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES
AND RELIEF 136 (1996)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter FEDERAL
POSTCONVICTION (1996)]:
In the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's, the [United States] Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts gradually liberalized federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners . . . .

In the 1960's the United States

underwent a 'criminal procedure revolution' under the leadership of
the Warren Court . . .. The criminal procedure revolution included .

. . the transformation of the federal writ of habeas corpus into an
effective instrument for enforcing [federal constitutional rights] . ...
By the early 1970's, when the criminal procedure revolution ended,
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners had acquired an
'extraordinary prestige' and had become the principal instrument for
assuring that state criminal proceedings were conducted in
accordance with federal constitutional requirements . . . . The
Warren Court . . . was committed to a 'manifest federal policy that

federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied
without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.'
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generally able to consider a petitioner's constitutional claims." 9
Beginning around 1972, however, as a result of changes in its
membership, the United States Supreme Court, in an unusual
display of judicial activism running contrary to its previous
trend of expanding and liberally construing postconviction
remedies, commenced handing down decision after decision
narrowing the availability of federal habeas relief for persons
convicted in a state court. 10 These decisions hobbled the federal
writ of habeas corpus by, among other things, constructing new
procedural obstacles to relief 1 and by imposing new substantive
9. Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial Activism and Legislative
"Reform" of Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Recent
Developments and Current Proposals,55 ALB. L. REV. 1, 19 n.65 (1991).
10. For an overview of these decisions for the period 1972 to 1996, see
FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 136-37 (delineating

various procedural and substantive limitations on the writ of habeas corpus).
See generally Stephen B. Bright, Is FairnessIrrelevant?: The Eviscerationof
FederalHabeas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of States' Courts to
Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1997); Barry
Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247 (1988); Joseph L.
Hoffmann, The Supreme Court's New Vision of FederalHabeas Corpusfor

State Prisoners,1989 SUP. CT. REV. 165 (1989); Emanuel Margolis, Habeas
Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557 (1994); Karl N.
Metzner, Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court in 1992: Confusion, Illusion,
and Limitation, 1 GEO. MASON IND. L. REV. 33 (1992); Kathleen Patchel,
The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 939 (1991); Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish
for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 362 (1991); Robert
Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9

(1990); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575
(1993).
11. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991)

(explaining how the "state ground doctrine" bars federal habeas corpus);
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 487 (1991) (describing various forms of
procedural errors that would bar habeas relief); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 497 (1986) (denying habeas review of a petitioner's "procedurally
defaulted" discovery claim); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 108-09 (1982)
("[A] state prisoner, barred by procedural default from raising a
constitutional claim on direct appeal, may not litigate that claim in a § 2254
habeas corpus proceeding without showing cause for and actual prejudice
from the default."); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977) (claim that
confession was obtained in violation of federal constitutional right was
procedurally defaulted in state court system because it was not raised at trial,
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limitsl2 on federal habeas corpus.13 Some of the Court's
opinions in these cases are written in a querulous, chastening
tone indicative of the Court's distaste for habeas litigation and
and therefore is barred in federal habeas corpus, absent cause and prejudice);
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (federal habeas claim that
blacks had been excluded from the state grand jury that had indicted habeas
petitioner was barred, absent a showing of prejudice, because the claim was
not raised before trial as required by state law). See generally Stephen B.
Bright, Death by Lottery - Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in
Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92
W. VA. L. REV. 679 (1990); Alan W. Clarke, ProceduralLabyrinths and the
Injustice of Death: A Critique of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (PartOne),
29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1327 (1995); Alan W. Clarke, ProceduralLabyrinths
and the Injustice of Death: A Critique of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus
(PartTwo), 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 303 (1996); Jack A. Guttenberg, Federal
Habeas Corpus, Constitutional Rights, and Procedural Forfeitures: The
Delicate Balance, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 617 (1984); Graham Hughes,
Sandbagging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the
Procedural Default Principle, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 321
(1987-88); Maria L. Marcus, Federal Habeas Corpus After State Court
Default: A Definition of Cause and Prejudice, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 663
(1985).
12. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305-10 (1989) (subject to two

exceptions, federal habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
494 (1976) ("[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."). See
generally Marc M.

Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower

FederalCourts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1991); James S.
Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro: " The Rehnquist Court's Rout of
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 537 (1990-91); Karl N. Metzner, Anatomy of an Upset: The
Supreme Court's Shocker on Habeas Retroactivity, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 521

(1992);

Ira P. Robbins & James E. Sanders, Judicial Integrity, the

Appearance of Justice, and the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus: How to Kill
Two Thirds (or More) with One Stone, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 63 (1977);
David M. Snyder, Habeas Corpus: Stoned But Not Dead, 19 CRIM. L. BULL.
197 (1983).
13. These decisions had their desired effect of "transforming the federal

writ of habeas corpus from a broad and effective postconviction remedy into
an attenuated remedy available only in extraordinary circumstances."
FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 137.
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its dislike of federal postconviction review.14 They convey the
impression that the writ of habeas corpus just might be a
candidate for Public Enemy No. 1. Then, in the midst of the
Supreme Court's unrelenting assault on and weakening of the
federal habeas remedy, the beleaguered remedy received an
additional staggering blow when Congress enacted Title I of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which,
for the first time in the nation's history, amended the federal
habeas corpus statutes for the purpose of drastically restricting
the power of federal courts to grant habeas relief to state
prisoners whose conviction or sentence was obtained in
violation of their federal constitutional rights under the federal
Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment. 16
As the effectiveness of the federal habeas corpus remedy for
state prisoners has steadily declined over the past four decades
due to both judicial activism and legislative enactment, there
has during the same period also been a marked decline in
Georgia's habeas corpus remedy. Georgia's retrenchment is
closely connected to the federal retrenchment.
Just as
14. The majority opinions in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), and
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), are classic examples.
15. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214-1319 (1996), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publl32/content-detail.html.
16. See FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996),

supra note 8, at 510

(discussing the United States Supreme Court case law developments in the
1970's and the enactment of Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 and their effects on the writ of habeas corpus). See also
Daniel Klaidman, "The Great Writ" Hit, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1996, at 72
("E[nglish judges invented it]. A[braham] L[incoln] suspended it. Wrongly
convicted prisoners rely on it. And last week Congress and the president
bruised it badly."). For a recent Supreme Court decision describing the
severe restrictions the 1996 Act placed on the granting of federal habeas
corpus relief to state convicts, and emphasizing the enormous deference the
Act requires federal habeas courts now to give to state court criminal
judgments, see Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). In 2010 and
2011, the Court, on appeals by prison wardens, reversed lower federal courts
10 times on grounds that those courts had exceeded the limits placed by the
1996 Act on the power of the federal courts to grant habeas relief Hill v.
Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011).
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enlargement of federal habeas corpus once had the effect of
encouraging Georgia to expand its state writ of habeas corpus,
so curtailment of federal habeas corpus has emboldened
Georgia to curtail its habeas corpus remedy. This curtailment
has been effected principally by legislation but also by judicial
decision. 17
Part II of this Article explores the curtailment of the Georgia
writ of habeas corpus by six statutes enacted since 1967, while
Part III examines five notably egregious post-1967 Georgia
Supreme Court decisions curtailing the Georgia writ. Part IV,
the conclusion, surveys the damaging changes in habeas corpus
that have occurred since 1967, calls for the abandonment of
what is called the "finality fetish", points out the lack of love
the law enforcement establishment has for habeas corpus, and,
finally, reminds us of some important things we used to be
aware of back when the protection of our rights was the
overarching concern in postconviction habeas proceedings.
II. STATUTORY CURTAILMENT OF GEORGIA HABEAS CORPUS
SINCE

1967

Six times since 1967 - in 1973, 1975, 1982, 1986, 1999, and
2004 - the Georgia legislature has statutorily curtailed habeas
corpus.1 One of these six statutes restricts both postconviction
17. Georgia is not the only state to cut back on state postconviction relief

in response to these federal developments. In recent years numerous states
have imposed new restrictions on state postconviction remedies. At least 38
states, for example, have now added statutes of limitations applicable in
postconviction cases. See STATE POSTCONVICTION 2013, supra note 7, at 1213 (listing those aforementioned states). In 1970, by contrast, only three
states had such statutes of limitations. Id. at 13.
18. Since 1967, five additional statutes relating to Georgia habeas corpus
have been enacted which do not curtail habeas corpus but instead deal with
matters of court administration or funding in habeas cases. See 2004 Ga.
Laws 420, § 3 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 38-3-62(7) (West, Westlaw through
2014)) (authorizing extension of time to file habeas petition when judicial
emergency is declared); 1985 Ga. Laws 883, § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 910-14 (West, Westlaw through 2014)) (providing for model form of
postconviction habeas petition required to be used by certain inmates); 1985
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and pre-conviction habeas corpus proceedings; the other five
statutes restrict only postconviction habeas corpus proceedings.
Ga. Laws 440, § 1 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §15-6-17(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2014)) (authorizing superior court judges in a county in
which a state correctional institution is located to conduct postconviction
habeas corpus proceedings involving inmates of the institution in a suitable
room at the institution); 1980 Ga. Laws 390, § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 1710-36(d) (West, Westlaw through 2014)) (in death sentence cases,
procedures governing the writ of habeas corpus may be employed to assert
rights or seek remedies if the Unified Review Procedure procedures
established in the rules of the Supreme Court as applied to the petitioner are
inadequate or ineffective in any constitutional sense); 1978 Ga. Laws 2051, §
1 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 9-14-53 (West, Westlaw through
2014)) (providing for a habeas corpus clerk in certain counties and
authorizing reimbursement to certain counties for expenses incurred in postconviction habeas proceedings). One other post-1967 habeas statute was the
Georgia Death Penalty Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1995, 1995 Ga. Laws
381 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 9-14-44, 9-14-47, 9-14-47.1, 9-14-48 (West,
Westlaw through 2014), and 15-1-9.1(3), (4) (West, Westlaw through
2014)). For analysis of the 1995 statute, see John A. Creasy, Jr., Habeas
Corpus: Amend Proceduresfor First Time Challenges to State Court Death
Sentence Proceedings; General Provisions: Require Establishment of
Uniform Court Rules ConcerningTime Periods and Schedules, 12 GA. ST. U.
L. REv. 18, 20 (1995); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The Georgia Death Penalty
Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1995, GA. DEFENDER, Nov. 1995, at 1. The

1995 Act was designed primarily to expedite postconviction habeas
proceedings in death sentence cases, and an un-codified portion of the
statute, 1995 Ga. Laws, § 1, seems to endorse the law enforcement
establishment's pro-death penalty talking point that death row inmates are
using habeas corpus "solely as a delaying tactic under the guise of asserting
rights. . ." See 1995 Ga. Laws 381, § 2(2).

Nevertheless, taking the provisions of the 1995 Act into account as a
whole, it would probably be inaccurate to regard the 1995 statute as an
example of curtailment of habeas corpus. But see Gibson v. Turpin, 513
S.E.2d 186, 197 (Ga. 1999) (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting) (recognizing that the
1995 Act imposes strict time limitations on habeas petitions in death penalty
cases; these strict time limits discourage lawyers from providing pro bono
assistance because they "do not permit adequate time to become familiar
with the Byzantine requirements of habeas corpus law."); Jill Wasserman,
Note, Has Habeas Corpus Been Suspended in Georgia? Representing
Indigent Prisoners on Georgia's Death Row, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 605,

613-615 (2000) (examining, under Georgia Death Penalty Habeas Corpus
Reform Act of 1995, specific time limits and schedules for habeas
proceedings in death sentence cases).
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A. 1973 Statute
The first statute cutting back on the availability of habeas
relief in Georgia was enacted only six years after passage of the
Georgia Habeas Corpus Act of 1967. The 1973 statutel9 was
enacted to deal with situations where a habeas petitioner files a
second or subsequent habeas petition raising a claim omitted
from the original habeas petition.20 Under the 1973 statute,
such a claim cannot be entertained on the merits, subject to two

exceptions.2 1
19. 1973 Ga. Laws 1314, § 1 (originally codified at GA. CODE § 50127(10) (1973); now codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-14-51 (West, Westlaw
through 2014)):
All grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner for a writ of habeas
corpus shall be raised by a petitioner in his original or amended
petition. Any grounds not so raised are waived unless the
Constitution of the United States or of this state otherwise requires or
unless any judge to whom the petition is assigned, on considering a
subsequent petition, finds grounds for relief asserted therein which
could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended
petition.
20. If the habeas petition (whether successive or not) raises a claim
decided against the petitioner on the direct appeal, the claim is regarded as
resjudicata,unless there is newly discovered evidence bearing on the claim
or there has been a change in the law subsequent to the previous habeas
proceeding. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Morrow, 717 S.E.2d 168, 178 (Ga.
2011) (emphasis in original):
This Court allows claims to be revisited on habeas corpus where new
facts have developed since the time of the direct appeal not because
the Court intends to allow prisoners to have a second chance to prove
their claims but, instead, because a claim that is based on facts that
did not actually exist at the time of direct appeal is essentially a
different claim.
The same resjudicata principle applies if the habeas petition raises a claim
decided adversely to the petitioner in the previous habeas proceeding. Id
21. The statute actually says that, subject to the two exceptions, the claim
is "waived." O.C.G.A. § 9-14-51 (West, Westlaw through 2014). "'Waiver'
is a vague term used for a great variety of purposes . . . in the law." Green v.

United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957). Traditionally, "it connotes some
kind of voluntary knowing relinquishment of a right." Green, 355 U.S. at
191. In 1973, the United States Supreme Court announced that "[a]lmost
without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has
been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a
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Prior to 1967 in Georgia, a successive habeas petition raising
a claim not included in the original petition was governed by the
judicially created abuse of writ doctrine, under which "a court
would refuse to entertain the substantive allegations of a habeas
corpus petition whenever they had been withheld from an
earlier petition." 22 The Georgia Habeas Corpus Act of 1967

criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial." Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973). "The question of whether the
defendant himself ha[s] to knowingly waive the right or whether his counsel
could waive it without consulting him depend[s] on the nature of the right at
issue." Tabak & Lane, supra note 9, at 19 n.67 (citing to Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 439 (1963)). Constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, which
are inherently personal - for example, the right to jury trial and the right to
testify - can be waived only by the defendant personally. FEDERAL
POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 681.
Intentional relinquishment of a known right is not the only meaning of
waiver in regard to the law of postconviction remedies.
Another principal meaning of waiver in the postconviction context has to
do with whether the defendant has forfeited the right to complain to the
courts about the violation of his rights as a consequence of having committed
a procedural default. "A procedural default consists of the failure of a
defendant to comply with a state's procedural rule governing the timing or
manner for asserting errors in criminal proceedings [or postconviction
proceedings]." Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV.
247, 288 (1988). "The failure to follow legitimate procedural rules that
result in the loss of a remedy is often referred to as a 'waiver,' 'forfeiture' or
'[procedural] default."' Guttenberg, supra note 11, at 619 n.4. In this sense,
waiver "describe[s] those situations where rights or remedies are lost by
operation of law regardless of the parties' volitional actions." Guttenberg,
supra note 11, at 620. A right which may no longer be asserted in court
because it was not raised in compliance with a procedural rule is, therefore,
commonly said to be "waived," "barred," "forfeited," or "procedurally
defaulted."
In postconviction statutes and postconviction case law, therefore,
"waiver" is sometimes used to refer to an intentional relinquishment of rights
and sometimes to refer to a failure to raise a rights claim at the time or in the
manner required by a procedural rule.
In this Article, depending on the context, "waiver" sometimes refers to a
knowing relinquishment of rights and at other times to a loss of the right to
raise a rights claim, due to a previous failure to properly raise the claim in
court.
22. A New Role for an Ancient Writ, Part II supra note 4, at 361.
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abolished the abuse of writ doctrine23 and replaced it with a
different, more petitioner-friendly rule which (1) authorized
dismissal of a subsequent habeas petition on grounds it was
successive only where in the previous habeas proceeding there
had been an evidentiary hearing on the merits or a hearing on an
issue of law, and (2) permitted the court to entertain a
successive habeas petition even though it raised a new ground
for relief deliberately withheld from the earlier petition.24
The 1973 statute repealed the petitioner-friendly provision of
the 1967 Act governing successive habeas petitions that
presented a new claim for relief, and replaced it with the
following:
All grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner for a writ of
habeas corpus shall be raised by a petitioner in his original
or amended petition. Any grounds not so raised are waived
unless the Constitution of the United States or of this state
otherwise requires or unless any judge to whom the petition
is assigned, on considering a subsequent petition, finds
23. PostconvictionHabeas Corpus Relief in Georgia,supra note 4, at 265.
24. 1967 Ga. Laws 835, 838 § 3 (codified at GA. CODE § 50-127(10)

(1967) (repealed 1973)):
Where after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual
issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment and sentence of a court has been
denied relief upon application for a writ of habeas corpus, a
subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of such

person need not be entertained by the court unless the application
alleges and is predicated upon a ground not adjudicated on the
hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court is
satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application
deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused
the writ.
For a survey of judicial interpretation of the 1967 version of § 50-127(10)
during the six years before it was repealed, see A New Role for an Ancient
Writ, Part II supra note 4, at 63-66. The text of the 1967 version of §50127(10) was borrowed verbatim from former 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1966), a
federal habeas corpus statute enacted in 1966 but repealed 30 years later by
Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. For a
discussion of judicial interpretation of the 1966 version of 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b), see RONALD P. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 190-92 (1969).
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grounds for relief asserted therein which could not
reasonably have been raised in the original or amended
petition.25
For most practical purposes, the effect of the 1973 statute was
(with slight modifications) "to reestablish the abuse of writ
doctrine which was in effect until it was abolished by the 1967
[Habeas Corpus] Act." 26 The 1973 statute established a
procedural default rule under which omitting to raise a claim in
a habeas petition may very well result in the claim being barred
in a subsequent habeas petition by the same petitioner,
regardless of the merits of the claim.
"The Georgia Supreme Court has explained that the purpose
of the procedural rule [created by the 1973 statute] is to bar
successive petitions [raising a claim omitted from the initial
petition]." 2 7 Specifically, the purpose of the 1973 statute was
"to discontinue the practice of filin multiple habeas corpus
petitions under a single conviction." 2 Thus, "[u]nder Georgia
law, a prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief must present all of
his grounds for relief in his original petition." 29 However, the
1973 statute does not "prohibit separate habeas . . . petitions

attacking different convictions based on separate trials."30
Pursuant to the 1973 statute, the Georgia Supreme Court has
upheld or ordered the dismissal of numerous successive habeas
petitions, even in death sentence cases, without inquiring into
their merits, on the ground the successive petition raised a claim
that was omitted from a previous petition filed by the same
25. 1973 Ga. Laws 1314, § 1 (originally codified at GA. CODE § 50127(10) (1973); now codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-14-51 (West, Westlaw
through 2014)). This law is derived from a 1973 Maine postconviction
statute, which in turn was derived from the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing
Act of 1949. See infra note 46.
26. PostconvictionHabeas Corpus Relief in Georgia, supra note 4, at 265

(footnote omitted).
27. Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1136 (11th Cir. 2000); Hunter v.
Brown, 223 S.E.2d 145, 146 (Ga. 1976).
28. Brown, 223 S.E.2d at 146.
29. Head,206 F.3d at 1136.
30. Brown, 223 S.E.2d at 146.
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petitioner.31
The 1973 statute does not focus on whether the habeas
petitioner or his attorney knowingly and voluntarily
relinquished a known right, but instead on whether the claim for
relief is procedurally barred because, in violation of the statute,
it was not raised in the first habeas petition. Under the 1973
statute, there is an objective test for determining whether a
claim not raised in a previous petition is defaulted and hence
barred in the subsequent habeas proceeding.32 A claim is
defaulted "if a reasonable person would have raised the omitted
claim in the first petition," 33 even if the habeas petitioner did not
knowingly or subjectively intend the waiver, 34 even if the
petitioner has been sentenced to death,3 5 and even if in the
initial habeas proceeding the petitioner was acting pro se. 3 6
31. See, e.g., Gaither v. Sims, 387 S.E.2d 889, 889 (Ga. 1990) (reversing
habeas grant based on procedural waiver); Tucker v. Kemp, 351 S.E.2d 196,
198 (Ga. 1987) (denying habeas relief on the basis that petitioner could have
raised claim in earlier state petition); Gunter v. Hickman, 348 S.E.2d 644,
645 (Ga. 1986) (denying habeas relief based on failure to raise issue in
original habeas petition not considered a "miscarriage of justice"); Smith v.
Zant, 301 S.E.2d 32, 32 (Ga. 1983) (holding that habeas court's refusal to
hear petition on the merits was not error when the issue had already been
raised in the first and second petitions); Dix v. Zant, 294 S.E.2d 52, 528 (Ga.
1982) (affirming lower court's denial of habeas relief because "any and all
grounds for relief could reasonably have been raised in the original or
amended petition of habeas corpus"); Fuller v. Ricketts, 214 S.E.2d 541, 542
(Ga. 1975) (affirming motion to dismiss based on waiver of grounds not
raised in original petition).
32. Presnell v. Kemp, 835 F.2d 1567, 1572 n.15 (11th Cir. 1988) (as
applicable to successive habeas petitions, the 1973 statute "requir[es] an
objective standard of waiver").
3 3. Id.
34. Id.

35. See, e.g., Hall v. Lee, 684 S.E.2d 868, 884 (Ga. 2009) ("The habeas
court correctly found that portion of Lee's claim 'wherein he assert[ed] his
death sentence [wa]s disproportionate' was res judicata."); Tucker, 351
S.E.2d at 198-99 (providing examples of past decisions of defaulted claims
in death penalty cases); Smith, 301 S.E.2d at 34.
36. McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 1992):
Georgia has imposed a procedural rule requiring any state prisoner
collaterally attacking his sentence by way of a petition for writ of
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Under the terms of the 1973 statute, the Georgia Supreme
Court has explained:
[A] subsequent habeas petition effects a waiver on any
grounds not originally raised, subject to two exceptions.
First, where the state or the federal Constitution provides
otherwise; and second, if the judge presiding finds other
grounds in the subsequent petition which could not
reasonably have been raised in the original or amended
petition."3 7
There do not appear to be any Georgia Supreme Court cases
where the first exception was found to authorize a successive
petition.38 There are cases where the Court has found a
successive petition to be permissible under the second
-39
exception.
habeas corpus to present all grounds for relief in the petition or
amendment thereto ... The Georgia procedural default rule does not

provide an exception to its requirements for pro se prisoners.
37. Dix v. Zant, 294 S.E.2d 527, 528 (Ga. 1982). See also Smith, 301
S.E.2d at 34 (ruling that in order to be so entitled to a hearing on a successive
habeas petition raising a claim not raised in the earlier petition, "the

petitioner must raise grounds which are either constitutionally non-waivable
or which could not reasonably have been raised in the earlier petition.").
38. In Gaither v. Sims, 387 S.E.2d 889 (Ga. 1990), for example, the
Georgia Supreme Court reversed a superior court ruling that an involuntary
guilty plea claim based on Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), was

constitutionally non-waivable and hence could be raised in a successive
habeas petition even though it had been omitted from the convicted person's

first habeas petition. The Georgia Supreme Court held that "[t]he habeas
trial court's holding that a Boykin claim is non-waivable was error.
Gaither, 387 S.E.2d at 889.
39. See, e.g., Gibson v. Head, 646 S.E.2d 257, 260 (Ga. 2007) ("[T]he
habeas court erred in relying on the assumption that Gibson could have
discovered his trial attorney's conflict of interest prior to filing his first
habeas petition to reach the conclusion that Gibson's conflict of interest
claim was barred as successive."); Bruce v. Smith, 553 S.E.2d 808, 810 (Ga.
2001) (holding that a successive habeas petition was permissible where the
claim omitted from the previous petition was based upon a court decision

decided after the previous petition); Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339, 340
n.1 (Ga. 1989) ("We limit our review to an examination of the impact of the
newly amended statute on the validity of Fleming's death sentence because
this is the only issue that has not been previously decided and could not
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The 1973 statute sometimes results in a habeas claim being
barred not only in a Georgia prisoner's state habeas corpus
proceeding, but also in the prisoner's subsequent federal habeas
corpus proceeding. The United States Supreme Court has held
that a state prisoner (including a death row inmate) who applies
for federal habeas corpus may be denied relief on procedural
grounds, without an inquiry into the merits of his federal
constitutional claim, if the claim was procedurally defaulted in
the course of the state postconviction proceedings.40 Stated
differently, if, in the course of seeking state postconviction
relief (including habeas relief), the convicted person violated a
state procedural rule regulating how and when his claim for
relief should be asserted, and if, as a result of that procedural
default, the claim is procedurally barred in the courts of the
state, the claim may also be barred in a federal habeas
proceeding.41 The 1973 statute is, of course, a procedural rule
which regulates state postconviction proceedings and which,
reasonably have been raised in Fleming's previous petitions for habeas
corpus."); Smith v. Zant, 301 S.E.2d 32, 37 (Ga. 1983) (allowing successive
habeas petition when there was previously unavailable evidence that the
prosecution had violated due process by failing to reveal false witness
testimony at trial); Jarrell v. Zant, 284 S.E.2d 17, 17 (Ga. 1981) (finding
successive habeas petition was permissible where the claim omitted from the
previous petition was based upon a court decision decided after the previous
petition).
40. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991)
(dismissing federal habeas proceeding by state death row inmate without
inquiring into its merits because the inmate's lawyers seeking state appellate
court review of denial of state postconviction habeas relief filed the appeal
after expiration of the time for appeal).
The Court further held that the only situation in which a procedural
default committed in a state postconviction proceeding would not bar federal
habeas relief would be if the petitioner could show either (1) cause for and
actual prejudice resulting the default or (2) actual innocence of the crime for
which the petitioner was convicted (both of which are narrowly defined and
extremely difficult to prove). Id. at 750-51. The petitioner in this case, the
Court concluded, had made no such showing, and therefore his federal
habeas petition had to be dismissed. Id. at 752-57. The Court also formally
overruled Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (or what was left of it by then).
Id. at 750.
41. Id. at 752-757.
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when violated, may operate to bar consideration of the merits of
a claim omitted from the initial habeas petition and raised for
the first time in a successive habeas petition.
Adhering to United States Supreme Court precedents, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held
that, even in death sentence cases, a Georgia prisoner may be
denied federal habeas relief, and the merits of his federal claim
not inquired into, if the claim is barred in the Georgia court
system because, in violation of the 1973 statute, it was omitted
from the prisoner's initial state habeas petition.42 The federal
42. See, e.g., Conner v. Hall, 645 F.3d, 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted):
[I]f the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is
independent of the federal question and adequate to support the
judgment . . . unless a petitioner can show cause for the failure to
properly present the claim and actual prejudice, or that the failure to
consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.
See also Ogle v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The
Georgia statute . . . can and should be enforced in federal habeas proceedings

against claims never presented in state court, unless there is some indication
that a state court judge would find the claims in question 'could not
reasonably have been raised in the original or amended [state] petition."');
Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1124 (11th Cir. 2000) (ruling that 21 of the
25 claims the petitioner presented in his federal habeas claim were
procedurally barred because they had not been previously presented in state
court); Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir. 1998)
(barring petitioner's federal claims on basis of procedural default in the state
habeas petition); Alderman v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541,1549 (11th Cir. 1994)
("Where a state court has ruled in the alternative, addressing both the
independent state procedural ground and the merits of the federal claim, the
federal court should apply the state procedural bar and decline to reach the
merits of the claim . . .") (quoting Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1270
(11th Cir.))); Burger v. Zant, 983 F.2d 1129, 1135 (11th Cir. 1993) (ruling
that "[a]ccordingly, the procedural default and abuse of the writ doctrines
serve as a procedural bar and preclude habeas corpus relief"); Stevens v.
Zant, 968 F.2d 1076, 1089 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that "the district court
was correct in refusing to consider Stevens' claim under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments" because they were not presented until the third
habeas petition); McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1262 (11th Cir. 1992)
(refusing to hear the federal habeas claims of the petitioner because they
were procedurally barred).
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habeas court may decide that the claim was forfeited under the
1973 statute even if the Georgia courts have not passed upon the
issue. 43 If the federal court concludes that the claim is barred in
the Georgia court system under the 1973 statute, the merits of
the claim may be examined by the federal habeas court only in
the extremely unlikely event that the petitioner shows either that
there is cause for and actual prejudice resulting from the default,
or that he is factually innocent of the crime.44
The origins of the Georgia's 1973 statute are to be found in,
first, a Maine postconviction statute enacted in 1963, on which
the Georgia statute was modeled, and, second, a 1972 United
States Supreme Court decision interpreting the Maine statute.
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court decided Murch v.
Mottram,4 5 in which the Court enforced a 1963 Maine
postconviction habeas corpus statutory provision which was
almost identical to the 1973 Georgia statute. Expressing
approval of the Maine statutory provision, 46 the Supreme Court
held that federal habeas relief should not have been granted to a
state prisoner based on a federal claim which, in violation of the
Maine statute, had been omitted from the petitioner's first state
postconviction petition. 47 The Court concluded that, under the
circumstances of the case, the federal habeas petitioner had
43. See, e.g., Chambers, 150 F.3d at 1327 (ruling that because the

petitioner's state habeas claims would be procedurally defaulted, they are
also barred in his federal habeas claim).
44. See, e.g., Conner, 645 F.3d at 1287; Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223,
1228 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e conclude that . . . [fjor the third issue,
[a]ppellant has made the necessary substantial showing [of actual prejudice].
We grant a COA on the third issue and address only that issue in this
opinion."); Mincey, 206 F.3d at 1124.
45. Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972).
46. "There can be no doubt that States may . . . provide, as Maine has

done, that a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must assert all known
constitutional claims in a single proceeding." Id. at 45. The 1973 Maine
statute itself seems to have been based on a section of the Illinois PostConviction Hearing Act of 1949 which provided: "Any claim of substantial
denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or amended petition
[for postconviction relief] is waived." 9 F.R.D. 347, 365 (1950).
47. Mottram, 409 U.S. at 47.
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deliberately bypassed state court procedures and thereby waived
the federal claim he had withheld from his initial state habeas
petition.48
Murch was decided at a time when Supreme Court case law
prohibited violations of state procedural rules from barring
federal habeas relief except where the habeas petitioner had
deliberately bypassed state procedures, 49 and the Court
purported to apply the deliberate bypass principle in deciding
the case. Nevertheless, in retrospect the decision was a
harbinger of the Court's decisions, soon to come, which would
replace the deliberate bypass rule with the cause and prejudice
rule, under which it is far more likely that courts will deny
habeas petitions for procedural reasons, without ever ruling on
the merits of the constitutional violations alleged in the habeas
petition.
Since the Court in Murch reversed a federal appellate court
decision in favor of the habeas petitioner, the decision also
presaged the numerous future habeas decisions in which the
Court would exhibit a penchant for hearing appeals by prison
wardens complaining about a grant of habeas relief and for then
reversing the lower court for having overprotected a habeas
petitioner's rights.o
48. Id.

49. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
50. See, e.g., Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115 (1995); Caspari v. Bohlen,
510 U.S. 383 (1994); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993); Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993); Keeney v.Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992);
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37
(1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S.
195 (1989); Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988); Lowenfield v. Phelps,
484 U.S. 231 (1987); Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165
(1986); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Morris v. Mathews, 475
U.S. 237 (1986); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986); Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78
(1983); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456
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The circumstances in which the Supreme Court upheld
enforcement of the 1963 Maine statute which served as the
model for the 1973 Georgia statute were far different from
circumstances in which the Georgia statute is usually applied.
In Murch v. Mottram the habeas petitioner (as was his statutory
right under the Maine postconviction statute) was represented
by court-appointed counsel and made his decision to omit
claims only after he was informed in open court by the judge
and also by his counsel of the dangers of omitting claims from
51
his initial postconviction petition. In Georgia, by contrast, the
1973 statute is typically applied in situations where the
petitioner is acting pro se; where the petitioner is not informed
in person by the judge in the courtroom of the consequences of
failing to comply with the 1973 statute; and where, if the
petitioner does violates the statute, the violation rarely can be
said to have amounted to a deliberate bypassing of the statute or
a knowing and voluntary waiver of a constitutional claim.
Furthermore, Murch v. Mottram involved a noncapital sentence,
whereas the 1973 Georgia statute sometimes procedurally bars
the claims of death row inmates.
B. 1975 Statute
In 1975, eight years after its enactment, the Georgia Habeas
Corpus Act of 1967 was amended restrictively for the second
time.
The 1975 statute52 limited the availability of
U.S. 107 (1982); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1981); Sumner v. Mata,
449 U.S. 539 (1980); Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979); Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98
(1977); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Caldwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583 (1974); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Illinois v.
Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433
(1973); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
51. Mottram, 409 U.S. at 43-44.
52. 1975 Ga. Laws 1143, §§ 1-3 (originally codified as GA. CODE § 50127(1), (7), (11) (1975), now codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §§ 9-1442(a)-(b), 9-14-52 (West, Westlaw through 2014)).
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postconviction habeas relief in two important respects. First, it
made it likely that a habeas claim relating to the composition of
a grand or petit jury would be procedurally barred - and hence
not considered on the merits - if the claim had not been
properly raised at trial. Second, the 1975 statute abolished
appeals of right from habeas decisions denying postconviction
relief.53
1. Barring GrandandPetit Jury Claims Based on Procedural
Default
One of the most intriguing features of the Georgia Habeas
Corpus Act of 1967 was its emphasis on deciding federal
constitutional claims on the merits. It imposed what has been
called a high waiver standard for relinquishing federal
constitutional rights. Under the Act, a federal constitutional
claim raised in a postconviction habeas proceeding was not to
"be deemed to have been waived unless it is shown that there
was an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege
which relinquishment or abandonment was participated in by
the party and was done voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently." 54
Under this high waiver standard, federal constitutional claims
could, as a general rule, be raised via state habeas corpus even
though the claim could have been but was not raised at trial.
53. Id. The 1975 Act made other changes in the 1967 Habeas Act, but
they do not require discussion in this Article.
54. 1967 Ga. Laws 835, § 3 (codified at GA. CODE § 50-127(1) (1967)
(amended 1975, repealed 1982).
55. See, e.g., McDuffie v. Jones, 283 S.E.2d 601, 603 (Ga. 1981),
overruled on other grounds by West v. Waters, 533 S.E.2d 88 (2000):

Because the constitutional rights of persons accused and convicted of
crimes, if not identical, are substantially the same under both the
state and federal constitutions, the waiver standard as to state
constitutional rights would be controlled in most instances by the
statutory waiver standard for federal constitutional rights (and we
will not deal here with the waiver standard for state constitutional
rights, if any, which may be in addition to federal constitutional
rights).
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As the Georgia Supreme Court has acknowledged, 5 6 the
standard was derived from Fay v. Noia,5 the 1963 United States
Supreme Court decision which for about a decade governed the
effect of state procedural defaults on federal habeas
proceedings, after which time the Court began to subvert the
decision step by step until it was officially overruled in 1991.
Under Fay v. Noia, violations of state procedural rules did not
bar federal habeas relief except where the habeas petitioner had
deliberately bypassed state procedures. 58 Fay v. Noia defined a
See also Smith v. Garner, 222 S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ga. 1976):

Although appellant's earlier counsel did not raise the present
constitutional grounds in the first habeas case, it is clear that
appellant did not waive them as he tried to raise them and did not
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently relinquish or abandon these
grounds which he now seeks to assert through his present counsel.
See also Blaylock v. Hopper, 212 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ga. 1975) (noting that a
valid waiver exists only when "the defendant intentionally relinquishes or
abandons a known right or privilege"); see also Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d
1562, 1583 (11th Cir. 1983) (remanding petitioner's jury challenge and
challenge to constitutionality of death penalty). See generally Postconviction
Habeas Corpus Relief in Georgia, supra note 4, at 260 ("The Georgia

Supreme Court has consistently held that a claimed denial of such a right
shall not be considered waived for purposes of habeas corpus relief merely
because the petitioner did not timely and properly object in the sentencing
court to the alleged denial."); A New Role for an Ancient Writ, Part II supra
note 4, at 59-60.
56. See McDuffie, 283 S.E.2d at 603 n.1 (federal habeas petition raising
claim that blacks were systematically excluded from the trial jury that
convicted petitioner; according to the state, this claim is procedurally
defaulted because it was not properly preserved under Georgia procedural
law; the court held the claim was not forfeited under governing Georgia law
at the time of petitioner's trial).
57. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963).
58. Id. at 438 ("We therefore hold that the federal habeas judge may in his
discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately bypassed the
orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state
court remedies.").
Three habeas decisions of the former United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit between June 1964 and March 1965 construed Fay v. Noia
to mean that a federal habeas corpus petitioner convicted in Georgia could
raise a federal claim he had not raised in the Georgia courts, provided the
petitioner had not in the state court proceedings intentionally relinquished or
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deliberate bypass as "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." 59
The high waiver standard meant, among other things, that a
petitioner in a Georgia state habeas corpus proceeding was
permitted to raise federal constitutional claims relating to the
composition of the grand jury that had indicted him or the petit
jury that had convicted him, even though he could have, but did
not, raise those claims at his criminal trial.6 0
In 1973, however, in one of the earliest of its line of major
decisions enlarging the circumstances under which a procedural
default committed at trial would bar a federal habeas claim, the
United States Supreme Court decided Davis v. United States.6 1
abandoned a known right. A New Role for an Ancient Writ, Part II, supra
note 4, at 41-50.
59. Noia, 372 U.S. at 439.
60. See, e.g., Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, 1569-71 (11th Cir. 1983)
(federal habeas petition raising claim that blacks were systematically
excluded from the trial jury that convicted petitioner; according to the state
the claim was procedurally defaulted because it was not properly preserved
under Georgia procedural law; the 11th Circuit held the claim was not
forfeited; under governing Georgia law at the time of petitioner's trial, rights
conferred or secured by the Constitution of the United States were not be
deemed waived unless it was shown that there was an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege which
relinquishment or abandonment was participated in by the party and was
done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently); Lumpkin v. Ricketts, 551
F.2d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 1977) (same); O'Neal v. Caldwell, 203 S.E.2d 191,
192 (Ga. 1974); Pass v. Caldwell, 200 S.E.2d 720, 721 (Ga. 1973)
(considering defendant's challenge to the grand jury venire); Mitchell v.
Smith, 194 S.E.2d 414, 418 (Ga. 1972) ("The habeas corpus court was
therefore in error in refusing to hear evidence on the question of the illegal
composition of the jury, which question had not previously been decided.");
Johnson v. Caldwell, 187 S.E.2d 844, 849 (Ga. 1972) (considering
defendant's jury discrimination claim). But see Atkins v. Martin, 194 S.E.2d
463, 464 (Ga. 1972) ("The failure of the petitioner to raise any question as to
the make-up of the jury until after verdict constitutes a waiver of any
contention as to the legality of the same.").
61. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). This postconviction case
involving a federal rather than a state prisoner was brought not under the
federal habeas statute but under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. V 2011), a related
statute which governs postconviction proceedings by federal convicts.
Nonetheless, because the § 2255 remedy is commensurate with and
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In Davis, the Court referred to a federal criminal procedure rule
providing that defenses and objections based on defects in the
institution of the prosecution or in the indictment might be
raised only by motion before trial, and held that failure to so
present such defenses or objections constitutes a waiver thereof
unless the court shown grants relief from the waiver for cause.62
A federal prisoner seeking postconviction relief was barred
from raising, for the first time, a claim of unconstitutional
discrimination in the composition of a grand jury where there
was no plausible explanation of the failure to timely make
objection to the composition of the grand jury. 63
Recognizing that if a federal prisoner was, under the Davis
decision, barred from attacking via 28 U.S.C. § 2255 the grand
jury's composition because he failed under federal criminal
procedure rules to raise the grand jury claim at trial, the former
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit soon
reasoned that "no principle relative to the Great Writ of Habeas
Corpus compels the conclusion that a state prisoner stands in
any better position." 64 Therefore, in decisions beginning early
in 1974, that Court upheld denials of federal habeas relief to
state convicts raising claims of unlawful selection of a grand or
petit jury, not on the merits, but on the procedural ground that
the prisoners had failed, in violation of state procedural rule
65
These federal court
requirements, to raise the claim at trial.
decisions, each of which, without an inquiry into the merits of a
petition for postconviction relief involving a jury claim, upheld
the dismissal of the petition based on a procedural default that
did not amount to a deliberate bypassing, set the stage for the
equivalent to habeas corpus and is intended to substitute for habeas corpus
when federal prisoners collaterally attack their convictions or sentences,
decisions involving this remedy are usually regarded as having equal
application to federal habeas corpus proceedings involving state prisoners.
62. Id. at 236.
63. Id. at 242.
64. Rivera v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1974).
65. See, e.g., id.; Jones v. Henderson, 494 F.2d 47, 48 (5th Cir. 1974);
Marlin v. Florida, 489 F.2d 702, 703 (5th Cir. 1974).
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1975 Georgia statute. 66
The 1975 statute carved out an exception to the high waiver
standard established by the 1967 Habeas Act, but only with
respect to claims involving the composition of a grand or petit
jury. Clearly, the 1975 statute was enacted with Davis v. United
States and its former Fifth Circuit progeny in mind.
The 1975 statute added the following italicized wording to
the waiver provisions of the 1967 Act:
Except for objections relating to the composition of a grand

or traverse jury, rights conferred or secured by the

Constitution of the United States shall not be deemed to have
been waived unless it is shown that there was an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege
which relinquishment was participated in by the party and
was done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The
right to object to the composition of the grand or traverse

jury will be deemed waived under this section, unless the
person challenging the sentence shows in the petition and
satisfies the court that cause exists for his being allowed to
pursue the objection after the conviction and sentence has
otherwise become final.6

The 1975 statute, like the 1973 statute, uses the term waiver
to refer to a rule of procedural default. Under the statute, a jury
composition claim is barred, even in a death sentence case, if
the habeas petitioner committed the procedural default of failing
to raise the issue at his trial, irrespective of whether he had
knowingly or intentionally decided to relinquish his rights. 68
This is subject to the statutory exception for cases where the
petitioner is able to satisfy the court that there is cause for his
being allowed to pursue the objection after the conviction and
66. See supra notes 60 and 65 and accompanying text.
67. 1975 Ga. Laws 1143, § 1 (originally codified at GA. CODE § 50-127(1)
(1975), now codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(b) (West, Westlaw through
2014)).
68. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Francis, 308 S.E.2d 806 (Ga. 1983); Smith v.
Zant, 301 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. 1983); Zant v. Gaddis, 279 S.E.2d 219 (Ga. 1981);
Patterson v. Balkcom, 266 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. 1980); Pulliam v. Balkcom, 263
S.E.2d 123 (Ga. 1980).
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sentence have become final. 69 Adhering to the federal approach
as to the effect of a procedural default on the subsequent
invocation of a federal claim in a federal habeas proceeding, the
Georgia Supreme Court has held that in order to satisfy the
cause exception to the 1975 statute's default rule, the petitioner
must show both cause for the noncompliance with the rule and
actual prejudice resulting from the violation of his constitutional
rights. The 1975 statute itself says nothing of prejudice.
Like procedural defaults under the 1973 statute, a default
under the 1975 statute may effect a double whammy on a
habeas petitioner. This is because a jury composition claim
barred in a Georgia habeas proceeding under the 1975 statute
will also be procedurally barred in federal court, even in death
sentence cases, if the convicted person then files a federal
habeas petition but fails to show cause and prejudice for the
default.n
2. Abolition ofAppeals ofRight From Denials of
PostconvictionHabeas Relief
In addition to restricting postconviction attacks on the
composition of a grand or petit jury, the 1975 Act also abolished
the right of persons denied postconviction relief to take a direct
appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court from the denial.
Traditionally, the final orders of superior courts granting or
denying habeas relief, including postconviction relief, have
been appealable of right.72 The 1975 Act, however, provided
69. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
70. Id.

71. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Newsome, 880 F.2d 362, 375 (11th Cir. 1989)
("Lancaster must establish cause for and actual prejudice from this
procedural default in order to excuse the untimely jury claim."); Birt v.
Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 597 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Before we can hear the
merits of his jury composition challenge on collateral attack, Birt must show
cause for his failure to raise the challenge before the trial court and actual
prejudice from that failure.").
72. For the appealability of final orders of superior courts in habeas cases
from 1846 (when the newly created Georgia Supreme Court began hearing
cases) through the end of the Civil War, see Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., From
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that, with respect to orders denying postconviction habeas relief,
"no appeal shall be allowed unless a justice of the Supreme
Court of Georgia shall issue a certificate of probable cause for
such appeal." Application for the certificate of probable cause
had to be filed with the clerk of the Georgia Supreme Court
within 30 days from entry of the order of the superior court
denying relief.74 The 1975 statute left intact the traditional
power of the state to appeal as of right a postconviction habeas
order granting relief.75 It also left intact the right of habeas
petitioners charged with a crime but not yet convicted to appeal
a denial of relief.76 For persons seeking appellate review of a
Oglethorpe to the Overthrow of the Confederacy: Habeas Corpus in
Georgia, 1733-1865, 45 GA. L. REv. 1015, 1039-40 (2011), and for the

appealability of such orders from 1865 to 1965, see Donald E. Wilkes, Jr.,
The Great Writ in the Peach State: GeorgiaHabeas Corpus, 1865-1965, 22

J. S. LEG. HIST. (forthcoming 2014). The 1967 Georgia Habeas Act
specifically provided that final orders in habeas corpus proceedings under the
Act would be appealable of right. See 1967 Ga. Laws 835, 838-839 § 3
(codified at GA. CODE § 50-127(11) (1967) (repealed 1975)). See also
O.C.G.A. § 9-14-22 (West, Westlaw through 2014) (regulating appeals in
non-postconviction habeas cases).
73. 1975 Ga. Laws, § 3 (originally codified at Ga. Code § 50-127(11)(a),
now codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 9-14-52(a), (b) (West, Westlaw
through 2014)).
74. Id. Under these provisions, the habeas petitioner who seeks appellate
review of a denial of postconviction relief must not only file an application
for a certificate of probable cause to appeal within 30 days with the Georgia
Supreme Court, but also file within the same time period a notice of appeal
with the superior court. See, e.g., Roberts v. Cooper, 691 S.E.2d 875 (Ga.
2010).
75. See Reed v. Hopper, 219 S.E.2d 409, 411 (Ga. 1975) ("The 1975
Habeas Corpus Act provides .

.

. that if the trial court finds in favor of the

petitioner, no certificate of probable cause need be obtained by the
respondent as a condition precedent to appeal."); STATE POSTCONVICTION
2013, supra note 7, at 681 ("If the final order grants relief, no certificate of
probable cause need be obtained by the state in order to appeal.").
76. See, e.g., Smith v. Nichols, 512 S.E.2d 279, 281-82 (Ga. 1999)
("[S]ince appellant filed his habeas petition while in custody in lieu of bond
awaiting a probation revocation hearing, he was authorized under § 9-14-22
to appeal directly the denial of habeas relief."); Kearse v. Paulk, 448 S.E.2d
369, 370 (Ga. 1994) (considering habeas corpus relief for petitioner who was
indicted but not yet charged); Reed v. Stynchcombe, 290 S.E.2d 469, 469
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denial of a postconviction habeas corpus petition, however, the

1975 statute replaced appeal of right with a discretionary
appeal.
In Reed v. Hopper, decided the year the 1975 statute was
enacted, the habeas petitioner attacked the portions of the statute
stripping habeas petitioners of their right to appeal denials of
postconviction relief, asserting that the statute was "just a clever
piece of legislation that was promoted by the Attorney General
of the State of Georgia to deny [the petitioner] his constitutional
(Ga. 1982) (considering Reed's petition while he was "in custody in lieu of
bond pending trial").
77. See Nichols, 512 S.E.2d at 281:

[The 1975 statute] does not authorize a prisoner to appeal directly the
denial of a [postconviction] petition for habeas corpus relief . .. [The
1975 statute] requires this Court to engage in a discretionary review
process concerning an appeal from the habeas court's denial of relief
to a prisoner held under a sentence of a state court of record, thereby
making unauthorized a direct appeal from the denial of a post-trial
habeas petition.
See also Mancill v. Hall, 545 F.3d 935, 939-40 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Georgia
law does not allow for a direct appeal as of right of the denial of a habeas
petition but rather provides for a discretionary appeal procedure whereby an
unsuccessful petitioner may seek a certificate of probable cause to appeal to
the Supreme Court of Georgia."); Crosson v. Conway, 728 S.E.2d 617, 619
(Ga. 2012) ("[A]n unsuccessful post-conviction habeas petitioner who
desires to appeal must file, within 30 days of entry of the final order, both a
notice of appeal with the clerk of the habeas court and an application for
certificate of probable cause with the clerk of this Court."); Fullwood v.
Sivley, 517 S.E.2d 511, 514 (Ga. 1999) (quoting Patterson v. Earp, 363
S.E.2d 248, 248 (Ga. 1988)):
O.C.G.A. § 9-14-52(b) requires an application for certificate of
probable cause to appeal habeas corpus denials . . . [C]ompliance
with that requirement is jurisdictional . . . Although an application

for a certificate of probable cause was filed in this case, it was late.
There is no legal distinction between the failure to file any
application and the failure to file a timely application.
Rule 36, GA. SUP. CT. R., governs applications for a certificate of probable
cause filed in that Court: "A certificate of probable cause to appeal a final
judgment in a habeas case involving a criminal conviction will be issued
where there is arguable merit, provided there has been compliance with
O.C.G.A. § 9-14-52(b)."
78. Reed v. Hopper, 219 S.E.2d 409 (Ga. 1975).
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right to have his appeal heard by the full bench of the Supreme
Court of Georgia." 79 Over the strong dissents of two justices,
the Court held that the provisions of the statute abolishing
appeals of right for postconviction habeas petitioners were
constitutional, except to the extent they permitted a single
justice to grant or deny an application for a certificate of
probable cause.80 The Court held that it would effectuate the
state legislature's intent by deciding all applications for a
certificate of probable cause by the Court sitting as a body and
by a quorum of the justices.81 The Court rejected the contention
that it was a violation of equal protection to grant the state but
not the habeas petitioner a right to appeal adverse decisions of
the habeas corpus court. 82
The dissenting justices would have struck down the 1975
statute insofar as it did away with the right of habeas petitioners
to appeal denials of relief but preserved the appellate rights of
the state:
The doctrine of "selective review," created by . .. the 1975

Habeas Corpus Act, is a dangerous one and is clearly
unconstitutional . . . [T]o classify the prisoner and the

warden in a different category for appeal is not a reasonable
classification, amounts to invidious discrimination, and is a
denial of equal protection of the law.83
The certificate of probable cause requirement is now regarded
as jurisdictional in nature.84 Failure to obtain the certificate
79. See PostconvictionHabeas Corpus Relief in Georgia, supra note 4, at

261 n.88 (1978) (quoting Brief for Appellant, Reed v. Hopper, 219 S.E.2d
409 (Ga. 1975)).

80. Hopper, 219 S.E.2d at 410-11.
81. Id. at 411. The codified successor of the 1975 statute, as amended,
now provides that it is "the Supreme Court [which] will either grant or deny
the application [for a certificate of probable cause]." O.C.G.A. § 9-14-52(b)
(West, Westlaw through 2014).
82. Id. at 411-12.

83. Id. at 412-413 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
84. See, e.g., Wade v. Battle, 379 F.3d 1254, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004)
("[T]he Georgia Supreme Court has unequivocally held that compliance with
O.C.G.A. § 9-14-52(b) is jurisdictional."); Crosson v. Conway, 728 S.E.2d
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means the appeal will be dismissed, even if a timely notice of
appeal was filed in the superior court.85 A decision of the
Georgia Supreme Court to deny a certificate of probable cause
is unreviewable (except in those extremely rare cases where the
United States Supreme Court reverses a decision denying the
certificate of probable cause). 86
As a consequence of the abolition of appeals of right for
postconviction habeas petitioners there has been a noticeable
decrease in the number of Georgia Supreme Court cases
reviewing denials of postconviction habeas relief.
An
examination of volumes 231 through 233 of the Georgia
Reports shows that, in 1974, the last full year before enactment
of the 1975 statute, and at a time of fewer convictions and fewer
prison inmates than now, there were (excluding cases handled
summarily and without an opinion) 38 Georgia Supreme Court
decisions involving an appeal from a denial of postconviction
habeas relief. In 2010, in contrast, the Georgia Supreme Court
heard 25 such appeals but denied a certificate of probable cause
in 235 cases, while the respective figures for 2011 are 13 and
264.87
C. 1982 Statute
The third statute cutting back on the protections of the
Georgia Habeas Corpus Act of 1967 was enacted in 1982. The
1982 statute limited postconviction habeas relief in two major
617, 619 (Ga. 2012) ("[T]here is no federal or state constitutional right to
appeal from an adverse order in a habeas corpus proceeding in the absence of
compliance with appellate jurisdictional requirements, nor is there any
constitutional right to counsel in a habeas proceeding or on application to
appeal a ruling therein."); Fullwood v. Sivley, 517 S.E.2d 511, 515 (Ga.
1999) (explaining that the jurisdictional requirement of O.C.G.A. § 9-1452(b) cannot be ignored in a habeas petition).
85. Crosson, 728 S.E.2d at 619; Fullwood, 517 S.E.2d at 515; Patterson v.
Earp, 363 S.E.2d 248, 249 (Ga. 1988).
86. See, e.g., Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3261 (2010).
87. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF GA., ANNUAL REPORT: GEORGIA COURTS FY
2012, available at http://www.georgiacourts.gov/files/Annual%/o20Reports/
fyl2_annual%20reportupdated.pdf
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respects.88 First, it abolished one of the three classes of grounds
for postconviction habeas relief, thereby narrowing the
substantive scope of the writ. Second, it abrogated in its
entirety the high waiver standard of federal constitutional rights
established by the 1967 Habeas Act and replaced it with a cause
and prejudice test, under which a failure to raise a constitutional
claim results in waiver of the claim absent a showing of cause
for and prejudice from the constitutional violation. Under the
cause and prejudice standard, it is much more likely that a
habeas petition will be dismissed for procedural reasons without
any inquiry into the merits of the claims raised in the habeas
petition.
1. Abolition of NonconstitutionalGroundsfor Relief
Prior to 1967, postconviction habeas corpus relief from a
conviction or a sentence was narrowly available in Georgia.89
Relief was limited to claims of jurisdictional error, and, except
with regard to the right to counsel, a violation of a constitutional
right was not deemed an error of jurisdictional proportions. The
Georgia Habeas Corpus Act of 1967 eliminated the pre-1967
requirement that postconviction habeas relief could be granted
only on grounds involving lack of jurisdiction. The Act
"established broad new grounds for obtaining the writ in
postconviction cases."90
It authorized three new, broad
categories of cognizable claims: (1) violations of federal
constitutional rights; (2) violations of Georgia constitutional
rights; and (3) violations of rights secured by the laws of
Georgia.91 Thus, in addition to federal and state constitutional
88. The 1982 statute made several additional changes in the 1967 Habeas
Act which do not require discussion here.
89. See generally PostconvictionHabeas Corpus Relief in Georgia,supra

note 4, at 249-52 (highlighting the grounds of habeas relief prior to 1967); A
New Role for an Ancient Writ, Part II supra note 4, at 39; A New Role for an
Ancient Writ, Part I supra note 4, at 336-52.
90. A New Role for an Ancient Writ, Part II supra note 4, at 55.

91. 1967 Ga. Laws 835, 836 § 3 (codified at GA. CODE § 50-127(1)
(1967), and O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014)) (repealed
1982) (granting habeas relief to an imprisoned person "if in the proceedings
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rights, rights secured by Georgia nonconstitutional law were
among the rights that could be vindicated in Georgia
postconviction habeas proceedings. The Georgia Supreme
Court specifically so held in 1981 in McDuffie v. Jones:92
[N]ot only can a substantial denial of a federal or state
constitutional right be raised on habeas corpus, but a
substantial denial of rights under the laws of this state can
also be raised pursuant to our habeas corpus act. 93
McDuffie v. Jones appears to be the only Georgia Supreme
Court case between 1967 and 1982 in which the Court openly
acknowledged that it was dealing with a habeas claim based on
a violation of a nonconstitutional right secured by "the laws of
Georgia." The petitioner claimed that at his trial he had been
denied his statutory right to make a closing argument. The
Court found that this right had indeed been violated but that the
violation was harmless error, 94 and denied relief. In a
concurring opinion, one justice asserted that the provision in the
resulting in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under
the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Georgia or the laws of
the State of Georgia"). This language was borrowed from the Illinois PostConviction Hearing Act of 1949; see 9 F.R.D. 347, 365 (1950). Since 1867
federal habeas relief for state prisoners has been available to redress not only
federal constitutional violations, but also violations of "the laws ... of the
United States," 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (2006); and since its
enactment in 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. V 2011), the postconviction
remedy for federal prisoners equivalent to habeas corpus, has authorized
relief not only from federal constitutional violations, but also from
convictions or sentences "imposed in violation of the ... laws of the United
States." In authorizing relief based on violations of nonconstitutional law,
therefore, the 1967 Georgia Habeas Corpus Act followed the federal
example.
92. McDuffie v. Jones, 283 S.E.2d 601, 607 (Ga. 1981), overruled on
other grounds by West v. Walters, 533 S.E.2d 88 (2000).
93. Id at 603.
94. Id at 604-05. The Court, in dicta, also addressed the question of
whether and to what extent a claim of denial of rights under the laws of
Georgia is barred by virtue of a failure to properly raise the claim at trial,
saying: "The waiver standard as to rights under the laws of this state is
certainly no more stringent than the statutory standard for constitutional
rights and in many instances may be less stringent." Id at 603.
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1967 Habeas Act making denials of Georgia nonconstitutional
rights grounds for relief "was a serious defect" in the statute
requiring legislative alteration. 95 Neither the per curiam opinion
for the majority nor the concurring opinion seemed to
comprehend that in permitting claims arising under the laws of
Georgia the 1967 Habeas Act did not have to be construed so as
to make every violation of a state statutory right - such as the
right to make the closing argument - cognizable in habeas.
Violations of nonconstitutional federal law are cognizable in
federal habeas proceedings filed by state convicts under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 and in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings filed by
federal convicts, but the federal courts have held that relief is
available not for every violation of nonconstitutional federal
law, but only for those violations amounting to a fundamental
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice. 96 If the Georgia Supreme Court had understood this, it
95. Id. at 607 (Jordan, C.J., concurring):
The majority opinion points up a serious defect
Corpus statute. An applicant for the Writ of Habeas
be required to allege violation of the Federal
Constitution. A simple violation of a state statute

in our Habeas
Corpus should
and or State
should not be

relitigated in a habeas proceeding . . . The General Assembly should

take steps to amend our Habeas Corpus statute so that it allows relief
only for a substantial denial of a Federal or State constitutional right.
The concurring justice seems to have been unaware of the fact that
habeas corpus or other postconviction remedies under which, in
addition to federal and state constitutional violations, violations of
the laws of the state constitute a ground for relief are common
among the states.
See, e.g., UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT (1966), § 1(a)(1)
("the conviction was obtained or the sentence imposed in violation of .. . the
... laws of this State"); Rule 3.850(a)(1), FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. ("judgment
was entered or sentence was imposed in violation of the . . . laws of the ...

State of Florida").
96. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 340 (1994) (§ 2254); see Davis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) ("We suggested that the appropriate
inquiry was whether the claimed error of law was 'a fundamental defect
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' and whether
'(i)t ... present(s) exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy
afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent."') (quoting Hill v. United
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would have realized that the 1967 Act did not necessarily
require vindication of all nonconstitutional habeas claims; it
could have rejected the claim before it on the ground it did not
involve fundamental error; and there would have been no
occasion for deeming the 1967 Act defective.
One year after McDuffie v. Jones, and apparently in an
endeavor to implement the concurring opinion in that decision
criticizing the portion of the 1967 Georgia Habeas Act making
violations of nonconstitutional Georgia rights cognizable in
habeas corpus, 97 the Georgia legislature enacted the 1982 statute
which, among other things, deleted the provision of the 1967
Habeas Act providing that violations of the laws of Georgia
could be raised in habeas corpus.
"The effect of the [1982
statute] was to limit the relief available by habeas corpus to
errors or deficiencies which constitute 'a substantial denial of . .
. rights under the Constitution of the United States or of this
state."' 99 Claims of denials of Georgia nonconstitutional rights
are therefore no longer cognizable in Georgia postconviction
habeas proceedings.100 The only Georgia rights cognizable in a
Georgia habeas proceeding are state constitutional rights.
2. Expansion of ProceduralDefault Groundsfor Denying
Habeas Relief
The concurring opinion in the 1981 McDuffie v. Jones
decision recommended not only abolition of violations of
States, 368 U.S. 424, 429 (1962)).
97. See Valenzuela v. Newsome, 325 S.E.2d 370, 373 (Ga. 1985) ("It is
interesting (and gratifying) that the General Assembly implemented . . .
Chief Justice Jordan's suggestions in amending O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42. Now,
under the 1982 amendment, habeas corpus is available to review
constitutional deprivations only . . .") (citations omitted).
98. Act of 1982, 1982 Ga. Laws 786, sec. 1, § 9-14-42; sec. 2, § 3 (1982)
(current version at O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42 (West, Westlaw through 2014)).
99. Black v. Hardin, 336 S.E.2d 754, 754 (Ga. 1985) (citations omitted).
100. See id; see also Valenzuela, 325 S.E.2d at 373-374; Parker v.

Abernathy, 324 S.E.2d 191, 191-192 (Ga. 1985); Britt v. Smith, 556 S.E.2d
435, 437 (Ga. 2001) ("[T]he controlling principle [is] that 'habeas corpus is
available to review constitutional deprivations only."') (citation omitted).

No. 2]

The Great Writ Hit

449

nonconstitutional Georgia laws as grounds for relief, but, in
addition, replacing the high waiver of rights standard under the
1967 Habeas Act with the waiver standard being used in the
federal courts, i.e., the cause and prejudice test. 01 The next
year the Georgia legislature followed through on this
recommendation. 102
Because the provisions of the 1982 statute abrogating the
high waiver standard and replacing it with the cause and
prejudice standard were inspired by various United States
Supreme Court decisions which restrictively construed the
federal habeas postconviction remedy between 1974 and 1982,
it will be helpful, before examining those procedural default
statutory provisions, to explore the four most important of those
decisions. In all four decisions the Court denied relief because
the habeas petitioner committed a procedural default in the state
court system before or during his criminal trial.103 These
decisions, Justice Harry Blackmun said, are part of the Court's
"crusade to erect petty procedural barriers in the path of any
state prisoner seeking review of his federal constitutional
claims."104 These judicially manufactured rules of pleading and
procedure have created a "Byzantine morass of arbitrary,
unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of
federal rights."10 5
The first of these federal habeas decisions, Francis v.
Henderson,106 handed down in 1976, involved a grand jury
discrimination claim which was procedurally defaulted in the
state court system because, in violation of a state rule of
101. McDuffie v. Jones, 283 S.E.2d 601, 607 (Jordan, C.J., concurring)
("The statute should also be amended to eliminate the waiver requirements
of the statute, which as written exceed the waiver requirements of present
federal constitutional law.").
102. See supra note 90.

103. For a more comprehensive analysis of these decisions, see FEDERAL
POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 674-78.

104. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758-59 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
105. Id at 759.

106. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
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procedure, it had not been raised prior to trial. o0 The United
States Supreme Court held that, where the federal claim has
been forfeited in the state courts because it was not raised in
accordance with state procedural requirements, the claim is
barred in a federal habeas proceeding unless there is both cause
for and actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional
violation.10 8
In the following year the Court extended Francis v.

Henderson when it decided Wainwright v. Sykes,109 where the
federal habeas claim was that an illegal confession had been
admitted at the petitioner's trial, although in violation of a state
procedural rule the claim had not been raised prior to the trial.' 10
Partially overruling Fay v. Noia,111 the Court held that the rule
of Francis v. Henderson applied and that, absent cause and
actual prejudice, the confession claim was barred in federal
habeas:
[W]e deal only with contentions of federal law which were
not resolved on the merits in the state proceeding due to [the
habeas petitioner's] failure to raise them there as required by

the state procedure. We leave open for resolution in future
decisions the precise definite of the "cause"-and-"prejudice"
standard, and note here only that it is narrower than the
standard set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noia, which would make

federal habeas review generally available to state convicts
absent a knowing and deliberate waiver of the federal
constitutional contention. It is the sweeping language of Fay
v. Noia, going far beyond the facts of the case eliciting it,
which we today reject."12
107. Id. at 536.

108. Id. at 542.
109. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
110. Id. at 72.
111. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
112. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87-88 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
The Court also directed that the federal habeas petition be dismissed because
there was neither cause nor actual prejudice shown. Id. at 91. Cause was
lacking because no explanation had been advanced for failing to raise the
confession claim at trial, and actual prejudice was absent because the other
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The other two decisions were handed down on the same day,
less than two weeks before enactment of the 1982 statute. In
Engle v. Isaac,113 the Court held: (1) "the futility of presenting
an objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause for
a failure to object at trial;"114 and (2) the cause and prejudice
test applies to all procedurally defaulted claims,
even those
that "affect the truthfinding function of the trial."1 16 In United
States v. Frady,'1 7 the person seeking postconviction relief
raised the due process claim that he had been convicted by a
jury which had been erroneously instructed on the meaning of
malice, a claim which was procedurally defaulted because it had
not been raised at trial."
The Court held: (1) "the proper
standard for review of Frady's [postconviction] motion is the
'cause and actual prejudice' standard enunciated in Davis v.
United States, and later confirmed and extended in Francis v.
Henderson and Wainwright v. Sykes;" 119 (2) "[u]nder this
standard, to obtain collateral relief based on trial errors to which
no contemporaneous objection was made, a convicted defendant
must show both . . . 'cause' excusing his . . . procedural default,
and . . . 'actual prejudice' resulting from the errors of which he

complains;" 120 (3) Frady, who claimed actual prejudice, "must
shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his
trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to
evidence admitted at the habeas petitioner's trial was "substantial to a degree
that [it] negate[d] any possibility of actual prejudice." Id
113. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
114. Id. at 130.
115. Id at 129 ("We reaffirm, therefore, that any prisoner bringing a
constitutional claim to the federal courthouse after a state procedural default
must demonstrate cause and actual prejudice before obtaining relief.").
116. Id. at 129.
117. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (involving a federal
postconviction case rather than a state prisoner and brought not under the
federal habeas statute but under 28 U.S.C. §2255, which provides a remedy
which is equivalent to the federal habeas remedy and is governed by habeas
corpus principles.)
118. Id. at 152.

119. Id. at 167 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 167-68.
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his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial
with error of constitutional dimensions;" 12 1 and (4) "the strong
uncontradicted evidence of malice in the record, coupled with
Frady's utter failure to come forward with a colorable claim that
he acted without malice, disposes of his contention that he
suffered such actual prejudice that reversal of his conviction 19
years later could be justified." 122
The procedural default portions of the 1982 statute show the
influence of these four decisions on Georgia lawmakers. These
decisions have also influenced Georgia Supreme Court
interpretations of the 1982 statute, as the case law demonstrates.
Murray v. Carrierl23 and Smith v. Murray,124 two 1986
United States Supreme Court decisions further enlarging the
effect of state procedural defaults on federal habeas corpus
proceedings, were handed down four years after the 1982
statute, and therefore did not contribute to enactment of the
statute. However, these two decisions deserve mention because,
like the four United States Supreme Court decisions just
discussed, they too, as the case law indicates, have influenced
Georgia Supreme Court decisions interpreting the procedural
default provisions of the 1982 statute.
In Murray v. Carrier,the Court held: (1) "the mere fact that
counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim,
or failed to raise the claim despite reco nizing it, does not
constitute cause for a procedural default"1 25 and therefore "the
question of cause for a procedural default does not turn on
whether counsel erred or on the kind of error counsel may have
made;" 126 (2) "the existence of cause for a procedural default
must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some
objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's
121. Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 172.
123. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
124. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
125. Carrier,477 U.S. at 486.

126. Id. at 488.
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efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule;" 127 (3) "a
showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not
reasonably available to counsel, or that 'some interference by
officials[]' made compliance impracticable, would constitute
cause under this standard;" 128 (4) "[i]neffective assistance of
counsel . . . is cause for a procedural default;" 1 2 9 (5) "generally.
.

.

a claim of ineffective assistance [must] be presented to the

state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to
establish cause for a procedural default;" 13 0 (6) "the cause and
prejudice test applies to procedural defaults on appeal" as well
as those at trial;131 and (7) "in an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction
of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may
grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the
procedural default." 132
In Smith v. Murray, decided the same day, the Court held: (1)
"although federal courts at all times retain the power to look
beyond state procedural forfeitures, the exercise of that power
ordinarily is inappropriate unless the defendant succeeds in
showing both 'cause' for noncompliance with the state rule and
'actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional
violation;"' 33 (2) "a deliberate, tactical decision not to pursue a
particular claim is the very antithesis of the kind of
circumstance that would warrant excusing a defendant's failure
to adhere to a State's legitimate rules for the fair and orderly
disposition of its criminal cases;" 134 (3) "a federal habeas court
must evaluate appellate defaults under the same standards that
apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim at trial;" 135 and
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
130. Id. at 489.
131. Carrier,477 U.S. at 489.
132. Id. at 496.
133. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).
134. Id. at 534.
135. Id. at 533.
127.
128.
129.
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(4) "the concept of 'actual,' as distinct from 'legal,' innocence
does not translate easily into the context of an alleged error at
the sentencing phase of a trial on a capital offense." 136
With this background - truly a "bleak story"137 - illed in, it
is now appropriate to take a close look at the 1982 statute's
default provisions and the resultant case law. That statute added
the following italicized provisions to the Georgia Habeas
Corpus Act of 1967:
The court shall review the trial record and transcript of
proceedings and consider whether the petitioner made
timely motion or objection or otherwise complied with
Georgia procedural rules at trial and on appeal and
whether, in the event the petitioner had new counsel
subsequent to trial, the petitioner raised any claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on appeal; and absent
a showing of cause for noncompliance with such
requirement, and of actualprejudice, habeas corpus relief
shall not be granted. In all cases habeas corpus relief shall
be granted to avoid a miscarriage of justice. If the court

finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate

order with respect to the judgment or sentence challenged in
the proceeding and such supplementary orders as to
rearraignment, retrial, custody, or discharge as may be
d138
necessary and proper.
Nowadays, as a result of the 1982 statute, "[o]ne of the basic
tenets of Georgia's statutory habeas corpus scheme is the
'procedural default' rule" established by the statute.139 The
Georgia Supreme Court has described the procedural default
regime instituted by the 1982 statute as follows:
[A] failure to make timely objection to any alleged error or
136. Id. at 537.
137. Larry W. Yackle, The Misadventures of State Postconviction
Remedies, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 359, 379 (1987-88).
138. Act of 1982, 1982 Ga. Laws 786, sec. 1, § 9-14-42; sec. 2, § 3 (1982)
(emphasis in original) (current version at O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42 (West,
Westlaw through 2014)).
139. Chatman v. Mancill, 604 S.E.2d 154, 155 (Ga. 2004) (citation
omitted).
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deficiency or to pursue the same on appeal ordinarily will
preclude review by writ of habeas corpus. However, an
otherwise valid procedural bar will not preclude a habeas
corpus court from considering alleged constitutional errors
or deficiencies if there shall be a showing of adequate cause
for failure to object or pursue on appeal and a showing of
actual prejudice to the accused. Even absent such a showing
of cause and prejudice, the relief of the writ will remain
available to avoid a miscarriage of justice where there has
been a substantial denial of constitutional rights.140
The 1982 statute closely follows the federal approach with
respect to procedural default of postconviction habeas claims,
and the Georgia court decisions applying the statute are
informed by federal decisions.141 "A procedural bar to asserting
a claim on habeas corpus arises if the defendant failed to timely
object to any alleged error or deficiency at trial or on appeal." 142
If, therefore, even in death sentence cases, the habeas claim was
not properly raised at trial, or (even if it was properly raised at
trial) if it was not also properly raised on the direct appeal, the
claim is barred, absent a showing of either cause and actual
prejudice or of a miscarriage of justice.143 In accordance with
140. Black v. Hardin, 336 S.E.2d 754, 755 (Ga. 1985) (emphasis added).
141. See, e.g., Turpin v. Todd, 493 S.E.2d 900, 905 (Ga. 1997) ("Because
the procedural default standards of [the 1982 statute] are modeled after the
federal standards, we look to federal decisions for guidance on this issue.").
142. Id.

143. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Hart, 755 S.E.2d 192, 195 (Ga. 2014) (holding
that a habeas claim was barred by procedural default); Humphrey v. Riley,
731 S.E.2d 740, 750 (Ga. 2012) (barring habeas claims on basis of
procedural default); Griffin v. Terry, 729 S.E.2d 334, 337 (Ga. 2012)
(barring petitioner's right to be present at trial by procedural default);
Humphrey v. Lewis, 728 S.E.2d 603, 617 (Ga. 2012); Perkins v. Hall, 708
S.E.2d 335, 348 (Ga. 2011) (barring incompetency claim and holding that
miscarriage of justice exception did not apply); Hall v. Wheeling, 646 S.E.2d
236, 238 (Ga. 2007); Walker v. Johnson, 646 S.E.2d 44, 45 (Ga. 2007);
Wright v. Hall, 638 S.E.2d 270, 272 (Ga. 2006) (upholding lower court
decision to bar all habeas claims on the basis of procedural waiver); Upton v.
Jones, 635 S.E.2d 112, 114 (Ga. 2006) (barring habeas for jurisdictional
reasons); Schofield v. Meders, 632 S.E.2d 369, 376 (Ga. 2006); Waldrip v.
Head, 620 S.E.2d 829, 831-32 (Ga. 2005) (prosecutorial misconduct claims
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the federal approach, the burden of proving that there is cause
and prejudice or that there has been a miscarriage of justice is
on the habeas petitioner.144
Proving cause is difficult. "To show cause, [the petitioner]
must demonstrate that 'some objective factor external to the
defense impeded counsel's efforts' to raise the claim that has
been procedurally defaulted." 145 A showing of "interference by
government officials 'that ma[de] compliance with the . . .
procedural rule impracticable"', or "a showing that the factual
or legal basis for the claim was not reasonably available to
counsel," will constitute cause.146
A showing that the
barred by procedural default); Chatman v. Mancill, 604 S.E.2d 154, 155 (Ga.
2004); Davis v. Turpin, 539 S.E.2d 129, 134 (Ga. 2000); Head v. Taylor, 538
S.E.2d 416, 418-19 (Ga. 2000); Turpin v. Lipham, 510 S.E.2d 32, 35-36 (Ga.
1998); Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 462 (Ga. 1998); Turpin v. Todd,
493 S.E.2d 900, 904 (Ga. 1997); Black v. Hardin, 336 S.E.2d 754, 755 (Ga.
1985); Valenzuela v. Newsome, 325 S.E.2d 370, 373-73 (Ga. 1985).
However, a failure to raise on direct appeal a claim that trial counsel was
ineffective is not deemed a procedural default of the ineffectiveness claim if
trial counsel represented the petitioner on the direct appeal. See, e.g., Gibson
v. Head, 646 S.E.2d 257, 260 (Ga. 2007) ("The [ineffective assistance of
counsel] claim would not be barred by res judicata, however, if it were based
on facts that were not reasonably available at the time of the first habeas
proceeding."); Head v. Taylor, 538 S.E.2d 416, 419 (Ga. 2000); Turpin v.
Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 462 (Ga. 1998); White v. Kelso, 401 S.E.2d 733,
734 (Ga. 1991). Additionally, a claim that since the conviction there has
been a retroactive case law change in substantive law affecting the
criminality of the habeas petitioner's conduct may be raised in a Georgia
habeas proceeding regardless of whether the claim was raised at trial or on
appeal, and without regard to cause and prejudice. See, e.g., Wilkerson v.
Hart, 755 S.E.2d 192 (Ga. 2014); Sellars v. Evans, 745 S.E.2d 643 (Ga.
2013); Luke v. Battle, 565 S.E.2d 816 (Ga. 2002).
144. See, e.g., Walker v. Penn, 523 S.E.2d 325, 326, 327 (Ga. 1999)
(miscarriage of justice); Turpin v. Todd, 493 S.E.2d 900, 905, 907 (Ga.
1997) (cause and prejudice).
145. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d at 462 (quoting Todd, 493 S.E.2d at 905).
146. Todd, 493 S.E.2d at 905 (Ga. 1997) (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at
488). See also McMichen v. Hall, 684 S.E.2d 641, 659 (Ga. 2009):
[Habeas petitioner]'s claim that the State knowingly presented false
testimony [through witness Williams] is, at least as an initial matter,
barred by procedural default because it was not raised on direct
appeal and, therefore, can be considered on its merits only if
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procedural default resulted from constitutionally ineffective
147
assistance of counsel will also constitute cause.
Proving prejudice is difficult. "[T]o overcome the procedural
bar, [the petitioner] must not only demonstrate cause for failing
to raise the claim . . . but also actual prejudice." 14 8 "To show
prejudice, he must demonstrate actual prejudice that 'worked to
his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting
his entire trial
149
with error of constitutional dimensions."'
[petitioner] can satisfy the cause and prejudice test. Williams's pretrial and trial testimony denying the existence of a deal, the district
attorney's representation to the trial court that no deal existed, and
the recentness of the recantation by Williams demonstrate cause
sufficient to excuse counsel's failure to raise this claim at trial and on
direct appeal.
See also Walker v. Johnson, 646 S.E.2d 44, 45 (Ga. 2007). The court found
the habeas petitioner's due process claim arose out of "the State's failure [at
the petitioner's criminal trial] to produce to the defense audiotapes
containing exculpatory witness statements and Johnson's own statement to
police during investigation of the crimes" and was not
[P]rocedurally defaulted because Johnson has shown cause . . . to

excuse the default[;] [n]either Johnson nor his counsel was aware of
the tapes as a result of the State's failure to provide them in
discovery, and the tapes were obtained only after the denial of
Johnson's direct appeal when Johnson's father filed an Open
Records Request.
Id. (citation omitted).
147. Todd, 493 S.E.2d at 905-06. In holding that ineffective assistance of
counsel may constitute cause, the Court acknowledged that it was relying on
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986). Id. at 906. The Georgia Supreme
Court explained: "In seeking habeas relief, a convicted defendant may assert
a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claim, or he may assert that counsel's
ineffectiveness constitutes cause to overcome his procedural default, or he
may raise ineffectiveness in both contexts." Id. at 908 n.43.
148. Todd, 493 S.E.2d at 907.
149. Mobley, 502 S.E. at 462 (citing Todd, 493 S.E.2d at 907, citing
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)). See also Humphrey v.
Lewis, 728 S.E.2d 603, 607 (Ga. 2012) (citations omitted):
The warden correctly points out that the habeas court failed to
address the fact that Lewis' [habeas claim] was procedurally
defaulted, at least as an initial matter, because he did not raise it at
trial or on direct appeal. However, a petitioner may overcome
procedural default by satisfying the cause and prejudice test. We
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"The only exception to the cause and prejudice test is the
granting of habeas corpus relief to avoid a 'miscarriage of
justice'. . ."o50 That is, "even if a petitioner fails to show cause
need not decide whether Lewis can show cause to excuse the
procedural default to his .

.

. claim, because we are satisfied that

Lewis has failed to establish the requisite prejudice. Because
[Lewis'] underlying claim is a constitutional claim involving the
denial of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the underlying claim and the prejudice analysis necessary to satisfy
the cause-and-prejudice test are coextensive . . . . Lewis cannot
prevail on the merits of his underlying . . . claim, and therefore, his

claim remains procedurally defaulted.
See also McMichen, 684 S.E.2d at 649-650, finding cause for the procedural
default was shown:
[T]he fate of the procedural bar to this claim hinges on whether
McMichen can show prejudice. This Court has held that, because
the prejudice that must be shown to overcome default is a prejudice
of constitutional proportions and because a habeas petitioner is
entitled to relief only for constitutional violations, the prejudice
prong of the cause and prejudice test is 'co-extensive' with the merits
of a claim of a constitutional violation. Both to show prejudice and
to succeed on the merits, McMichen would have to show that
Williams's recent allegation that he and the district attorney lied at
the time of trial is true and that there is a 'reasonable likelihood that
the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.'
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103
(1976)). See also Walker v. Johnson, 646 S.E.2d 44, 45 (Ga. 2007) (finding
cause and prejudice for habeas petitioner's due process claim, which was not
raised at trial or on appeal, arising out of the state's failure at the petitioner's
criminal trial "to produce to the defense audiotapes containing exculpatory

witness statements and Johnson's own statement to police during
investigation of the crimes"; "[a]s for the required showing of prejudice,
Johnson's underlying claim is a constitutional claim involving the denial of
his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights"); Upton v. Jones, 635 S.E.2d
112, 115 (Ga. 2006) ('A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
requires a showing both that counsel's performance was deficient and that
the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the defendant's appeal.' A habeas
petitioner who meets the prejudice prong of this test establishes thereby the
prejudice which is required to overcome the procedural bar of O.C.G.A. § 914-48(d).") (citations omitted) (quoting Crawford v. Thompson, 603 S.E.2d
259, 261 (Ga. 2004); Waldrip v. Head, 620 S.E.2d 829, 832 (Ga. 2005)
("The prejudice sufficient to satisfy the cause and prejudice test is a
prejudice of constitutional dimensions.").
150. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d at 462 (citing Valenzuela v. Newsome, 325
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[and prejudice] for a procedural default, courts retain the power
to grant relief under the writ if the procedural bar would work a
miscarriage of justice."1 5 1 Proving a miscarriage of justice is
extraordinarily difficult. "The miscarriage of justice exception
is an extremely high standard and is very narrowly applied." 15 2
There is a miscarriage of justice when the habeas petitioner is
factually innocent of the crime for which he has been
convicted.153

In its first major decision construing the 1982 statute, the
Georgia Supreme Court stated:
[T]he term [miscarriage of justice] is by no means to be
deemed synonymous with procedural irregularity, or even
with reversible error. To the contrary, it demands a much
greater substance, approaching perhaps the imprisonment of
one who, not only is not guilty of the specific offense for
which he is convicted, but, further, is not even culpable in
the circumstances under inquiry. (A plain example is a case
of mistaken identity.)154
Where a Georgia habeas claim is procedurally barred under
the 1982 statute, it may be equally barred for purposes of
S.E.2d 370 (1985)).
151. Todd, 493 S.E.2d at 905 n.13.
152. Walker v. Penn, 523 S.E.2d 325, 327 (Ga. 1999).

See also Mobley,

502 S.E. at 462 (noting the miscarriage of justice standard "is an extremely
high standard").
153. See Head v. Stripling, 590 S.E.2d 122, 128 (Ga. 2003) ('Miscarriage

of justice' is primarily associated with its core purpose, i.e., to free the
innocent who are wrongly convicted, and should rarely be used to overcome
otherwise-valid procedural bars.").
154. Valenzuela v. Newsome, 325 S.E.2d 370, 374 (Ga. 1985) (emphasis
in original); accord Walker v. Penn, 523 S.E.2d at 327; Turner v. Lipham,
510 S.E.2d 32, 35 (Ga. 1998); Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 462 n.15; Gavin v.
Vasquez, 407 S.E.2d 756, 757 (Ga. 1991). However, a claim that a person
sentenced to death is mentally retarded (and hence ineligible for the death
penalty) which was not raised at trial or on direct appeal may be presented
and considered in a habeas proceeding "under the 'miscarriage of justice'
exception to the rule of procedural default . . ." Schofield v. Holsey, 642
S.E.2d 56, 63 (Ga. 2007); accord Stripling, 590 S.E.2d at 128 (Ga. 2003);

Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 620 (Ga. 2003); Turpin v. Hill, 498 S.E.2d 52,
53 (Ga. 1998).
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federal habeas corpus in the event the unsuccessful Georgia
habeas petitioner thereafter files a federal habeas petition. If the
Georgia courts have found the claim to be procedurally barred
under the 1982 statute, or if the Georgia courts have not decided
the issue but the federal court makes it own determination that,
under the 1982 statute, the claim is barred in the Georgia courts,
then the claim is also barred in a federal habeas proceeding,
even in death sentence cases, unless the federal court makes its
own finding of cause and prejudice or of actual innocence.
However, if the Georgia courts decline to apply the 1982
statute's procedural default rule and instead decide the claim on
the merits, then the claim is not barred for purposes of federal

habeas corpus.156
The superimposition of federal habeas corpus procedural
default principles on Georgia state habeas proceedings was, for
at least four reasons, misguided. 1
In the first place, these
procedural rules run counter to the fundamental principles of
modern civil procedure: they involve technicalities; they deflect
from fact-finding; they prevent on procedural grounds a court
from deciding the merits of the claim raised; and they often
have the effect of slamming shut the courthouse door on a party
155. See, e.g., Crowe v. Hall, 490 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2007); Lynd v.
Terry, 470 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006); Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249,
1250 (11th Cir. 2006) ("[W]hen a death-sentenced prisoner makes a
successful showing of actual innocence, procedural default alone cannot bar
consideration of his constitutional claims of an unfair trial."); Crawford v.
Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1323 (11th Cir. 2002); Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232,
1257 (11th Cir. 2002); Alderman v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir.
1994); Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1455 (11th Cir. 1993).
156. Hardin v. Black, 845 F.2d 953, 958 (11th Cir. 1988).
157. Numerous other states have also extended the federal habeas default
rules to their postconviction remedies, with the result that "[i]n an
extraordinary number of cases, state courts decline to consider federal claims
because of procedural default," Yackle, supra note 137, at 377, and that
"wholesale procedural dismissals in . . . state . . . court have now become

commonplace." Id. at 381. See also Tabak & Lane, supra note 9, at 42
(noting federal habeas procedural default rules have "encouraged several
states to develop new preclusion rules that bar state court consideration of
[postconviction] claims not presented in earlier proceedings").
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with a valid, provable claim for relief. Inappropriate in ordinary
civil actions, these types of procedural rules are even more
inappropriate in habeas proceedings, where questions of
constitutional rights and personal liberty are at stake. 158
Second, these procedural default rules punish criminal
defendants for the mistakes of their attorneys. The procedural
default is almost always committed by the defendant's lawyer
(who usually is not a lawyer chosen and hired by the defendant
but a public defender provided by the government), and to
punish the defendant by disregarding his claim because his
lawyer mistakenly failed to properly raise the claim is unjust. 159
Third, habeas procedural default rules frequently result "in
unnecessarily time-consuming and complex review of purely
procedural issues" when "[i]t would often be far quicker and far
fairer . . . simply to decide the constitutional issues being

presented." 160
Fourth, habeas procedural default rules
inevitably produce arbitrary and capricious results. 16 1
158. See ABA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW,
STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES § 6.1(d) (1968):

Because of the special importance of rights subject to vindication in
post-conviction proceedings, courts should be reluctant to deny relief
to meritorious claims on procedural grounds. In most instances of
unmeritorious claims, the litigation will be simplified and expedited
if the courts reaches the underlying merits despite possible
procedural flaws.
159. The classic example of such an injustice is Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722 (1991), where the petitioner, Roger Coleman, was denied
federal habeas relief and the merits of his claims disregarded, all because
while he was incarcerated on death row, his attorney filed a notice of appeal
- a piece of paper - three days late in the state court system. Coleman was
subsequently executed.
160. Tabak & Lane, supra note 9, at 41.
161. Bright, supra note 11, at 685:
This is illustrated by the cases of Smith and Machetti, two
codefendants
sentenced to death at separate trials by
unconstitutionally composed juries within a few weeks of each other
in the same county in Georgia. Machetti's lawyers challenged the
jury composition in state court; Smith's lawyers did not because they
were unaware of a United States Supreme Court decision decided
only five days before Smith's trial began. A new trial was ordered
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D. 1986 Statute
Prior to 1986 there were no time limits on applying for
habeas relief in Georgia. There was no statute of limitations
applicable to the writ of habeas corpus, and the doctrine of
laches did not extend to habeas proceedings.162 The first
temporal restriction on seeking habeas relief in Georgia dates
from 1986, when the Georgia legislature enacted its fourth post1967 statutory restriction on the state's postconviction habeas
corpus remedy.
The 1986 statutel63 created the first habeas corpus statute of
limitations in Georgia history, providing that:
Any challenge to a misdemeanor conviction of any of the
traffic laws of this state or the traffic laws of any county or
municipal government which may be brought pursuant to
Chapter 14 of Title 9 [the habeas chapter of the Official
Code of Georgia] must be filed within 180 days of the date
the conviction becomes final ... Failure to file the challenge
within the time prescribed in this Code section shall divest
the court ofjurisdiction.164
The 1986 statute, it appears,165 was the state legislature's profor Machetti by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and, at that
trial, a jury which fairly represented the community imposed a
sentence of life imprisonment. The Eleventh Circuit refused to
consider the identical issue in Smith's case because his lawyers did
not preserve it. Smith was executed ...
162. Zant v. Cook, 379 S.E.2d 780, 781 (Ga. 1989); Jackson v. Jones, 327
S.E.2d 206, 208 (Ga. 1985). See also Earp v. Brown, 391 S.E.2d 396, 397
(Ga. 1990) (Prior to the 1986 statute, "the general rule of law" in Georgia
was "that a defendant can collaterally attack void judgments at any time.").
163. Act of 1986, 1986 Ga. Laws 444, § 1 (current version at O.C.G.A. §
40-13-33 (West, Westlaw through 2014)). The 1986 statute also changed the
venue to Fulton County for all postconviction habeas proceedings involving
misdemeanor traffic laws where the Commissioner of Public Safety (now the
Commissioner of Driver Services) is named as respondent, but this aspect of
the statute need not be discussed in this Article.
164. Id. These provisions are now codified at O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33 (a),
(d) (West, Westlaw through 2014).
165. See Earp v. Boylan, 390 S.E.2d 577, 578 (Ga. 1990) (noting the 1986
statute was enacted "in response to Hardinson"). See infra note 166 and

No. 2]

The Great Writ Hit

463

government response to an admirable 1985 Georgia Supreme
Court decision, Hardison v. Martin,16 6 in which the Court held,
first, that a person convicted of a traffic offense whose driver's
license has been revoked, but who is neither in physical custody
nor on probation, is nonetheless sufficiently restrained of his
liberty to satisfy the custody requirement of Georgia habeas
corpus, and, second, that such a person may use a petition for
habeas corpus to challenge the revocation of his driver's license
if "the underlying sentence upon which the revocation is based
is void for a reason not appearing on the face of the record." 167
Because revocation of a person's driver's license is not
considered a sufficient restraint on liberty to amount to custody
for purposes of the federal habeas corpus custody
requirement,168 Hardison v. Martin provides protections beyond
what is mandated under federal constitutional or statutory law.
As the Georgia Supreme Court has held, Hardison v. Martin not
only provides "greater protections than the Federal Constitution
requires"1 69 but also "goes beyond federal constitutional and
statutory habeas corpus requirements." 170
Four years after passage of the 1986 statute, the Georgia
Supreme Court, in Earp v. Boylan, rejected a habeas petitioner's
assertion
that the
180-day
statute
of limitations
unconstitutionally suspends the writ of habeas corpus.1
The
Court reasoned that: (1) the statute of limitations extends to "a
accompanying text.
166. Hardison v. Martin, 334 S.E.2d 161 (Ga. 1985).
167. Id. at 163-165.
168. See, e.g., Harts v. Indiana, 732 F.2d 95, 96-97 (7th Cir. 1984)

(holding one-year suspension of license was not severe enough to constitute
"in custody" for purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction); Westberry
v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623, 624 (5th Cir. 1970) (federal habeas petitioner, who
had been deprived of her driver's license and forced to pay several fines for
various traffic violations, was not entitled to bring a petition for habeas
corpus because at the time of the filing of the habeas petition she was not in
custody for purposes of federal habeas statute).
169. Boylan, 390 S.E.2d at 579.
170. d.
171. Id. Accord Earp v. Brown, 391 S.E.2d 396, 397 (Ga. 1990).
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narrowly defined class of cases - those in which a petitioner
who is not in custody seeks habeas relief pursuant to Hardison
v. Martin from a misdemeanor traffic conviction;" 172 (2)
"[b]ecause Hardison v. Martin provides greater habeas corpus
protection than is required by the United States Constitution ...
the legislature may place a procedural limitation on that
protection without suspending the writ;" 173 and (3) the 180-day
statute of limitations is no different than "a number of
recognized procedural limitations on the writ of habeas corpus,"
including the limitations on appellate review of denials of relief
(derived from 1975 statute), or the procedural default rules
barring review of claims not properly raised at trial or on direct
appeal (derived from the 1982 statute). 17
Thus, the 1986
statutory restriction on habeas corpus was validated, at least in
part, by virtue of two of the other post-1967 statutes restricting
habeas corpus.
The Georgia Supreme Court has not yet construed the
unusual provision of the 1986 statute under which a failure to
file a habeas petition within the required statute of limitations
divests the habeas court of jurisdiction. Most statutes of
limitations in civil litigation, including the statute of limitations
on filing federal habeas petitions enacted in 1996, are regarded
as affirmative defenses that are nonjurisdictional and subject to
waiver, forfeiture, and equitable tolling.
The 180-day statute of limitations enacted in 1986, applicable
to misdemeanor traffic law convictions, was the only time
restraint on filing Georgia habeas corpus petitions until 2004,
172. Boylan, 390 S.E.2d at 579.
173. Id.
174. Id.

175. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 632 (2010) (holding "[a]
'petitioner' is 'entitled to equitable tolling' if he shows '(1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way' and prevented timely filing." (quoting Pace v.
DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005))); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S.
198, 199 (2006) (finding that "a district court has discretion to decide
whether the administration of justice is better served by dismissing the case
on statute of limitations grounds or by reaching the merits of the petition.").
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when both a general statute of limitations and a rule of laches
were grafted onto Georgia habeas by statute.
E. 1999 Statute
The 1999 statutel76 is the fifth of the six post-1967 statutory
curtailments of the writ of habeas corpus in Georgia. It is the
only one of the six statutes whose restricting provisions are not
limited to postconviction cases.
The habeas restrictions
imposed by the 1999 statute fall into two categories.
First, the 1999 statute abolished appeals of right for habeas
petitioners charged with a crime who were not yet convicted.
This had the indirect effect of ending all appeals of right in
habeas cases involving confinement on criminal charges,
whether pretrial or postconviction, except that the government's
right to appeal grants of postconviction relief was undisturbed.
This startling curtailment of the writ was accomplished so
stealthily that it took the Georgia Supreme Court a dozen years
to figure out what the state legislature had done.
Second, the 1999 statute placed new procedural burdens on
indigent prisoners who proceed, or apply to proceed, in forma
pauperis in a postconviction habeas corpus proceeding. These
burdens are punitive in purpose and practice.
1. Abolition ofAppeals ofRightfor Habeas Petitioners in
CriminalConfinement
The story of how the Georgia legislature utilized the 1999
statute to unobtrusively abolish the long-standing and important
right of habeas petitioners imprisoned prior to trial on criminal
charges to appeal of right a denial of relief is complicated and
convoluted. It requires, to begin with, an examination of two
other Georgia statutes, the Discretionary Application Appeals
Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996.
Expansively amended numerous times since its original
176. Act of 1999, 1999 Ga. Laws 847, §§ 1 to 3 (current version at
O.C.G.A. §§ 42-12-3(1), 42-12-7.1, 42-12-7.2 (West, Westlaw through
2014)).
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enactment in 1979, the Discretionary Application Appeals
Act is designed "to assist in reducing the massive caseload of
the appellate courts."17 8 The Act provides for discretionary
appeals instead of appeals of right. The Act abolishes appeals
of right with respect to the classes of cases specified by the Act,
and requires that in these cases the party who was unsuccessful
in a trial court (including a superior court) and now seeks
appellate review must apply for and obtain permission of the
appellate court before the appeal is allowed. If permission is
granted, the appeal thereafter proceeds as if it was an appeal of
right. If permission is denied, there is no appeal.
The Discretionary Application Appeals Act vests the Georgia
appellate courts with discretion not to entertain an appeal,179 and
any attempt to appeal in violation of the statute will result in
dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.180 While it does
provide for discretionary appeals, the Act also specifically states
that it "shall not affect" 181 the codified provisions of the 1975
statute, which preserve the government's power to take an
appeal of right from a grant of relief but require postconviction
habeas petitioners to obtain a certificate of probable cause
before appealing a denial of relief. Thus, by its own terms, the
Discretionary Application Appeals Act does not extend to
postconviction habeas corpus cases (where appeals continue to
be governed by the 1975 statute as now codified).182
Allegedly to cope with expenses and problems resulting from
frivolous or malicious civil actions filed by prison inmates, the
Georgia legislature enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
177. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (West, Westlaw through 2014).
178. Rebich v. Miles, 448 S.E.2d 192, 193 (Ga. 1994).
179. See, e.g., id. at 192; Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Rayle, 273
S.E.2d 139, 142 (Ga. 1980).
180. See, e.g., Prison Health Services, Inc. v. Ga. Dep't of Admin.
Services, 462 S.E.2d 601 (Ga. 1995); Armstrong v. Miles, 455 S.E.2d 587
(Ga. 1995).
181. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(i) (2013).
182. See, e.g., Brown v. Crawford, 715 S.E.2d 132, 134 (Ga. 2011); Jones
v. Townsend, 480, 490 S.E.2d 24 (Ga. 1997).
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1996.183
Regrettably, the 1996 Act is suffused with the tone of
hostility to prison and jail inmates, and to the civil litigation
these inmates institute, that is a hallmark of the law enforcement
establishment's public policy positions; and the Act plainly is
the product of political forces aligned with that establishment. 184
The Act's legislative findings and determinations are based
on anecdotal, one-sided, and unreliable assertions about the
alleged evils and expenses of prisoner civil litigation, and the
wording of the Act bespeaks a callous indifference to the harsh
realities of incarceration in penal institutions.185 The Act even
purports to find and determine that "prisoners ... view litigation
as a recreational exercise" 1 86 - a heartless exaggeration which
dehumanizes prisoners and desensitizes society to the suffering
and misery that criminal confinement entails and to the
legitimate, understandable complaints of citizens detained in
total institutions. Unsurprisingly, the fingerprints of the law
enforcement establishment are on the Act, which is based on
183. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, 1996 Ga. Laws 400
(current version at O.C.G.A. §§ 42-12-1 to 42-12-9 (West, Westlaw through
2014)). A number of other states also have enacted prison litigation reform
acts.
See George R. Blum, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of State Prison Litigation Reform Acts, 85 A.L.R. 6TH 229

(2013).
184. For background information on the Act, see Kevin W. King, Prison
Litigation Reform: Impose Court Costs on Prisoners Who File Lawsuits;
Authorize Courts to OrderPayments of Defendant's Attorney Fees Incurred
in Defending Frivolous Lawsuits, 13 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 280 (1996); see also
Roger S. Williams, PrisonLitigationReform: Provide that a PrisonerFiling
a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pay Feesfrom the Prisoner'sAccount; Prohibit in
Forma Pauperis FilingPrisoners Who Have Repeatedly FiledFrivolous or
Malicious Claims, 16 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 219 (1999).

185. The findings and recommendations even refer to "the fact all
prisoners' needs are provided at city, county, or state expense," O.C.G.A. §
42-12-2(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014) (emphasis added), which is not
even remotely true. Contrary to what some Georgia lawmakers seem to
believe, imprisonment in a Georgia penal facility is hardly comparable to a
pleasure trip on a cruise ship, where all the passengers' needs (including
three meals a day) are attended to. See infra Part II.E.2.
186. O.C.G.A. § 42-12-2(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014).
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"substantial research and drafting contributions by the Georgia
Attorney General's Office," 187 with much of what we know
about the origins and provisions of the Act coming from an
interview with an Assistant Attorney General of Georgia. 188
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 broadly defines a
prisoner as "a person 17 years of age or older who has been
convicted of a crime and is presently incarcerated or is being
held in custody awaiting trial or sentencing." 189 Thus, all adults
confined on criminal charges before or after conviction are
subject to the Act. These are the persons who are stripped of
appeals of right by the Act. These are the persons who, if they
seek habeas relief while indigent, are weighed down by the Act
with new, punitive procedural requirements.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, among other things,
abolishes appeals of right with respect to civil actions filed by
prisoners, requiring instead that appeals of such actions be in
accordance with the Discretionary Application Appeals Act. 190
Prisoners seeking to appeal are now required to apply for and
obtain permission of the appellate court before being allowed to
appeal, and without that permission there will be no appeal.
The year after it was enacted, the Georgia Supreme Court
blandly stated that the Prison Litigation Reform Act was
directed "[t]o rectify the perceived imbalances in the judicial
system toward which the Act was directed . . . ."191 According
to the Court, the Act's provisions could be divided into two
categories: first, it "provided procedures for monitoring prisoner
litigation," 192 and second, it "placed certain burdens on
prisoners seeking to conduct civil litigation." 193
187. King, supra notel84, at 281.
188. Id. at 280-84, nn.4, 9, 10, 17, 32, 42
189. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, 1996 Ga. Laws 400, § 1
(current version at O.C.G.A. § 42-12-3(4) (West, Westlaw through 2014)).
190. See O.C.G.A. § 42-12-8 (West, Westlaw through 2014) (codifying
this provision).
191. Jones v. Townsend, 480 S.E.2d 24, 24-25 (Ga. 1997).
192.Id at 25.
193. Id.
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As originally enacted in 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform
Act itself specifically excepted both direct appeals and habeas
corpus proceedings from the Act.194 After passage of the Act,
therefore, prisoners in pretrial custody on criminal charges
continued to enjoy the habeas rights they had previously
enjoyed, including the ability to appeal as a matter of right an
order denying habeas relief.195 The writ of habeas corpus was
not within the scope of the Act and was untouched by the Act.
However, among other things, the 1999 statute1 96 repealed the
portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 that had
exempted habeas cases from its provisions. Specifically, the
1999 statute amended the 1996 Act in three important respects:
(1) the 1996 Act's provision exempting habeas corpus
proceedings was deleted;197 (2) several sections of the 1996 Act
imposing various procedural requirements on prisoners filing
civil actions were declared inapplicable to habeas
proceedings;198 and (3) two new statutory sections imposing
194. 1996 Ga. Laws 400, § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 42-12-3(1)(A), (B)
(1996) (repealed 1999) (West, Westlaw through 2014)) ('Action' means
any civil lawsuit, action, or proceeding, including an appeal, filed by a
prisoner, but shall not include" (A) "a petition for writ of habeas corpus"; or
(B) "an appeal of a criminal proceeding."). See Brown v. Crawford, 715
S.E.2d 132, 134 (Ga. 2011) ("[T]he legislature expressly exempted appeals
from criminal convictions and habeas corpus filings from the ambit of the
Act"); Jones v. Townsend, 480 S.E.2d 24, 25 n.3 (Ga. 1997) ("The Act
specifically excludes from its scope criminal appeals and habeas corpus
actions.").
195. See, e.g., Smith v. Nichols, 512 S.E.2d 279, 282 (Ga. 1999); Hood v.
Carsten, 481 S.E.2d 525, 528-529 (Ga. 1997).
196. 1996 Ga. Laws 400 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §§ 42-12-1 to
42-12-9 (West, Westlaw through 2014)).
197. 1999 Ga. Laws 847, § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 42-12-3(1) (West,
Westlaw through 2014)). Thus, where the Prison Litigation Reform Act
formerly excepted both habeas corpus and criminal direct appeals from the
Act, it now excepts only "appeal[s] of a criminal proceeding." O.C.G.A. §
42-12-3(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014).
198. 1999 Ga. Laws 847, § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 42-12-3(1) (West,
Westlaw through 2014)) ("[T]he provisions of Code Sections 42-12-4
through 42-12-7 shall not apply to petitions for writ of habeas corpus.").
This language would be superfluous if habeas were not now governed by the
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punitive procedural burdens with respect to in forma pauperis
habeas corpus proceedings by indigents were added to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act. 199
The effect of the 1999 statute on habeas appeals does not
appear to have ever been considered by the backers of the
statute. The only account we have of the background of the
statute contains no mention of habeas appeals.200 The scant
legislative history of the 1999 statute, which passed both houses
of the legislature without opposition, indicates that it was
enacted to curb supposedly ongoing evasion of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1996 being committed by prisoners
wrongfully invoking the writ of habeas corpus.201 According to
that legislative history, the 1999 statute was intended to institute
two principal reforms: to remove the exception for habeas
corpus filings from the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and to
make it more procedurally complicated and burdensome for
indigents to file in forma pauperis habeas corpus petitions. 202
Allegedly, "some prisoners [were continuing] to file malicious
and frivolous suits under the guise of habeas corpus
petitions." 203 The evidence for alleged evasion of the 1996 Act
is anecdotal and unproven; nor is there evidence that, if the
problem ever existed, it was a widespread or significant one.
The sponsors of the bill appear not to have realized that the
legislation was unneeded because the courts already had
perfectly adequate ways of dealing with habeas petitioners who
abuse the court system by showering it with frivolous or
malicious habeas petitions.204
At any rate, the main sponsor of the 1999 statute seems to
Prison Litigation Reform Act.
199. 1999 Ga. Laws 847, §§ 1, 2 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 42-12-3(1), 4212-7.1, 42-12-7.2 (West, Westlaw through 2014)).
200. See Williams, supra note 184, at 219-21 (noting that habeas corpus is
not mentioned in the legislative history of the Prison Litigation Reform Act).
201. Id. at 220.
202. Id.
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. See, e.g., Howard v. Sharpe, 470 S.E.2d 678, 680 (Ga. 1996).
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have been unaware of the fact that courts are not bound by the
label a prisoner gives his pro se pleading and that they may
dispose of a such a pleading based on its substance rather than
its title. If it was true that some prisoners were filing civil
actions disguised as habeas petitions, therefore, it cannot be
doubted that the courts of this state would have treated the
actions as subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act and
disposed of them in accordance with that Act (which would
mean that the prisoner would be unable to appeal of right and
would have to seek appellate review via the discretionary appeal
procedure). The 1999 statute was not needed.
Amazingly - it bears emphasizing again - nothing indicates
its backers or the legislature had thought through the
devastating effect the 1999 statute would have on habeas
appeals of right.
The legislative history says nothing
whatsoever about habeas appeals. There is nothing in the
legislative history of the 1999 statute suggesting that anyone
understood that bringing habeas proceedings within the scope of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act would have these three major
consequences: (1) appeals of right by habeas petitioners would
be abolished in cases involving pretrial custody; (2) since
appeals of right had already been abolished in postconviction
habeas cases where relief was denied, all appeals of right by
habeas petitioners in criminal confinement were, as an indirect
consequence of the 1999 statute, now being ended; and (3)
although the government would continue to be able to appeal as
of right in a postconviction case, it would no longer have the
right to appeal an order granting habeas relief from pretrial
criminal confinement.
The 1999 statute never explicitly stated that it was abolishing
the traditional appeal of right for habeas petitioners in pretrial
criminal confinement. However, it did quietly effect such an
abolition. It did so in an almost clandestine manner. First, the
1999 statute brought habeas proceedings within the scope of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act; that Act made appeals of prisoner
civil actions (which now included habeas proceedings in pretrial
criminal custody cases) subject to the Discretionary Application
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Appeals Act; and under that Act there were no appeals of right,
only discretionary appeals. Nor is this all. Since postconviction
habeas petitioners previously had been stripped of traditional
habeas appeal rights (by the 1975 statute), an indirect effect of
the 1999 statute was to bring an end to all habeas appeals of
right by persons in custody on criminal charges. By simply
repealing an exception to the Prison Litigation Reform Act and
without expressly announcing what it was doing or its
significance, the legislature quietly, almost furtively,
demolished a basic right convicted inmates possessed until 1975
and which unconvicted inmates possessed until 1999.205
Appeals of right from denials of habeas relief were now things
of the past.
It took over a decade for the Georgia Supreme Court to figure
out that the 1999 statute had zapped habeas appeals of right in
cases of pretrial criminal confinement. As late as 2010 the
Court was still of the view that "[w]here . . . a prisoner files a
pre-trial habeas corpus petition while in custody . . . the

discretionary procedures of [the codified version of the 1975
statute relating to certificates of probable cause] are replaced by
the direct appeal route . . . ."206 It was not until 2011, when it
205. The 1999 statute also abolished the government's traditional power to
take an appeal of right in habeas cases involving pretrial criminal
confinement, and replacing it with the discretionary appeal authorized by
Discretionary Application Appeals Act. See Brown v. Crawford, 715 S.E.2d

132, 134 (Ga. 2011) ("[A]s the Act reads presently, any appeal of a court's
action with respect to a habeas corpus filing by a prisoner must follow the
discretionary review process set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35."); see also Ray v.
Barber, 548 S.E.2d 283, 284 (Ga. 2001) ("[T]he language is clear and
requires that in all actions filed by prisoners, appeals must come by
discretionary application.") It has been said that "[t]his makes little
difference" because "[w]here the State is not granted discretionary review, it
likely would have lost on appeal anyway." Brown, 715 S.E.2d at 135
(Nahmias, J., concurring). Furthermore, according to the concurrence, "the
General Assembly is free to change [the 1999 statute]," thereby restoring the
state's right to appeal. Brown, 715 S.E.2d at 135. Such a statutory change
seems probable, in view of the legislature's post-1967 trend of favoring the
interests of government over the rights of citizens when passing habeas laws.
206. Jackson v. Bittick, 690 S.E.2d 803, 804 (Ga. 2010).
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decided Brown v. Crawford,207 that the Court, directing its
attention to the 1999 statute for the first time, overruled eight
post-1999 rulings and announced that persons in pretrial
custody on criminal charges could no longer appeal of right
from a denial of habeas relief.208 Brown v. Crawford was the
first Georgia Supreme Court decision to construe the 1999
statute.
The holding in Brown v. Crawford was straightforward and
logical, even though the legislation it had to construe was
complicated and convoluted.
The Court reasoned as follows. First, in cases covered by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act no appeals of right are
permitted;209 instead, appeal of an order issued by a trial court
must "follow a discretionary application procedure." 210 Second,
the state legislature had originally "expressly exempted . . .
habeas corpus filings from the ambit of the [Prison Litigation
Reform Act]," 211 which meant that "a prisoner could [continue
to] appeal directly from the denial of a pre-trial petition for writ
of habeas corpus but [had to] apply [under the 1975 statute] for
discretionary review of a judgment rendered on a post-trial
petition for writ of habeas corpus." 212 Third, "[i]n 1999 . . . the

General Assembly amended the [Prison Litigation Reform] Act
"213
to remove the exemption for habeas corpus filings .
207. 715 S.E.2d 132 (Ga. 2011).

208. The eight overruled cases were: Jackson v. Bittick, 690 S.E.2d 803
(Ga. 2010); Massey v. St. Lawrence, 671 S.E. 2d 834 (Ga. 2009); Lamb v.
Bennett, 671 S.E.2d 506 (Ga. 2009); Nguyen v. State, 651 S.E.2d 681 (Ga.
2007); Bryant v. Vowell, 651 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. 2007); Gresham v. Edwards,
644 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. 2007); Whitmer v. Conway, 610 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 2005);
Tabor v. State, 610 S.E.2d 59 (Ga. 2005).
209. See Brown, 715 S.E.2d. at 133 (Ga. 2011) ("[I]n the situations
covered by the Act, a prisoner does not have the right of direct appeal but
must file a discretionary application in the appropriate appellate court in
order to obtain [appellate] review. .)
210. Id. at 133.
211. Id.at 134.
212. Id.
213. Id
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Fourth, pursuant to the 1999 statute, "a prisoner who files for
habeas corpus now must abide by [the] procedures in the
[Prison Litigation Reform] Act . .. including O.C.G.A. § 42-12-

8 [which requires appeals in cases covered by the Act to follow
the discretionary appellate review process established by
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35, the Discretionary Application Appeals
Act]," 2 14 except in postconviction cases (where the codified
version of the 1975 statute governs). Therefore, "as the [Prison
Litigation Reform] Act reads presently, any appeal of a court's
action with respect to a habeas corpus filing by a prisoner must
follow the discretionary review process set forth in O.C.G.A. §
5-6-35 [except in postconviction cases]." 2 15 Even appeals by
the government (except in postconviction cases) from grants of
habeas relief may be reviewed on appeal only via the
discretionary application appeals review procedure.216 Fifth and
finally, the post-1999 cases "allow[ing] a petitioner to file a
direct appeal from the denial of a pre-trial petition for writ of
habeas corpus" 217 were overruled.
To summarize: as a result of the 1999 statute, it is now
established law in Georgia that "[a]n application for
discretionary appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 is required
to obtain review of an order on a pretrial habeas petition filed by
a prisoner,"218 even if it is the government which seeks the
appeal.219 (A failure to meet the 30-day deadline for filing an
application for a discretionary appeal in a pretrial habeas case is
a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal of the habeas
220
In addition, as an indirect result of the 1999 statute,
appeal).
all appeals of right by habeas petitioners in criminal custody
have been abolished and replaced with the discretionary appeal.

214. Id.

215. Brown, 715 S.E.2d. at 134.
216. Id.
217. Id.

218. Crosson v. Conway, 728 S.E.2d 617, 619 (Ga. 2012).
219. Brown, 715 S.E.2d at 134.
220. Crosson, 728 S.E.2d at 619.
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2. Punitive Burdens on Indigent Petitioners
The 1999 statute also added to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act two new sections intended to impose heavy new burdens,
harsh to the point of punitiveness, on indigent habeas petitioners
seeking to proceed in forma pauperis and on the families and
friends of those petitioners.
The first of these two new punitive sections is codified at
O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.1:

§ 42-12-7.1. Procedure applicable when indigent prisoner
files petition for habeas corpus
The following provisions shall apply when an indigent
prisoner files a petition for habeas corpus:
(1) The indigent prisoner shall pay the current balance of
funds in the prisoner's inmate account;
(2) The clerk of court shall notify the superintendent of the
institution in which the prisoner is incarcerated that a
petition for habeas corpus has been filed. Notice to the
superintendent shall include:
(A) The prisoner's name, inmate number, and civil action
number; and
(B) The amount of the court costs and fees due and
payable; and
(3) Upon notification by the clerk of court that an indigent
prisoner has filed a petition for habeas corpus, the
superintendent shall:
(A) Immediately freeze the prisoner's inmate account; and
(B) Order that all moneys deposited into the prisoner's
inmate account be forwarded to the clerk until all court costs
and fees are satisfied, whereupon the freezing of the account
shall be terminated.22'
221. O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.1 (West, Westlaw through 2014). The
legislative history of § 42-12-7.1 tells us little: "Code section 42-12-7.1 . ..
require[s] indigent prisoners to pay the current balance in their inmate
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Traditionally, most habeas corpus proceedings on behalf of
prison inmates are undertaken in forma pauperis. In forma
pauperis proceedings are not an evil. They are essential to
liberty and the rule of law. In forma pauperis proceedings give
meaning to "the fundamental right of every litigant, rich or
poor, to equal consideration before the courts." 22 2 Leave to
proceed in forma pauperis must be given to an indigent habeas
petitioner unless the habeas petition is frivolous or malicious;
indeed, for a state to deny access to the writ of habeas corpus
because the prisoner cannot pay filing fees or costs is
unconstitutional.
It is a glory of our system of law that, for
those who cannot afford it, the writ of habeas corpus is free of
charge. Clarence Earl Gideon was an indigent habeas petitioner
who proceeded in forma pauperis.224
Traditionally, when indigent Georgia prison inmates sought
to proceed in forma pauperis, they would file a pauper's
affidavit and, if it was in order, would then be authorized (by
order of the judge) to proceed in forma pauperis, which meant
they would not have to pay filing fees or costs and the case
would thereupon proceed. 225 As a result of enactment of
accounts ... and defines the procedures that apply when an indigent prisoner
files a petition of habeas corpus. Specifically, it requires that the prisoner's
inmate account be frozen until all court costs and fees are satisfied."
Williams, supra note 184, at 220-21. Further:
Code section 42-12-7.1 requires that prisoners filing indigent claims
pay the current balance of funds in their inmate accounts. This Code
section further defines the procedures to be followed by the clerk of
court and prison superintendent when an indigent prisoner files a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, including freezing the prisoner's
inmate account until all court costs and fees are satisfied.
Id. at 221.
222. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 456 (1962) (Stewart &
Brennan, JJ., concurring).
223. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961) ("We hold that to
interpose any financial consideration between an indigent prisoner of the
State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is to deny that
prisoner the equal protection of the laws.").
224. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963).
225. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-15-2, 9-15-4 (West, Westlaw through 2014)
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O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.1 in 1999, there has been a drastic
alteration in the procedures followed when an indigent habeas
petitioner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis.
The petitioner must still file a pauper's affidavit and still
obtain permission from the court to proceed in forma
pauperis.226 However, under the 1999 statute, even if he is
indigent and is being allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, the
habeas petitioner nonetheless still must pay the clerk of the
habeas court all the fees and costs of the habeas proceeding.
Furthermore, once an inmate files an in forma pauperis habeas
petition, the statute ousts him from accessing his inmate account
and transforms the account into a collection agency for the state.
When the inmate's habeas petition227 is filed in forma pauperis,
the 1999 statute provides, the current balance in the prisoner's
inmate account will be immediately seized and transferred to
the habeas court clerk. The account is then immediately frozen,
with all funds thereafter deposited into the petitioner's account
to be forwarded automatically to the court until all costs and
fees are satisfied, at which time, if ever, involuntary transfers
from the account will cease, and the account will be unfrozen
and thus made usable for the prisoner.
These procedures are gratuitously punitive to indigent
prisoners, and they also subject the relatives and friends of those
prisoners to unnecessary hardships.
The filing fee for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
(permitting in forma pauperis proceedings in civil actions); see also
O.C.G.A. § 15-6-77(d), (e) (West, Westlaw through 2014) (exempting
indigents from filing fees and costs in civil litigation).
226. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-14 (West, Westlaw through 2014). A blank model
form of Request to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, which includes the required
pauper's affidavit, is available free of charge from the Administrative Office
of the Courts of Georgia. A petitioner who seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis should fill out this form and submit it to the court at the time he
submits his habeas petition.
227. The Administrative Office of the Courts of Georgia makes available
without charge a model blank form of Application for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, for use in postconviction habeas corpus proceedings, the use of
which is mandatory. Heaton v. Lemacks, 466 S.E.2d 7, 8 (Ga. 1996).
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$207. In addition, there is the cost, typically $50, of having the
sheriff serve the prison warden with a copy of the habeas
petition. Thus, at a minimum there usually will be over $250 in
fees and costs that become due the moment a habeas petition is
filed. Additional costs may also be incurred later, but it will be
assumed for present purposes that $257 is the total amount of
fees and costs which the habeas petitioner must pay through his
inmate account. Only rarely will a prison inmate be able to
arrange for this amount to be paid up front by a relative or other
third party at the time the habeas petition is filed. Usually the
prisoner will have to hope that third parties will make enough
deposits to his inmate account to pay the pending fees and costs,
so that his inmate account will be unfrozen.
If the habeas petitioner has $257 in his inmate account, he
will be required to pay the fees and costs from the money in his
account. He will not be regarded as indigent; he will not
proceed in forma pauperis; and the petitioner's account will not
be frozen (unless additional costs are incurred). But few
prisoners will have a balance of more than $250 in their
account. If the prisoner does have funds in his account but they
total less than $257, his account will be emptied and paid to the
court clerk; the account will immediately be frozen; during the
time the account is frozen, any additional deposits to the
account will automatically be taken out and sent to the clerk;
and the account will remain frozen until the full amount due to
the clerk has been paid. If the indigent prisoner has no funds in
his inmate account when he files his habeas petition, the same
procedure will be followed and the inmate's account frozen,
except that at the time of filing there will be no funds in the
inmate account to transfer to the clerk.
Most indigent prisoners, therefore, who file a habeas petition
in forma pauperis will have their inmate accounts frozen until
the fees and costs due, which will be at least $250, are paid in
full. If neither the prisoner nor his family and friends are able to
deposit that amount in the inmate's account, the account will
remain frozen indefinitely and therefore continue to be of no use
to the prisoner. It is unlikely that the prisoner, on his own, will
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be able to make deposits of any significant amount. If his
family and friends do make enough deposits, then the account
will be unfrozen, but this means of course that the burden of
paying the litigation expenses of the habeas petition of an
indigent prisoner has been shifted from the government to the
relatives and associates of the indigent prisoner. It is unjust to
require these persons (who are unlikely to be wealthy) to
assume these expenses, which ought to be paid by the
government. But if they don't make payments equal to what is
due to the court, their loved one's inmate account will remain
frozen, and, as they probably will find out, the prisoner will be
subjected to various resulting hardships, including loss of his
ability to use his account for the purpose of making purchases at
the prison commissary, which is the only source for food,
toiletries, clothing, and other items.
Under the 1999 statute, therefore, nearly every time an
indigent prisoner files a habeas petition, the balance in his
inmate account (if there is any) is involuntarily transferred
away, the account is promptly frozen, and the account remains
frozen indefinitely, perhaps permanently. When a prisoner's
account is frozen and he is thereby deprived of access to the
commissary, he suffers a multitude of hardships. Even the
number of meals he gets to eat per day may be affected.
The Georgia state prison system serves inmates three meals a
day four days a week; on Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays two
meals a day are served. Only by purchasing extra food at the
commissary can a prisoner eat three meals a day every day of
the week. A prisoner denied use of the commissary is forced to
eat only twice a day for nearly half of each week. The 1999
statute puts the indigent prisoner who seeks to file a habeas
petition and proceed in forma pauperis into an unenviable
position. If the prisoner does not file the petition, he is giving
up his constitutional right to habeas corpus, and he will lose the
opportunity to litigate his claim, which may warrant relief. But
if he does file the habeas petition, he will be unable to make
purchases at the commissary for an indefinite period of time,
and possibly for as long as he is incarcerated. He will have to
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eat two meals a day, three days a week.
Forcing an indigent prison inmate to choose between either
filing a habeas petition or eating three meals every day is an
unnecessary cruelty; no inmate should be placed in a situation
where filing a habeas petition may well result in his eating less
food three days a week.
The fees and costs of a habeas proceeding instituted by an
indigent prisoner should, as they traditionally have been, be
paid by the government. Compelling an indigent prisoner, or
pressuring his family and friends, to pay the fees and costs of
the prisoner's in forma pauperis habeas proceeding is inherently
wrong and unnecessarily cruel, even if the prisoner is being
permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. Seizing the contents of
a petitioner's inmate account as punishment for proceeding in
forma pauperis is wanton cruelty, as is indefinitely freezing the
account for the same punitive reasons. Compelling an indigent
prisoner to choose between proceeding in forma pauperis or
eating three meals a day is uncivilized.
O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.1 is inhumane. It subverts the basic
principle that the government should pay the costs of in forma
pauperis litigation. It places undue pressures on family and
friends of indigent inmates, and it imposes unfair financial
burdens on those families and friends. It mindlessly empties
inmate accounts, freezes inmate accounts, and makes an
inmate's account useless to the inmate for indefinite amounts of
time, causing unnecessary hardships for those inmates. No
indigent inmate should have his account balance seized and his
account frozen for the "offense" of filing an in forma pauperis
habeas corpus petition. O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.1 should be
repealed.
The other punitive section added by the 1999 statute is
codified at O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.2. It too needs to be repealed.
It provides:
In no event shall a prisoner file any action in forma pauperis
in any court of this state if the prisoner has, on three or more
prior occasions while he or she was incarcerated or detained
in any facility, filed any action in any court of this state that
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was subsequently dismissed on the grounds that such action
was frivolous or malicious, unless the prisoner is under
*
*
* *228
imminent danger of serious physical
injury.
Let us be clear about this downright noisome law, which is
outrageously designed to punish prisoners who file
inappropriate civil actions by excluding them, subject to one
tiny exception, from the writ of habeas corpus (unless they pay
fees and costs, which as indigents they cannot do).
On its face O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.2 prohibits an indigent
prisoner, absent imminent danger of serious physical injury,
from filing an in forma pauperis habeas petition if he has, while
a prisoner, filed three previous actions which were dismissed as
frivolous or malicious. To deprive an indigent habeas petitioner
of the opportunity to proceed in forma pauperis is to deny him
habeas corpus. O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.2 insupportably punishes an
indigent prisoner (including a prisoner who is illegally detained
or otherwise entitled to habeas relief and who would be granted
relief if he filed his habeas petition, but who is not in danger of
physical harm) by prohibiting him from filing his petition in
forma pauperis if in the past he filed three actions that were
dismissed for frivolousness or malice. It denies in forma
pauperis status to a class of indigents as punishment for having
previously filed worthless lawsuits. This means it denies habeas
corpus to those indigents: to deny in forma pauperis status to an
indigent habeas petitioner is equivalent to denying him access to
the writ on account of his poverty, since an indigent cannot pay
court fees and costs required of persons who are not indigent.
To the extent it denies in forma pauperis standing to any
indigent, O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.2 is not only unjust, but
unconstitutional.
In barring certain indigents not in imminent physical danger
from proceeding in habeas corpus unless they pay fees and
costs, O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.2 adopts an unheard-of and
unacceptable approach to habeas litigation. It excludes an
identifiable class of indigents from the writ of habeas corpus for
228. O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.2 (West, Westlaw through 2014).
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reasons unrelated to whether the habeas petition is frivolous or
malicious. Denial of access to the writ of habeas corpus is now
to be deemed appropriate punishment for out-of-control
jailhouse lawyers, regardless of the possible validity of their
habeas claims for relief.
Whether or not the indigent inmate is in physical danger, it is
unthinkable for government to deny in forma pauperis status to
an indigent who seeks habeas corpus relief and may have a
valid habeas claim - and thereby in effect deny him access to
the writ of habeas corpus - because he previously filed
worthless lawsuits or because of any other reason unrelated to
whether the current habeas petition is frivolous or malicious.
This is monstrous public policy. It is never permissible to deny
an indigent habeas petitioner in forma pauperis status, unless the
petition is frivolous or malicious. But O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.2
does exactly this. Moreover, it is unconstitutional to deny an
indigent access to habeas corpus because of his inability to pay
fees and costs.
The legislative history of O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.2 indicates that
it "is modeled upon a corresponding subsection of the Federal
P[risoner] L[itigation] R[eform] A[ct], which has recently been
upheld as constitutional." 229 Unlike the Georgia three-strikes
229. Williams, supra note 184, at 222. Despite its official designation, the
federal Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII,
110 Stat. 1321-71, was enacted on April 24, 1996 (the same day that Title I
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was enacted),
twenty-three days after enactment of Georgia's Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1996. Just as the Georgia Act severely curbed civil actions filed in the
Georgia courts by Georgia prisoners, so, the federal Act severely curbed civil
actions filed by prisoners in federal court. And, like the Georgia Act, the
federal Act resulted from the exercise of anti-prisoner political power by
elements of the law enforcement establishment (e.g., the National
Association of Attorneys General) and their law and order political allies
(e.g., the American Enterprise Institute).
The provision of the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on
which O.C.G.A. § 42-12-7.2 is based is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
(West, Westlaw through 2014):
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment
in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has,
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provision, however, the federal three-strikes statute does not
extend to habeas corpus proceedings.230 It does bar in forma
pauperis status to prisoners seeking to file a civil action if they
have previously filed three civil actions dismissed for
frivolousness or maliciousness, but the prohibition does not
extend to habeas corpus proceedings, and does not bar the filing
of any habeas petitions.231
Therefore, contrary to what the legislative history of the 1999
statute might suggest, it is not true in federal court that a
prisoner may, absent imminent danger of serious physical
injury, be debarred from proceeding in forma pauperis in federal
habeas corpus because he previously filed three frivolous or
malicious civil actions which were dismissed by a court.
However unfriendly they may at times be to prisoner litigation,
neither Congress nor the federal courts has opted for Georgia's
unusually punitive approach.
F. The 2004 Statute
The sixth restrictive statute, enacted in 2004, placed new,
additional time limits on filing a postconviction habeas corpus
petition. It established both a statute of limitations and a
statutory rule of laches.
As codified, the 2004 statute232 provides:
on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any
facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States
that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
230. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johnson, 475 F.3d 261, 263 n.2 (5th Cir. 2007)
("The P[rison] L[itigation] R[eform] A[ct]'s three-strikes provision does not
bar prisoners from proceeding in forma pauperis in a habeas action, even if
the prisoner has accumulated three strikes) (citations omitted).
231. See FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (2013), supra note 8, at 421
(explaining that federal courts have held the draconian provisions of the
federal Prison Litigation Reform Act restricting civil litigation filed by
prisoners do not apply to federal postconviction habeas proceedings).
232. 2004 Ga. Laws 917, §§ 1, 3 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 9-14-42(c), (d),
9-14-48(e) (West, Westlaw through 2014)). The second section of the 2004
statute, codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-14-43 (West, Westlaw through 2014),
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§ 9-14-42. Denial of constitutional or other rights; waiver of

objections
(c) Any action brought pursuant to this article shall be filed
within one year in the case of a misdemeanor, except as
otherwise provided in Code Section 40-13-33, or within four
years in the case of a felony, other than one challenging a
conviction for which a death sentence has been imposed or
challenging a sentence of death, from:
(1) The judgment of conviction becoming final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review; provided, however, that any person
whose conviction has become final as of July 1, 2004,
regardless of the date of conviction, shall have until July 1,
2005, in the case of a misdemeanor or until July 1, 2008, in
the case of a felony to bring an action pursuant to this Code
section;
(2) The date on which an impediment to filing a petition
which was created by state action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of this state is
removed, if the petitioner was prevented from filing such
state action;
(3) The date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Georgia, if that right was newly
recognized by said courts and made retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review; or
(4) The date on which the facts supporting the claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise
of due diligence.
(d) At the time of sentencing, the court shall inform the
defendant of the periods of limitation set forth in subsection
(c) of this Code section.

provides for venue in postconviction habeas proceedings involving
petitioners in federal custody or in custody outside the state of Georgia, or
not in custody at all, and need not be discussed in this Article.
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§ 9-14-48. Proof; depositions; affidavits; order of court
(e) A petition, other than one challenging a conviction for
which a death sentence has been imposed or challenging a
sentence of death, may be dismissed if there is a
particularized showing that the respondent has been
prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in
its filing unless the petitioner shows by a preponderance of
the evidence that it is based on grounds of which he or she
could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable
diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the
respondent occurred. This subsection shall apply only to
convictions had before July 1, 2004.233
1. Statute ofLimitations
The provisions of the 2004 statute of limitations are as
follows: (1) the 180-day limitation period with respect to
misdemeanor traffic law convictions (originally established by
the 1986 statute) is undisturbed; (2) for all other misdemeanors
the limitations period is one year; (3) for felonies, the
limitations period is four years; and (4) in cases where the death
sentence has been imposed, there is no limitations period.
Under the statute, the limitations period runs from the latest
of a number of events, which are enumerated at O.C.G.A. § 914-42(c)(1) to (4). In most cases, the operative date from which
the limitation period is measured will be the one identified in
O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c)(1), i.e., the date on which the judgment
of conviction becomes final at the end of the direct review
process. But later filings are permitted where the provisions of
O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c)(2) to (4) apply. For persons whose
convictions occurred before passage of the 2004 statute,
however, these limitations periods begin to run on July 1, 2004,
the 2004 statute's effective date, with a person convicted of a
felony having four years, until July 1, 2008, and a person
convicted of a misdemeanor having one year, until July 1, 2005,
233. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-14-42(c), (d), 9-14-48(e) (West, Westlaw through
2014).
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to file the habeas petition.
The Georgia Supreme Court has not decided a case requiring
it to pass upon the constitutional validity of the 2004 statute of
limitations; nevertheless, several of its decisions seem to imply
that the statute is valid.234
The statute of limitations enacted in 2004 is patterned after
and is worded nearly identically to the statute of limitations on
federal habeas corpus proceedings by state prisoners,235 which
was added to the federal habeas corpus statutes by Title I of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,236
except that the federal time limitation period is one year for all
offenses. Also, unlike the federal statute, the Georgia statute
requires that a criminal defendant be informed at sentencing by
the judge of the periods of limitation on applying for habeas
relief.237 Presumably, the Georgia Supreme Court will interpret
the Georgia habeas statute of limitations in accordance with the
way the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal
habeas statute of limitations. 238
234. See, e.g., State v. Sosa, 733 S.E. 2d 262, 263 (Ga. 2012) (construing
O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c)(3) to require reversal grant of habeas relief); Smith v.
State, 716 S.E.2d 143, 143-44 (Ga. 2011) (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c) as
support to deny postconviction motion); Humphrey v. Owens, 715 S.E.2d
119, 120 (Ga. 2011) ("[T]he utilization of such remedy [of habeas corpus]
may be barred by the statute of limitation, see OCGA § 9-14-42(c)(1)."); see
also Edwards v. State, 707 S.E.2d 335, 335-36 (Ga. 2011).
235. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (West, Westlaw through 2014), with
O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014).
236. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, tit. 1, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, § 101, 110 Stat. 1217 (1996). Prior to 1996, there was no
statute of limitations governing federal habeas corpus proceedings. See
generally FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 714; see also

Wyzykowski v. Dep't of Corrs., 226 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2000)
(noting that prior to 1996, "the only time limitation [on filing a federal
habeas petition] was provided by [former] Rule 9(a), Rules Governing §
2254 Cases.").
237. See O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(d) (West, Westlaw through 2014).
238. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1926 (2013) (holding
that the statute of limitations can be overcome by a showing of actual
innocence); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 631 (2010) (holding that the
federal statute of limitations on habeas corpus is subject to equitable tolling
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In 2010, in Phagan v. State,239 the Georgia Supreme Court
held that under the four year statute of limitations, a habeas
petition filed ten years after conviction was nonetheless timely,
where the petition had been dismissed by operation of law
because no written order had been entered in the case for five
years, and where, in accordance with the Civil Practice Act
statutes regarding renewal of dismissed civil actions,240 the
habeas proceeding had been recommenced within six months of
the dismissal.24 1
On the other hand, also in 2010, in Roberts v. Cooper,242 the
Georgia Supreme Court refused to extend the prison mailbox
rule, under which a court document is deemed filed the day it is
deposited in the prison mail system, to habeas petitions
allegedly filed after the four-year statute of limitations. For
purposes of the statute of limitations, a habeas petition is
deemed filed only when it is physically received in the superior
court clerk's office.
Given the trend of habeas legislation in this state, as well as
legislative trends in other states, it is very likely that within a
few years the four-year statute of limitations will be
shortened. 243 Within a decade, it may be predicted, 244
the
less.
or
year
one
to
reduced
been
have
will
period
limitations
in appropriate cases).
239. 700 S.E.2d 589 (Ga. 2010).

240. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-60(b) (West, Westlaw through 2014); O.C.G.A.
§§ 9-11-41(e) (West, Westlaw through 2014).
241. Phagan, 700 S.E.2d 589 at 593.

242. 691 S.E.2d 875 (Ga. 2010). This case is examined infra notes 328347 and accompanying text.
243. "The trend in recent years has been for states to add statutes of
limitation to their principal postconviction remedies and, once a particular
statute of limitations had been adopted, to shorten it."
STATE
POSTCONVICTION 2013, supra note 7, at 13.

244. In Idaho, for example, there was no statute of limitations on the
state's postconviction remedy until a five-year statute of limitations was
enacted in 1979, and in 1993 the limitation period was reduced to one year.
DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF 456

(1996). In Alabama, a two-year postconviction statute of limitations was
established in 1991, and in 2002 it was shortened to one year. STATE
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2. Laches Rule
In addition to the statute of limitations provisions codified at
O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c) and (d), the 2004 statute also enacted the
statutory rule of laches codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(c). The
Georgia laches provision is entirely retrospective; it applies only
to convictions which occurred prior to July 1, 2004, the date the
2004 statute became effective.24 5
The Georgia laches statute is patterned246 after former Rule
9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts, which was in effect from 1977 to 2004.247
Prior to 1977, laches did not extend to federal habeas corpus.248
Former Rule 9(a) changed this. "[Former] Rule 9(a) was
interpreted as a codification of the equitable doctrine of laches
as applied to habeas corpus petitions." 249 "Under the equitable
POSTCONVICTION 2013, supra note 7, at 54 (2013); STATE POSTCONVICTION
REMEDIES AND RELIEF, supra note 244, at 219-20.

245. O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014).
246. Flint v. State, 701 S.E.2d 174, 175, 176 n.4 (Ga. 2010).
247. Rule 9(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District
Courts (adopted 1977; repealed 2004). For discussion of former Rule 9(a),
see 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACTICE
AND
PROCEDURE
1273-86 (6th ed. 2011); FEDERAL
POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 722-30; see also Robert N.
Clinton, Rule 9 of the FederalHabeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the
Need for Reform of the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IOWA L. REv. 15 (1977);
Christine Burt, Note, Rule 9(a) and Its Impact on Habeas Corpus Litigation,
11 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 363 (1985).

Former Rule 9(a) provided:
A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state of which the
respondent is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond
to the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that it
is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by
the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances
prejudicial to the state occurred.
425 U.S. 1178, 1178-79 (1976), as amended by Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub.
Law No. 94-426, 98 Stat. 1335.
248. See FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 722
(including the "delayed petitions rule" as one of the obstacles to habeas
corpus relief); Robert N. Clinton, supra note 247 at 31-33.
249. Flint, 701 S.E.2d at 176 n.4. See, e.g., Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d
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doctrine of laches, a suitor may, under some circumstances, be
denied relief if his delay in seeking redress prejudiced the other
party to the lawsuit." 250 Because it permitted dismissal of a
habeas petition which had not been filed in timely fashion, the
rule of laches adopted by former Rule 9(a) was sometimes
called the delayed petitions rule. 25 1
Former Rule 9(a) and O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(e) are almost
identical in wording.252 The Georgia Supreme Court has
recognized that the 2004 laches statute is modeled after former
Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.253 The
federal case law on former Rule 9(a) reveals the rule was
"narrow in scope." 254 The federal courts described former Rule
9(a) as "no more than a legitimate procedural device designed to
prevent abuses of the habeas corpus process,"255 which had to

472, 479 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Rule 9(a) codifies the application of the equitable
doctrine of laches to habeas corpus petitions."); Walters v. Scott, 21 F.3d
683, 687 (5th Cir. 1994); Strahan v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir.
1985).
250. FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 723.
251. Id. at 722.

252. Apart from their different limitations periods and the gender-neutral
language in the Georgia provision, there are only two significant differences
between former Rule 9(a) and O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(e). First, although the
text of former Rule 9(a) did not require that the state's showing of prejudice
be particularized, case law imposed such a requirement, see, e.g., Paprskar v.
Estelle, 612 F.2d 1003, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980), and O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(e)
(West, Westlaw through 2014), as enacted in 2004, on its face requires that
there be "a particularized showing [of prejudice] . . ." (emphasis added).
Second, former Rule 9(a) did not specify the burden of proof on the habeas
petitioner to show that he could not have had knowledge of the grounds for
relief by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances
prejudicial to the government occurred. The Georgia provision, however,
specifies that the petitioner must meet this evidentiary burden "by a
preponderance of the evidence."

O.C.G.A.

§ 9-14-48(e) (West, Westlaw

through 2014) (emphasis added). This was more or less in general
accordance with case law interpreting former Rule 9(a); see, e.g., Rideau,
237 F.3d at 472; Walters 21 F.3d at 683.
253. See Flint, 701 S.E.2d at 174-75.
254. FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 723.

255. Davis v. Adult Parole Auth., 610 F.2d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 1979).
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"be carefully considered and construed liberally." 256 The
burden of showing prejudice was on the government,257 and the
showing had to be particularized.258
The rule was not
mandatory; even if there had been prejudicial delay in filing the
petition, the court had discretion to grant relief notwithstanding

the delay. 259
260
In Rideau v. Whitley, the narrow reach of former Rule 9(a)
was described as follows:
The State bears a heavy burden under Rule 9(a) to (1) make
a particularized showing of prejudice, (2) show that the
prejudice was caused by the petitioner having filed a late
petition, and (3) show that the petitioner has not acted with
reasonable diligence as a matter of law. The State must
make a particularized showing of prejudice to its ability to
respond to the habeas petition. Mere passage of time alone
is never sufficient to constitute prejudice. Prejudice to the
State's ability to retry or reconvict the petitioner is
irrelevant. Lapses of time that affect the state's ability, but
that do not make it virtually impossible for the state to
respond, [do not] require dismissal. The application of Rule
9(a) must be carefully limited to avoid abrogating the
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. 261
The Georgia Supreme Court has not carefully limited the
laches rule. The Court has decided two cases, the first in 2007
and the other in 2010, involving the Georgia habeas laches
statute. In the first, Wiley v. Miles,262 the state habeas petition
256. Id. at 414.
257. See, e.g., Bedford v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 934 F.2d 295, 299-300
(11th Cir. 1991); Lawrence v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1572, 1574 (11th Cir. 1988);
Paprskar,612 F.2d at 1003.
258. FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 723. Although
the text of former Rule 9(a) did not require that the state's showing of

prejudice be particularized, case law imposed such a requirement, see, e.g.,
McDonnell v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1982); Paprskar,612 F.2d at
1003.
259. FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 723.
260. 237 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2000).
261. Id. at 477-79 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
262. 652 S.E.2d 562 (Ga. 2007).
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had been filed thirty-seven years after the conviction; in the
second case, Flint v. State,263 it was twenty years. In both cases
the Court held that there had been delay warranting dismissal of
the habeas proceeding without inquiring into the merits of the
claims. In neither case is there much discussion of the meaning
of such key terms as "delay" or "prejudice" or much analysis of
the personal liberty issues raised by applying laches rules such

as O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(e). 2 64
263. 701 S.E.2d 174 (Ga. 2010).
264. O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48 (West, Westlaw through 2014). In Wiley v.
Miles, for example, the facts were these: the state habeas petitioner, Wiley,
pleaded guilty to two charges of burglary in a Georgia court in 1965 and
finished serving his prison sentences around 1978; in 1994 he was convicted
in absentia in a federal district court; he remained a fugitive until 2000; in
June 2000 he was recaptured and soon thereafter the federal district court
sentenced him as a recidivist to life imprisonment without parole, in part
based on his two 1965 Georgia burglary convictions; in June 2002, after a
federal appellate court on direct review had ordered resentencing
proceedings, and shortly before he was to be resentenced, petitioner filed his
state habeas petition attacking the burglary convictions which were being
used to enhance his federal sentence. Wiley, 652 S.E.2d at 563.
Unquestionably, the conviction was in 1965 and the habeas petition was
in 2002, thirty-seven years later. For purposes of laches, however, the
question is not how many years ago the conviction occurred, but whether the
petition was unreasonably delayed. Delay is the sine qua non of the laches
rule, and not every delay counts against the petitioner - only unreasonable
delay. See, e.g., Strahan v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1985);
Aiken v. Spalding, 684 F.2d 632, 633 (9th Cir. 1982).
Was there
unreasonable delay here? No.

Considering the circumstances at the time,

the petitioner Wiley acted with reasonable diligence, even though he did not
seek habeas relief until he was convicted in federal court and suddenly
became subject to a severe recidivist punishment based at least in part on the
burglary convictions. Any delay was therefore excusable. To understand
this, one must look at the totality of the events, not some isolated fact; see
McDonnell v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 246, 251 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[A] [laches] case .
requires careful attention to the facts surrounding each case.")
To begin, under Georgia law at the time there was no habeas statute of
limitations or laches rule. In 1965 Georgians with a claim for postconviction
relief were free to decide to postpone the filing of the habeas petition until
later. Yes, presumably Wiley could have filed a pro se, in forma pauperis
habeas petition immediately after the conviction; he knew then of the facts
giving rise to the claim that his pleas were involuntary (although it is not
clear that he knew all the facts or that he understood the legal ramifications
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of what allegedly had happened). For unknown reasons, he did not then
apply for habeas relief But this was not unreasonable. This was what the
law then allowed. Under Georgia law at the time, no habeas clock began
ticking for Wiley in 1965. Wiley's behavior was identical to that of the great
majority of convicted persons, including those who think they have a claim
for relief; they don't, for one reason or another, seek postconviction relief
We should also remember that the circumstances resulting in a violation of
rights may well induce a sense of helplessness and futility which discourages
seeking relief in the courts, especially when the victim has to act pro se if he
acts at all.
Once petitioner Wiley finished his sentences on the burglary convictions,
like most inmates who finish their prison time, he saw even less reason to
collaterally attack the convictions. What would be the point? Like most
persons released from prison, he decided not to petition for postconviction
relief All of this was reasonable. The sentence had been fully served, and
why bother further? Besides, habeas corpus was no longer available to
Wiley once he was no longer in custody under the sentences. Then, once the
petitioner discovered that he was in danger of having his federal sentence
enhanced to life without parole because (at least in part) of the Georgia
burglary convictions, he, again acting like a reasonable person, promptly

sought state habeas corpus. He did not cynically or strategically postpone
the state habeas proceeding until documents and court records were lost and
the witnesses dead. He filed the petition following the federal conviction,
when the validity of burglary convictions became a matter of great practical
importance to him. In short, there was no unreasonable delay. The
petitioner, under all the circumstances, acted with reasonable diligence, even
though thirty-seven years separate the convictions and the habeas petition.
The Georgia Supreme Court's logic was inexorable: Wiley knew of the
alleged defects in the guilty pleas as of the time they were entered, yet did
not seek postconviction relief until 2002, by which time the necessary
records and documents about his guilty pleas no longer existed; therefore his
petition was delayed too long and must be dismissed without proceeding
further.
But this reasoning is misplaced. It annihilates the true meaning of delay.
It suggests that when the time and opportunity for filing a petition passes,
any petition filed thereafter is automatically deemed a delayed petition. It
turns the rule into an ex post facto requirement that all postconviction
petitions be filed almost immediately. It erroneously defines delay, without
more, as simply the amount of time between when the petitioner knew he
had a postconviction claim and the time he first applied for postconviction
relief It doesn't distinguish between delay and unreasonabledelay.
Debating whether the claim could have been raised long ago, or whether
the state has been prejudiced, is relevant only once it is determined that there
has in fact been unreasonable delay. The basic issue in administering the
laches issue is not when the petitioner first became aware of the factual basis

No. 2]

The Great Writ Hit

493

In deciding Miles, the Court did not seem to notice the
incongruities flowing from its ruling. In the Georgia court
system, the only proper forum for collaterally attacking the two
Georgia burglary convictions,265 the convictions were ancient
history and habeas petitions attacking the convictions were
airily dismissed as delayed, without any inquiry into the merits
of the claim that the convictions were invalid on constitutional
grounds. In federal court, on the other hand, where the burglary
266
convictions could not be collaterally attacked,
the two
convictions were, at least for sentence enhancement purposes,
robust and energetic, and by no means ancient history. They
had enough vitality and reliability to elevate an imprisonment
sentence into a sentence of imprisonment for life without
parole. 267
Strangely, and despite the pleas of the attorneys representing
the habeas petitioner in one of the cases,
the Georgia
Supreme Court in Wiley v. Miles and Flint v. State ignored the
extensive federal case law construing former Rule 9(a), on
which the 2004 laches statute is based.269 The Court did not
for his postconviction claim. The basic question is whether there was
unreasonable delay in filing the petition. If there was no unreasonable
delay, nothing else matters, and the petition cannot be dismissed.
265. See Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994) (with the
exception of "convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel," "a
defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding may [not] collaterally attack the
validity of previous state convictions that are used to enhance his [federal
sentence]."). A person convicted in federal court may not use the federal
sentencing forum to gain review of his state convictions; such a convicted
person may, however, attack his state sentences in the state courts or through
federal habeas review, and, if he is successful, he may then apply for
reopening of any federal sentence enhanced by the state sentences. Id. at
497.
266. Id.

267. Permitting sentence enhancement based on a prior conviction, which
itself cannot be attacked because the habeas petition attacking it is delayed
within the meaning of former Rule 9(a), does not, the courts have held,
violate due process. See Lawrence v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1572, 1574 (11th Cir.
1988).
268. See Flint, 701 S.E.2d at 176-77.
269. This included case law under former Rule 9(a) dismissing a habeas

494

John MarshallLaw Journal

[Vol. VII

mention the case law holding that in order for the prejudice
component of former Rule 9(a) to be satisfied, the state must
show (1) that the delay was unreasonable,270 (2) that it has
suffered some particularized prejudice,271 and (3) that the
prejudice was caused by the delay.272 Nor did it refer to the
case law holding that delay alone is sufficient to warrant
dismissal under former Rule 9(a), 273 or that it was a requirement
that a habeas petitioner be given notice and opportunity to show
that the delay was not prejudicial or that the delay was
excusable.274 The Court also failed to mention the significant
fact that, during the twenty-eight years former Rule 9(a) was in
effect, there was appended to the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases a model form for use in cases where there was a delayed
petition issue. The form, which would be sent to the petitioner
by the court, gave the petitioner notice that the habeas petition
might be dismissed for delay in its filing, and afforded the
petitioner an opportunity to explain why the habeas petition
should not be dismissed. 275 The form was of immense help in
assuring fairness in processing allegedly delayed habeas
petitions. Georgia uses no such model form.
petition as delayed. See, e.g., Ford v. Superintendent, Ky. State Penitentiary,
687 F.2d 870, 871 (6th Cir. 1982); Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992, 999
(5th Cir. 1980).
270. See, e.g., Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472, 482 (5th Cir. 2000);
Strahan v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1985); Aiken v. Spalding,
684 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1982); Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.
1980).
271. See, e.g., Rideau, 237 F.3d at 476; Paprskar v. Estelle, 612 F.2d
1003, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980).
272. See, e.g., Bedford v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 934 F.2d 295, 299 (11th
Cir. 1991); Lawrence v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1988); Hill v.
Linahan, 697 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 1983).
273. See, e.g., Smith v. Duckworth, 910 F.2d 1492, 1494 (7th Cir. 1990);
Davis v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1513, 1518 (11th Cir. 1987); Strahan v.
Blackburn, 750 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1985).
274. See, e.g., Norman v. McCotter, 765 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 1985);
Paprskar,612 F.2d at 1006.
275. See Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9, Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (1976).
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The habeas petition in Wiley v. Miles was filed two years
before the 2004 laches statute was enacted; the habeas petition
in Flint v. State was filed only three years after passage of the
statute. Almost all of the supposed "long delay" 276 in Wiley v.
Miles and Flint v. State occurred during the pre-2004 era when
there was no statute of limitations (except for misdemeanor
traffic convictions beginning in 1986) or laches rule applicable
to state habeas corpus, and both petitioners had every right to
not be concerned about the timing of filing Georgia habeas
petitions. They were not under an imperative to race to the
courthouse. They could hardly predict that years later the
legislature would enact a retrospective statute that would punish
them for exercising their pre-2004 rights. Petitioner Wiley had
no reason to anticipate that two years after he filed his habeas
petition the legislature would enact a retrospective statute that
would condemn him for having acted as the law previously
authorized, even encouraged.
The pre-2004 conduct of
petitioners Wiley and Flint - which was justifiable and fully
protected by law and involved the exercise of a basic right was, under inauspicious Georgia Supreme Court decisions
construing a retrospective statute passed years after one of the
habeas petitions was filed, retroactively transmogrified into
inexcusable idleness.
Exercising rights suddenly became
sleeping on those rights.
Both Wiley v. Miles and Flint v. State transform what was
supposed to be an equitable, flexible rule into just another
procedural rule for tripping up habeas petitioners and permitting
dismissal of a habeas petition without even considering the
merits of the habeas claim. These two cases should have been
decided differently.
In neither case was it "virtually
impossible" to respond to the habeas petition, and in at least one
of the cases the petitioner had acted with reasonable diligence in
filing the habeas petition, so that any delay in his case was
excusable.

276. Wiley v. Miles, 652 S.E.2d 562, 564 (Ga. 2007).
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III. POST-1967 GEORGIA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
CURTAILING GEORGIA HABEAS CORPUS

Since 1967, the Georgia Supreme Court has decided
hundreds of postconviction habeas corpus cases. Most of these
decisions are examples of ordinary appellate litigation and
either turn on procedural issues or, if the merits are reached,
determine whether a petitioner should be granted habeas relief
due to a violation of constitutional rights. Not infrequently,
habeas relief is granted. A few of the Court's habeas corpus
decisions granting relief are civil liberties landmarks. Most of
the Court's habeas decisions, however, deny relief. Typically,
the decisions refusing habeas relief are routine appellate cases.
However, at least five of the Georgia Supreme Court's habeas
decisions denying relief warrant singling out and close
inspection because of their remarkable coldness toward the writ
of habeas corpus and the prisoners who invoke the writ, and
because they are astounding legal victories for the law
enforcement establishment. These five decisions are by no
means the only post-1967 decisions of the Court which have
treated the writ of habeas corpus shabbily. 277
A. Reed v. Hopper (1975)
This decision, which has already been examined at length
earlier in this Article,278 needs no further discussion.
B. Jacobs v. Hopper (1977)
In 1977, in Jacobs v. Hopper,279 the Georgia Supreme Court
dealt a crippling blow to the Georgia Habeas Corpus Act of
277. See, e.g., Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 618 (Ga. 2003) (affirming
that it is not unconstitutional to require a death row inmate to prove his
retardation beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the inmate to be ineligible
for death penalty; superior court order granting habeas relief is reversed).
278. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
279. 233 S.E.2d 169 (Ga. 1977). Prior to 1977, search and seizure claims
could be raised in Georgia postconviction habeas proceedings. See, e.g.,
Wynn v. Caldwell, 204 S.E.2d 143 (Ga. 1974); Morgan v. Kiff, 196 S.E.2d
445 (Ga. 1973).
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1967 when it removed search and seizure claims - claims that
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment had been
admitted at the habeas petitioner's criminal trial, i.e., Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule claims - from the list of claims
cognizable under the Act. The Court reasoned that this
substantive limitation on Georgia habeas corpus was
appropriate in light of Stone v. Powell,280 decided the previous
year by the United States Supreme Court.
Arguably disregarding precedents,281 Stone v. Powell
slammed the door on federal habeas review of search and
seizure claims which, the Court held, could be raised in federal
habeas only if the petitioner had been denied an opportunity for
full and fair consideration of the claim in the state court
system.282 Because a state offers such an opportunity as long as
it grants criminal defendants a procedure for objecting at trial to
the admission of illegally seized evidence - and every state does
this - after the Stone v. Powell decision in 1976, search and
seizure claims vanished from federal habeas litigation.283
As a result of Stone v. Powell, the Fourth Amendment can no
280. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
281. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973); Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560
(1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U.S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
282. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494.
283. See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 247, at 1537-54;
FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 732-37.

Recently, and almost unbelievably, in Young v. Conway, 698 F.3d 69 (2d
Cir. 2012), federal habeas corpus relief was granted on the ground that
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was admitted at the
petitioner's state criminal trial. The Court held that Stone v. Powell is a
nonjurisdictional limitation on federal habeas corpus and that, under the
circumstances, the state had waived the benefits of the Stone v. Powell
decision by not raising it despite numerous opportunities to do so, with the
record bereft of any reason as to why the state failed to invoke Stone v.
Powell. The Young v. Conway decision is an extraordinarily uncommon one.
Nearly 40 years after Stone v. Powell, federal habeas decisions granting
relief on Fourth Amendment grounds are as unusual as bones in polyps.
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longer be protected or enforced in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. This was thought to be a good thing by the law
enforcement establishment community and by conservative
legal scholars. They welcomed an end to federal court habeas
review of cases where the issue was whether prosecutors or
police violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a convicted
state prisoner.
Among other legal scholars and civil liberties advocates,
Stone v. Powell, which "ha[d] a devastating impact on federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction,"284 is widely regarded as one of the
worst federal habeas decisions ever decided by the highest court
in the land,285 and the decision "produced a flood of
commentary, much of it justifiably sharply critical."2 8 6 The
decision undermined the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, the federal habeas corpus
remedy for state prisoners, and the special function of the
federal courts in protecting cherished rights. To crown all,
Stone v. Powell (along with its companion case) was a
successful appeal by a prison warden, and the decision gave the
Court occasion both to rebuke a lower federal court for
overprotecting constitutional rights and to set aside the lower
court's order granting habeas relief. Reversing grants of habeas
relief soon became a common practice of the Court. Of the
numerous Supreme Court decisions between 1972 and 1996
which methodically created new restrictions on federal habeas,
Stone v. Powell is arguably the most important and memorable
284. Ira P. Robbins & James E. Sanders, Judicial Integrity, The
Appearance of Justice, and the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus: How to Kill
Two Thirds (or More) with One Stone, 15 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 63, 68 (1977).
285. FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 733 (1996) ("The

Stone decision is one of the most tragic and unfortunate of all Supreme Court
civil liberties decisions. It represents the triumph of those who had been
working to block the expansion of federal habeas jurisdiction."). See also
Robbins & Sanders, supra note 284, at 86 ("In Stone v. Powell, the Court
curtailed federal habeas corpus jurisdiction with inadequate explanations and
improper reasoning, and failed to address fundamental issues presented by
the case.").
286. FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 733.
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- and most dangerous to liberty.287 Under the decision, the
opportunity a state convict has to redress a search and seizure
claim in a federal habeas proceeding is but "a 'photo'
opportunity."288
Stone v. Powell has come to symbolize the current era of
enfeebled federal habeas corpus and narrowed postconviction
remedies. Nearly 40 years after it was lapidated by Stone v.
Powell, and nearly 20 years after much of its lifeblood was
drained away by the 1996 federal habeas corpus statute, the
federal habeas corpus remedy for state convicts has been
wrenched back to a more primitive epoch, to "a new Stone
Age."289 In this desolate legal landscape, once again Leo Frank
would be denied habeas corpus relief. The wizened, tottering
federal habeas remedy is barely recognizable compared to what
it once was. "The writ has become an ambassador without
portfolio." 290
In Jacobs v. Hopper, the Georgia Supreme Court decided that
"the test announced . . . in Stone v. Powell . .. regarding federal

habeas corpus review would serve equally well for state habeas
corpus review, and we therefore adopt it."291 The Georgia
Supreme Court thought that a calamitous decision which
abolished use of the federal habeas corpus remedy to vindicate
Fourth Amendment rights, which clucked with disapprobation
287. For an article advocating the overruling of Stone v. Powell, see
Steven Semeraro, Enforcing Fourth Amendment Rights Through Federal
Habeas Corpus, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 983 (2006). For an article arguing that

the Stone v. Powell "opportunity" rule should not be extended to
constitutional free speech claims, see Michael Wells, Habeas Corpus and
Freedom ofSpeech, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1307.
288. FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION (1996), supra note 8, at 732.
289. Postconviction Habeas Corpus Relief in Georgia, supra note 4, at
273. See also Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania and
State Bills of Rights, 54 Miss. L.J. 223, 258 (1984) [hereinafter First Things

Last] ("Stone has come to symbolize an era.").
290. Tabak & Lane, supra note 9, at 42 (quoting Evans v. State, 441 So.2d
520, 524 (Miss.1983) (Robertson, J., dissenting)); see also Emanuel
Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557

(1994).
291. Jacobs v. Hopper, 233 S.E.2d 169, 170 (Ga. 1977).
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of a remedy created by Congress to protect personal liberty in
the aftermath of the Civil War, and which paved the way for
further judicial erosion of the remedy, was a decision worthy of
emulation with respect to Georgia habeas corpus. As a result of
Stone v. Powell, the Fourth Amendment can no longer be
protected or enforced in federal habeas corpus proceedings, and
Georgia's highest court thought this was a good idea.
The basic reason the Georgia Supreme Court gave for so
deciding suggests the Court misunderstood the actual holding in
Stone v. Powell. In Stone v. Powell, the Court, expressing its
disapproval of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
announced, not for the first time, "that the rule is not a personal
constitutional right,"2 92 and that "the rule is a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect . .

."293

From this

language, according to the Georgia Supreme Court in Jacobs v.
Hopper, "it is clear [from Stone v. Powell] that the introduction
[in a state criminal trial] of evidence obtained in an illegal
search or seizure is not a 'substantial denial' of a defendant's
rights under the Constitution of the United States." 294
Therefore, the Court reasoned, search and seizure claims were
not among the federal constitutional rights protected under
Georgia Habeas Corpus Act.
The Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation of Stone v.
Powell was in error. Stone v. Powell did not overturn Mapp v.
Ohio,295 the case which established that the admission at a state
criminal trial of illegally seized evidence was prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment. In fact, Stone v. Powell acknowledged that
illegally seized evidence would continue to be inadmissible in a

292. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
293. U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("In sum, the rule is a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional
right of the party aggrieved.").
294. Jacobs, 233 S.E.2d at 170.

295. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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state trial court (and on direct appeal).
Stone v. Powell
involved the availability of raising search and seizure claims in
federal habeas proceedings, not at state criminal trials, and
courts have not interpreted Stone v. Powell as overruling Mapp
v. Ohio.297
The Georgia Supreme Court was also wrong in inferring from
Stone v. Powell that search and seizure claims were no longer
cognizable under the Georgia Habeas Corpus Act. In Stone v.
Powell the Court expressly stated that there was and continued
to be jurisdiction under the federal habeas statutes to entertain
search and seizure claims.298 If that decision did not rob federal
habeas courts of authority to hear search and seizure claims,
why should the decision prohibit Georgia habeas courts from
hearing such claims?
Quite apart from its viewpoint that Stone v. Powell was
worthy of adoption for state habeas corpus, and its
misinterpretation of what Stone v. Powell actually held, Jacobs
v. Hopper fails to appreciate the extent to which federalism
issues are central to the holding in Stone v. Powell, which is
preoccupied with curtailing federal district court review, via
habeas corpus, of state court judgments, especially in Fourth
Amendment issue cases.299 No federalism issues arise, and
296. Stone, 428 U.S. at 493 ("We adhere to the view that these
considerations support the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial
and its enforcement on direct appeal of state-court convictions.").
297. It is also worthy of note that the United States Supreme Court
described the Miranda v. Arizona decision as involving a prophylactic rule
rather than a constitutional right. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463
(1966); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974). The Court later held
that Miranda v. Arizona claims may be raised in federal habeas proceedings.
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 680 (1993); Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S.
428, n.3 (2000); see also Caldwell v. State, 917 S.W.2d 662, 688 (Tenn.
1996) (comparing and contrasting Stone v. Powell and Withrow v. Williams).

298. Stone, 428 U.S. at n.37 ("Our decision does not mean that the federal
court lacks jurisdiction over such a claim, but only that the application of the
[exclusionary] rule is limited to cases in which there has been both such a
showing [of denial of opportunity for full and fair litigation] and a Fourth
Amendment violation.").
299. See Stone, 428 U.S. at n.31, n.35 (expressing concern about federal
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there is no federal court intrusion into state court affairs, when a
Georgia habeas court reviews the judgment of another Georgia
court on Fourth Amendment (or any other) grounds.
Jacobs v. Hopper should be overruled. Under the decision,
postconviction habeas relief based on an illegal search and
seizure is impossible as long as Georgia continues to have a
statute authorizing persons charged with crime to move to
suppress the illegally seized evidence.
By erroneously
excluding search and seizure claims from the Georgia Habeas
Corpus Act, Jacobs v. Hopper completely bars state habeas
relief for search and seizure claims, no matter what the
circumstances. This goes too far. Overturning Jacobs v.
Hopper will not inconvenience the courts. Search and seizure
claims would still be subject to the 1982 statute and therefore
procedurally barred in habeas corpus if the claims had not been
raised at trial or on appeal, absent cause and prejudice. 300
The Georgia Supreme Court appears to be the only state
supreme court to have officially embraced Stone v. Powell for
purposes of state habeas corpus.301

habeas corpus creating "friction between our federal and state court system
of justice" and about federal habeas intruding on "the doctrine of
federalism;" questioning whether a federal judge is "more competent, or
conscientious, or learned with respect to the 'consideration of Fourth
Amendment claims' than his neighbor in the state courthouse").
300. Because the petitioner in Jacobs v. Hopper failed to properly raise
the search and seizure issue at trial or on his direct appeal and there was no
suggestion of cause and prejudice, the result in Jacobs v. Hopper would not
have been changed even if the "opportunity" rule was scrapped.
Interestingly, although the Court in Jacobs v. Hopper refused the habeas
relief requested on Fourth Amendment grounds, it did grant relief in the case
based on a separate claim involving a violation of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause that occurred at the petitioner's criminal trial, a claim
which could have been but was not raised at that trial.
301. The Connecticut Supreme Court held "in abeyance the question
whether the holding in Stone v. Powell .

.

. applies equally to state habeas

corpus proceedings." Payne v. Robinson, 541 A.2d 504, n.1 (Conn. 1988).
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C. Gibson v. Turpin (1999)
There is no federal constitutional right to counsel in state
postconviction proceedings, even in death sentence cases.302
Thus, indigent prisoners, including death row inmates, have no
federal constitutional right to appointed counsel in Georgia
habeas proceedings.
Most states recognize a right to counsel in their state court
postconviction proceedings, but it is a statutory right, not a
constitutional right.303 Currently, 29 states provide a statutory
right to counsel in their state postconviction proceedings, while
14 states provide a statutory right to counsel in their
postconviction proceedings in death sentence cases only. 304
Thus, in 43 states there is some form of statutory right to
postconviction counsel. Georgia is one of only seven states the other six states are Alabama, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, and New York - with no statutory
right to postconviction counsel.305 To its discredit, the Georgia
302. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989) (death sentence cases);
Penn. v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (noncapital cases); Gibson v.
Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 188 (Ga. 1999) (capital and noncapital cases).
303. Gibson, 513 S.E.2d at 192 (listing and citing various state statutes
securing a right to postconviction counsel); see generally Jill Wasserman,
Has Habeas Corpus Been Suspended in Georgia? Representing Indigent
Prisoners on Georgia's Death Row, 17 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 605 (2000)

(discussing mechanisms that the Georgia legislature could use to provide
funding for postconviction habeas corpus representation of the state's death
row inmates); Sarah L. Thomas, A Legislative Challenge: A ProposedModel
Statute to Providefor the Appointment of Counsel in State Habeas Corpus
Proceedingsfor IndigentPetitioners, 54 EMORY L.J. 1139 (2005) (discussing

a model statute for states to adopt, granting a statutory right to
postconviction counsel to state habeas petitioners).
304. STATE POSTCONVICTION 2013, supra note 7, at 9. Since publication

of this book, Delaware has joined the states securing a statutory right to
counsel for persons applying for state postconviction relief, and New York
(which has no death penalty) has been removed from the list of states
granting postconviction counsel only in death sentence cases.
305. STATE POSTCONVICTION 2013, supra note 7, at 9. Since publication

of this book, Delaware has been removed from the list of states with no
statutory right to postconviction counsel, and New York has been transferred
to the list of states with no statutory right to postconviction counsel.
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legislature has resolutely refused year after year to enact a
statute securing a right to counsel for postconviction habeas
petitioners, even those on death row.
Along with Alabama, Nebraska, and New Hampshire,306
Georgia is one of only four state death penalty jurisdictions (out
of a total of 32 such state jurisdictions) without a statutory right
to postconviction counsel in capital cases.307 Stated differently,
28 (87%) of the 32 death penalty states grant a statutory right to
postconviction counsel in death sentence cases, while Georgia is
one of the four death penalty states (13%) that do not.
Because most states provide a statutory right to
postconviction counsel, the issue of whether there is a state
constitutional right to postconviction counsel is infrequently
litigated. Furthermore, United States Supreme Court decisions
holding that there is no federal constitutional right to counsel in
state postconviction proceedings tend to make state courts
reluctant to reach a different result based on their state
constitution.308 Most of the state courts to have reached the
306. Although New Hampshire still has the death penalty on the books, it
has executed only 24 persons in its history, and its most recent execution was
on July 14, 1939.

Capital Punishment in New Hampshire, WIKIPEDIA,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalpunishment in New Hampshire (last
visited Apr. 27, 2014); WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 28990 (1974); DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., State by State Database,

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state bystate.
307. Although there is no statutory right to counsel in a Georgia habeas
corpus proceeding, even in death sentence cases, Georgia judges do possess
power to appoint an attorney to represent a pro se habeas petitioner. They
cannot, however, order that the state or local government pay the appointed
attorney for his services. See, e.g., Willis v. Price, 353 S.E.2d 488, 489 (Ga.
1987) (permitting a judge to exercise his discretion to appoint an attorney to
represent a habeas petitioner, but not authorizing that judge to order the
attorney to be paid out of government funds); State v. Davis, 269 S.E.2d 461,
462 (Ga. 1980) ("[W]e know of no statute, case, or constitutional provision
which would permit a trial judge to appoint counsel to a habeas petitioner, to
be paid out of state or county funds.").
308. First Things Last, supra note 289 at 228-29 (footnotes omitted):

In some states it [is] a 'doctrine of state constitutional construction'
to interpret state constitutional provisions by following federal cases
which [have] interpreted similar federal constitutional provisions . ..
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issue have held that there is no state constitutional right to
postconviction counsel.309 During the 30-year period from 1969
through 1998, the Georgia Supreme Court held again and again
that no such right exists in this state.310 On the other hand, in

three states - Alaska,311 Minnesota,312 and Mississippi313 - there
is, under a decision of the state's highest court, a state
constitutional right to postconviction counsel. In Mississippi,
the right extends only to death sentence cases.
[M]any state courts follow the practice of interpreting state bills of
rights in accordance with the way the [United States] Supreme Court
has interpreted the federal Bill of Rights.
309. See. e.g., Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448, 453 (R.I. 2012) ("We
begin by noting that the right to counsel in a postconviction-relief proceeding
is a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional right."); In re Barnett, 73
P.3d 1106, 1112 (Cal. 2003) (the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due
Process Clause does not require that the state supply a lawyer to indigents to
state postconviction proceedings; consequently, there is no federal
constitutional right to counsel for state habeas corpus proceedings, not even
in a capital case); Elkins v. Thompson, 25 P.3d 376, 380 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)
("Accordingly, the rights to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitutions, are inapplicable in this [postconviction] proceeding.").
310. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 269 S.E.2d 461, 463 (Ga. 1980); Stephens v.
Balkcom, 265 S.E.2d 596, 596 (Ga. 1980); Spencer v. Hopper, 255 S.E.2d 1,
4 (Ga. 1979); Yates v. Brown, 219 S.E.2d 729, 730 (Ga. 1975). For a list of
more than 20 Georgia Supreme Court decisions between 1969 and 1974
holding that there is no state constitutional right to postconviction counsel in
Georgia habeas proceedings, see A New Role for an Ancient Writ, Part II
supra note 4, at n.298.
311. See Grinols v. State, 74 P.3d 889, 892 (Alaska 2003) ("[W]e hold
today that the right to counsel in a first application for post-conviction relief
is of a constitutional nature, required under the due process clause of the
Alaska Constitution."); see also McCracken v. State, 518 P.3d 85, 88
(Alaska 1974) ("Both the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
and art. I, sec. 11 of the Alaska Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant
the right to counsel.")
312. See Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 92 (Minn. 2006) ("We hold that
a defendant's right to the assistance of counsel under Article I, section 6 of
the Minnesota Constitution extends to one review of a criminal conviction,
whether by direct appeal or a first review by postconviction proceeding.").
313. See Jackson v. State, 732 So.2d 187, 191 (Miss. 1999) (extending the
right). Mississippi, like Georgia, is a death penalty state, and Jackson was a
capital case.
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In 1999, in Gibson v. Turpin,3 14 the Georgia Supreme Court
was given the opportunity to overrule contrary precedents and
hold that there is a state constitutional right to postconviction
counsel in Georgia, at least in death sentence cases. The Court
declined to do so by a four to three vote.
Exzavious Lee Gibson, a Georgia death row inmate with an
IQ of 76, was the first capital habeas petitioner in modern times
to proceed through state habeas corpus without the assistance of
counsel. In December 1995, after the direct review process
ended, Gibson filed a pro se state habeas petition. In August
1996 a superior court judge conducted an evidentiary hearing in
Gibson's habeas case, a hearing at which Gibson was
unrepresented by an attorney, while the state was represented by
an Assistant Attorney General. Gibson was at a total loss on
how to proceed at the hearing. He failed to put on witnesses but
repeatedly stated that he was not waiving his rights. The state
put on a full defense and put at least one witness on the stand.
Gibson did not object to any of the questions put to the witness
and did no cross-examination. The judge asked the Attorney
General's office to prepare an order denying relief on all
grounds and then signed it without making any changes. 315
Portions of the transcript of Gibson's evidentiary hearing
shock the conscience.316 The Gibson evidentiary hearing is just
314. 513 S.E.2d 186 (Ga. 1999). Gibson was decided one month after the
Mississippi Supreme Court in Jackson v. State, 732 So.2d 187 (Miss. 1999),
held that its state constitution secures a right to counsel for Mississippi
postconviction petitioners on death row.
315. Jennifer N. Ide, The Case of Exzavious Lee Gibson: A Georgia
Court's (Constitutional?) Denial of a FederalRight, 47 EMORY L.J. 1079,

1079-80, 1082-84 (1998).
316. The Court: Okay. Mr. Gibson, do you want to proceed?
Mr. Gibson: I don't have an attorney.
The Court: I understand that.
Mr. Gibson: I am not waiving my rights.
The Court: I understand that. Do you have any evidence that you wish to
put up?
Mr. Gibson: I don't know what to plead.
The Court: I am not asking you to plead anything, I am just asking you if
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more proof, if any was needed, that "without the assistance of
counsel, a habeas petitioner [under a death sentence] is unlikely
to receive a fair and adequate hearing on his claims." 3 17
Unmoved by the facts of the case, the majority opinion in
Gibson v. Turpin concluded that there is no Georgia state
constitutional right to counsel for a habeas petitioner, based on
the following unconvincing reasoning: (1) "habeas corpus is not
a criminal proceeding, but considered to be civil in nature" 3 18
(2) "[h]abeas corpus is not intended to be a means for relitigating a prisoner's case;" 319 (3) states are not "obligated
under the United States Constitution to provide habeas corpus
proceedings as a means of obtaining post-conviction relief;" 320
(4) "[h]abeas corpus is not a second trial;" 321 (5) "[t]he lack of
appointed counsel upon state habeas corpus . . . is not

'fundamentally unfair;'

(6) "if a constitutional right to habeas

counsel exists . . . it would apply to almost all habeas corpus

petitioners, and not just to death-row inmates;" 322 and (7) "a
constitutional right to counsel to habeas counsel, carried to its
logical conclusion, would spawn more litigation and delay in an
already cumbersome system." 323
The majority in Gibson v. Turpin saw nothing fundamentally
unfair about the state of Georgia denying court-appointed
counsel to an indigent death row inmate seeking Georgia habeas
corpus relief. The majority found it constitutional for the state
in a postconviction proceeding to provide attorneys to represent
you have anything you want to put up, anything you want to introduce to this
Court.
Mr. Gibson: But I don't have an attorney.
The Court: Yes, sir. Do you have anything you want to tell this Court?
Mr. Gibson: I don't waive any rights.
Id. at 1079 (quoting from the transcript of the evidentiary hearing).
317. Id. at 1081.
318. Gibson, 513 S.E.2d at 188.
319.Id. at 188.
320. Id. at 189.
321. Id. at 188.
322. Id. at 191.
323. Id. at 191.
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the state while not providing an attorney to a death row inmate
financially unable to hire a lawyer.
The majority had
confidence in findings of fact arising out of a evidentiary
hearing at which the state is represented by counsel but the
death row inmate is without a lawyer because he cannot afford
to hire one. The majority's views smack of what George Orwell
labeled as defending the indefensible. 324 To paraphrase Stephen
B. Bright of the Southern Center for Human Rights, expecting a
death row inmate "to file and litigate a postconviction challenge
without a lawyer" is comparable to expecting "a passenger to
fly the Concorde to France without a pilot." 32 5
Compared with the majority opinion, the dissenting opinions
in Gibson v. Turpin are far more realistic about the adverse
consequences of denying a postconviction right to counsel to
death row inmates and about the advantages of providing such
counsel. 3 2 6
324. See GEORGE ORWELL, GEORGE ORWELL: IN FRONT OF YOUR NOSE,

1946-1950 Vol. 4, at 136 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds. 1968) ("the
defence [sic] of the indefensible").
325. JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE
WRONGLY CONVICTED 189 (2000). See also Thomas, supra note 303, at

1147 ("The History of Habeas Corpus Reveals the Necessity for the
Appointment of Counsel in State Habeas Corpus Proceedings for Indigent
Petitioners").
326. "When a petitioner is on death row and pursuing his first habeas
petition, there can be no glimmer of hope that fundamental fairness will
prevail in the absence of counsel and, without a procedure for appointed
counsel, the right to meaningful access to habeas review under the Georgia
Constitution is lost." Gibson, 513 S.E.2d at 199 (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting).
[F]undamental fairness demands that a condemned prisoner have the
benefit of competent counsel to articulate his constitutional claims
and to navigate the procedural and substantive morass that is our
habeas corpus law . . . Nevertheless, the majority today . . . requires

a condemned man, without counsel, to bring his claims for relief in
an arcane process that he cannot possibly understand in a court of
law that (most likely) will not be able to understand his
constitutional concerns. This is an outcome that no just government
should countenance.
Id. (Sears, J., dissenting).
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Since 1999, the Supreme Court of Georgia has reaffirmed its
support for its Gibson v. Turpin holding.327
D. Roberts v. Cooper (2010)
The prison mailbox rule is the rule that documents submitted
to a court by an unrepresented prisoner shall be deemed filed in
the clerk's office at the time they are deposited in the prison
mail system for forwarding to the court.328
329
In 1988, in Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme
Court, sensitive to the hardships faced by prison inmates
engaged in pro se civil litigation,330 adopted the prison mailbox
327. See, e.g., Britt v. Conway, 637 S.E.2d 43, 44 (Ga. 2006) (referring to
Gibson as the basis for denying habeas appeals based on appointment of
counsel); Fortson v. State, 532 S.E.2d 102, 104 (Ga. 2000) (citing to Gibson
as the basis for "no right to appointed counsel in a death penalty habeas
corpus proceeding").
328. See generally Ira P. Robbins, The Prisoners' Mail Box and the

Evolution of Federal Inmate Rights, 144 F.R.D. 127 (1993); Courtenay
Canedy, The Prison Mailbox Rule and Passively Represented Prisoners, 16

GEO. MASON L. REv. 773 (2009).
329. 487 U.S. 266 (1988). Lack was a federal habeas case filed by a state
prisoner acting pro se. Id. at 268. The petitioner had 30 days to file a notice
of appeal from the district court's denial of relief Id. The petitioner on the
27th day deposited the necessary documents in the prison mail system for
forwarding to the court clerk. Id. The clerk filed the documents on the 31st
day, with the result that the petitioner's appeal was dismissed. Id On
certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's dismissal). Id. at
269.

330. Id. at 270-72:
The situation of prisoners seeking to appeal without the aid of
counsel is unique. Such prisoners cannot take the steps other
litigants can take to monitor the processing of their notices of appeal
and that the court clerk receives and stamps their notices of appeal
before the thirty-day deadline.
Unlike other litigants, pro se
prisoners cannot personally travel to the courthouse to see that the
notice is stamped "filed" or to establish the date on which the court
received the notice. Other litigants may choose to entrust their
appeals to the vagaries of the mail and the clerk's process for
stamping incoming papers, but only the pro se prisoner is forced to
do so by his situation. And if other litigants do choose to use the
mail, they can at least place the notice directly into the hands of the
United States Postal Service (or a private express carrier); and they
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rule for notices of appeal in federal habeas cases. In Houston v.
Lack, the federal appellate rule requiring that a notice of appeal
in a federal habeas case involving a state prisoner be filed
within thirty days after entry of the judgment was construed to
mean that a pro se prisoner's notice of appeal would be deemed
filed at the time it was delivered to prison authorities for
mailing.3 3 1
can follow its progress by calling the court to determine whether the
notice has been received and stamped, knowing that if the mail goes
awry they can personally deliver notice at the last moment or that
their monitoring will provide them with evidence to demonstrate
either excusable neglect or that the notice was not stamped on the
date the court received it. Pro se prisoners cannot take any of these
precautions; nor, by definition, do they have lawyers who can take
these precautions for them. Worse, the pro se prisoner has no choice
but to entrust the forwarding of his notice of appeal to prison
authorities whom he cannot control or supervise and who may have
every incentive to delay. No matter how far in advance the pro se
prisoner delivers his notice to the prison authorities, he can never be
sure that it will ultimately get stamped "filed" on time. And if there
is a delay the prisoner suspects is attributable to the prison
authorities, he is unlikely to have any means of proving it, for his
confinement prevents him from monitoring the process sufficiently
to distinguish delay on the part of prison authorities from slow mail
service or the court clerk's failure to stamp the notice on the date
received. Unskilled in law, unaided by counsel, and unable to leave
the prison, his control over the processing of his notice necessarily
ceases as soon as he hands it over to the only public officials to
whom he has access-the prison authorities-and the only information
he will likely have is the date he delivered the notice to those prison
authorities and the date ultimately stamped on his notice.
Id.

331. Id. at 270-76:
We conclude that . . . petitioner . . . filed his notice within the

requisite 30-day period when, three days before the deadline, he
delivered the notice to prison authorities for forwarding to the
District Court . . .. We thus conclude that the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal because the notice of appeal was
filed at the time petitioner delivered it to the prison authorities for
forwarding to the court clerk.
Subsequently, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure was
amended to specifically authorize the prison mailbox rule for notices of
appeal filed by pro se prisoners. FED. R. APP. P. 4 (c).
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The mailbox rule is just and fair, and is good public and penal
policy.332 Since 1988, many states, by statute, court rule, or
judicial decision, have adopted some form of prison mailbox
rule for use in various pro se prisoner judicial proceedings,
including habeas cases.333
In 2001, in Massaline v. Williams,334 the Georgia Supreme
and
Court, aware of the difficulties facing inmate litigants,
agreeing with Houston v. Lack's policy arguments, 336 adopted
the prison mailbox rule with respect to both habeas notices of
appeal (which are filed in the superior court) and applications
for a certificate of probable cause to appeal a denial of habeas
relief (which are filed in the Georgia Supreme Court).33 7
Massaline v. Williams held:
[W]hen a prisoner, who is proceeding pro se, appeals from a
decision on his habeas corpus petition, his application for
certificate of probable cause to appeal and notice of appeal
will be deemed filed on the date he delivers them to the
prison authorities for forwarding to the clerks of this Court
and the superior court, respectively. 338
Three years later, in 2004, the Georgia habeas corpus statute
332. See Haag v. State, 591 So.2d 614, 617 (Fla. 1992) ("We find the
approach taken by the Court in Houston to be most consistent with . . .
simplicity and fairness . . .").
333. See, e.g., Massaline v. Williams, 554 S.E.2d 720, 721-22, n.6, n.7
(Ga. 2001) (delineating such adoptions).
334. Massaline, 554 S.E.2d at 721-22.

335. Id ("[W]e conclude that this Court also should make allowances for
the unique circumstances faced by pro se prisoners who bring their habeas
corpus petitions to this Court.").
336. The Court in Massaline v.
approvingly from Houston v. Lack. Id.

Williams quoted extensively

and

337. Massaline, 554 S.E.2d at 722-23.
338. Id. Subsequently, the Georgia Supreme Court's rules were amended
to expressly authorize the prison mailbox rule with respect to all documents,
and not just notices of appeal and applications for probable cause, submitted
to the Georgia Supreme Court by a pro se prisoner. GA. SUP. CT. R. 13 (1)
("A document submitted by a prisoner who is not represented by counsel
shall be deemed filed on the date the prisoner delivers the document to
prison officials for forwarding to the Supreme Court Clerk.").
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of limitations was enacted. This presented a question: would
the prison mailbox rule also apply in determining whether a pro
se habeas petition is timely under the 2004 statute of
limitations? In 2008, when that issue first arose in a federal
appellate court, the federal court took a look at Massaline v.
Williams and then predicted that the Georgia Supreme Court
would extend the mailbox rule to the filing of habeas petitions:
The rationale of Massaline applies equally in the case at

hand. We discern no basis for distinguishing between a pro
se prisoner filing a habeas petition and a pro se prisoner

filing a habeas appeal, and we have no reason to believe that
the Georgia Supreme Court would find one.33 9
This prediction turned out to be incorrect. In 2010, in
Roberts v. Cooper,340 the pro se habeas petitioner, because his
conviction occurred before July 1, 2004, had until July 1, 2008
to file his state habeas petition. He delivered the habeas petition
to prison officials for mailing on June 27, 2008, but it was not
received at the superior court clerk's office until July 2, one day
late. Citing the statute of limitations, the warden moved to
dismiss the habeas petition. The motion was denied, and the
warden, with the permission of the superior court, took an
interlocutory appeal.
The legal arguments of the habeas
petitioner were quite convincing.341 Nonetheless, the Georgia
Taylor v. Williams, 528 F.3d 847, 850-51 (11th Cir. 2008).
340. 691 S.E.2d 875 (Ga. 2010).
341. Brief of Appellee, Roberts v. Cooper, 691 S.E.2d 875 (Ga. 2010)
(No. S09A1512), 2009 WL 2954805, at *34:
First, applying the Massaline filing rule to Cooper's habeas petition
is not foreclosed by this Court's case law. Second, as a practical
matter, there is no distinction between a pro se habeas petitioner's
inability to monitor the filing of his legal papers in an appellate court
and his inability to monitor the filing of his legal papers in a trial
court. Nor is there a relevant distinction between a notice-of-appeal
deadline and a statute-of-limitation deadline that would warrant
applying the Massaline filing rule in the former context but not in the
latter. Third, the Massaline filing rule is consistent with the text of
OCGA § 9-14-42(c)(1). Subsection (c)(1) is a habeas-specific
statute of limitation written in language materially indistinguishable
from the notice-of-appeal provision at issue in Massaline and, for
339.
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Supreme Court held that the prison mailbox rule was
inapplicable and that therefore the habeas petition had to be
dismissed because it had not been filed within the four-year
statute of limitations. It was one day late in being received at
the superior court and therefore, according to an implacable
Court, the appeal must be dismissed without inquiring into its
merits.
The Court was emphatic that it would not expand the mailbox
rule:
[W]e take this opportunity to repeat that the mailbox rule
stated in Massalineis to be applied only in the circumstances
presented therein, that is, the attempted appeal of a pro se
habeas petitioner . . . There is no valid justification for this
Court to broaden the mailbox rule .

.

. We will continue to

apply the mailbox rule only in the confines we have
previously set forth ... 3 4 2
The reason the Court came up with to defend its decision
was:
A pro se felony habeas petitioner has four years to prepare
and submit his initial petition . . . [but] only 30 days to
prepare and submit his application for a certificate of
probable cause in this Court, and to prepare and submit his
notice of appeal in the habeas court. The difference between
the length of the two periods appears to us to have import.3 43
that reason, should be interpreted in light of Massaline's filing rule
under a longstanding canon of statutory construction. Finally,
because the Massaline filing rule applies to appeals from adverse
habeas decisions, discretionary appeals that are statutorily authorized
but not constitutionally guaranteed, it follows that the filing rule
applies a fortiori to Cooper's habeas petition itself, which is the
exclusive means for accessing a judicial forum to secure habeas
relief that he is constitutionally (not merely statutorily) entitled to
pursue.
342. Roberts, 691 S.E.2d at 877-78.
343. Id at 878. The Court also suggested that the failure of the legislature
to provide for the mailbox rule in the 2004 statute of limitations itself was
important. Id. "Had the General Assembly desired to extend the mailbox
rule, it could have done so, but it did not." Id. However, the legislature did

not expressly forbid use of the mailbox rule in connection with the filing of
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The Georgia Supreme Court's approach is at odds with that
of the federal courts. In the federal court system, where
admittedly the habeas statute of limitations is shorter than in
Georgia, a habeas petition by a state prisoner is, entirely on the
basis of case law, deemed filed within the one year statute of
limitations if it is deposited in the prison mail system within the
statute of limitations, even though it does not arrive at the
clerk's office until after the limitations period has expired.34 4
Thus, Georgia's prisoners enjoy the benefits of a mailbox rule
when they file a habeas corpus petition in a federal district court
in Georgia, 3 4 5 but they are denied these benefits when
petitioning for habeas corpus in the courts of the State of
Georgia.
The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hunstein in Roberts
v. Cooper, representing the views of three justices, is
persuasive:
First, the relatively short time for filing an appeal was not a
consideration in Massaline. Second, given the lack of
control an inmate has over his habeas petition .

.

. he "can

never be sure that it will ultimately get stamped 'filed' on
time" no matter how early in the four-year period it is
submitted. Finally, one seeking to file a habeas petition has
the right to utilize the full amount of time provided by
statute, and "the state cannot subtract from that period
through the failure to deliver a pro se inmate's petition until
after the period has expired, even if the delay is through

honest oversight." 346
Roberts v. Cooper seems to view the prison mailbox rule as
habeas petitions. If the only statutory rights Georgia prisoners have are those

which the courts find the legislature has explicitly authorized, the list of
prisoners' rights will never be lengthy.
344. See, e.g., Taylor v. Williams, 528 F.3d 847, 848-849 (11th Cir.
2008); Alexander v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrections, 523 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir.
2008), abrogatedon other grounds by Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278 (Mar.

7,2011).
345. See, e.g., Taylor, 528 F.3d. at 851.

346. Roberts, 691 S.E.2d at 880 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
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something of a nuisance, and needs to be overruled. Contrary to
the decision, there are many valid justifications for judicial
expansion of the prison mailbox rule to include the filing of
habeas petitions. Implementing the mailbox rule with respect to
the statute of limitations on filing habeas petitions will not cause
any practical problems and definitely will improve the
administration of justice.
Occasionally a habeas petition
received at the clerk's office a few days after the limitations
period expires will nonetheless be deemed timely filed. The
possibility of palpable injustices such as the one in Roberts v.
Cooper, where the habeas petition was dismissed because it had
not been received by the clerk until one day after the statute of
limitations period ended, even though the prisoner had mailed
the petition days before the limitations period expired, will be
precluded.
Even if it is not overruled, the holding in Roberts v. Cooper
could be ameliorated by amending the Georgia Uniform
Superior Court Rules to provide that a pro se prisoner's habeas
petition will be deemed filed at the time it is placed in the prison
mail system for delivery to the superior court.
E. Crosson v. Conway (2012)
As noted previously in this Article, since 1975, a petitioner in
a Georgia postconviction habeas proceeding who has been
denied relief must follow a two-step process involving two
courts if he seeks to appeal. First, he must within 30 days file a
notice of appeal with the superior court, and second, within the
same 30 days he must file an application for a certificate of
probable cause to appeal with the Georgia Supreme Court.
In Fullwood v. Sivley, 347 in 1999, the Georgia Supreme Court
held that the requirement that a certificate of probable cause be
issued before there can be an appeal from a denial of
postconviction habeas relief is jurisdictional in nature, and that
where the application for a certificate of probable cause had not
been filed by a pro se prisoner within the 30-day statutory time
347. 517 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. 1999).
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limit, even though the prisoner had been fully informed as to the
proper appellate procedure by the superior court judge, and even
though the prisoner did file a timely notice of appeal, the appeal
had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
In holding that the certificate of probable cause requirement
is jurisdictional, Fullwood v. Sivley followed the federal
approach.
In the federal court system, a certificate of
appealability (known until 1996 as certificate of probable cause)
is required before there can be an appeal from a denial of
federal postconviction habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner,
and the requirement has been held to be jurisdictional.3 4 8
In three decisions between 2001 and 2008,349 the Georgia
Supreme Court construed Fullwood v. Sivley to prohibit
dismissal of a pro se prisoner's untimely postconviction habeas
appeal if the "habeas petitioner is not informed [by the superior
court judge] of the proper procedure for obtaining appellate
review of an unfavorable ruling." 350
In 2012, however, in Crosson v. Conway,351 the Georgia
Supreme Court overruled these three decisions and held that a
failure to comply with the statutory requirement that a petitioner
seeking to appeal a denial of postconviction habeas relief must,
within 30 days, both (1) file a notice of appeal in the superior
court, and (2) file an application for a certificate of probable
cause in the Georgia Supreme Court, cannot be excused merely
because the pro se habeas petitioner was not informed by the
352
A habeas
judge of the statutory requirements for an appeal.
appeal must be dismissed if either the notice of appeal or the
application for probable cause was not filed within the 30-day
deadline, even though the petitioner is proceeding pro se and
348. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 651 (2012); Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 480
(2000).
349. Thomas v. State, 667 S.E.2d 375, 376 (Ga. 2008); Capote v. Ray, 577
S.E.2d 755, 757 (Ga. 2002); Hicks v. Scott, 541 S.E.2d 27, 27 (Ga. 2001).
350. Capote, 577 S.E.2d at 757.

351. 728 S.E.2d 617 (Ga. 2012).
352. Id. at 620.
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even though he is ignorant of the proper appellate procedures
required to be followed.3 53
Like Roberts v. Cooper, Crosson v. Conway suggests a Court
that is dissociated from the daunting realities experienced by
inmates confined in total institutions. In Crosson v. Conway, as
in Reed v. Hopper, Gibson v. Turpin, and Roberts v. Cooper, the
dissenting opinion is more convincing than the majority
opinion. Rather than re-canvassing any arguments, however, it
is preferable to point out that, while Crosson v. Conway may
deserve overruling, the adverse effects of the decision can be
ameliorated without actually overruling it. Promulgation of
new court rules will solve the problem.
In the federal court system, under a provision of the federal
habeas corpus statute, if a district court denies the habeas
petition of a state convict, the petitioner may not appeal the
denial to the appropriate United States Court of Appeals unless
a certificate of appealability is issued by a judge.3 54 (As noted
previously in this Article, this is a jurisdictional requirement.)
Under the federal system, the certificate of appealability may be
issued or denied by either the habeas trial judge or an appellate
judge, whereas under the Georgia system only the Georgia
Supreme Court can issue or deny the certificate of probable
cause. This distinction is unimportant for present purposes.
In the federal courts, there is no statute of limitations on
applying for the certificate of appealability, and therefore,
unlike the situation in Georgia, there are no cases where the
certificate has been denied because of delay in requesting it, or
where an appeal was dismissed because the certificate was not
timely requested or granted.
More importantly for our purposes, in the federal court
system the certificate must be either issued or denied on the
353. Id.
354. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014). In addition to
obtaining issuance of a certificate of appealability, the petitioner, to perfect
the appeal itself, must file a notice of appeal in the district court within 30
days after entry of the judgment appealed from. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
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merits by the trial or an appellate judge, even if the habeas
petitioner does not request it. Under the federal scheme, the
habeas petitioner is not required to request the certificate at
either the trial court or appellate court level. Under the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases, the district court must, without
any application by the petitioner, issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order denying relief.355
Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, if the district
judge denies the certificate, the petitioner may request a circuit
356
judge on the Court of Appeals to issue the certificate.
However, it is not necessary that the habeas petitioner do so,
because the application will be made for him anyway by
operation of law under the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure: "If no express request for a certificate [of
appealability] is filed, the notice of appeal constitutes a request
addressed to the judges of the court of appeal."3 57 Under these
circumstances, no federal habeas petitioner can or will be
denied the certificate of appealability for having asked for it too
late or for not having asked for it at all. If the certificate is
denied, it will be because probable cause to appeal is lacking,
and not because of any procedural misstep.
The Georgia Supreme Court should consider adopting a rule
patterned after the federal approach on this issue. Rule 36 of
the Rules of the Supreme Court of Georgia, relating to
certificates of probable cause, could be amended to add a
provision under which, if the habeas petitioner applied for a
certificate of probable cause late, or if the petitioner did not
apply for the certificate at all, then a timely filed notice of
appeal shall constitute a request for the certificate. Thus, as
long as the notice of appeal was filed on time, no certificate of
probable cause - and hence no habeas appeal - would ever be
denied or dismissed on timeliness grounds. The Georgia
355. R. GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE U.S. D. CT. 11(a),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/2254-2255.pdf.
356. FED. R. APP. P. 22(b)(1) ("If the district judge has denied the
certificate, the applicant may request a circuit judge to issue it.").
357. FED. R. APP. P. 22(b)(2).
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Uniform Superior Court Rules also need amendment. A
provision ought to be added requiring superior court judges to
advise habeas petitioners as to the appropriate appellate
procedures to be followed if they are denied relief and want to
appeal.358
IV. CONCLUSION

Unquestionably, Georgia's state writ of habeas corpus is in
better shape than it was before passage of the Georgia Habeas
Corpus Act of 1967. But also unquestionably, in the years since
1967, there has been a steady stream of legislative and judicial
developments which have eroded the Georgia writ of habeas
corpus and increased not only the probability that habeas
petitioners will be unsuccessful, but also the likelihood that
habeas petitions will be dismissed for purely procedural
reasons, without inquiry into their merits. This methodical
curtailment of the availability of relief is attributable mainly to
the series of state statutes curbing habeas corpus in various
ways, but also to some disconcerting Georgia Supreme Court
decisions which are low points in Georgia habeas corpus case
law jurisprudence.
Not every Georgia habeas statute since 1973 has constricted
the writ. Although, tellingly, none of the post-1973 statutes
expanded habeas relief, some did improve the administration of
habeas proceedings. For example, a portion of the 2004 statute
clarified the rules for proper venue in postconviction habeas
cases where the petitioner currently is in federal custody, in
custody outside Georgia, or not in custody at all, 359 and the
Georgia Death Penalty Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1995
efficiently reconfigured the use of depositions and affidavits in
postconviction habeas litigation.360
358. For an example of a proposed form of advising instructions to be
given by superior court judges to habeas petitioners denied relief, see
Thomas v. State, 667 S.E.2d 375, 377 (Ga. 2008).
359. See supra note 232.
360. These provisions are codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(a)(b)(c) (West,
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And by no means have all the Georgia Supreme Court
decisions since 1973 weakened the writ. Some, indeed, have
strengthened habeas. The Court, for example, has held that a
felony conviction, without more, is a sufficient restraint on
liberty to invoke the state writ even though the convicted
person's sentence has been fully served. 361 It has also held that
a person convicted of a misdemeanor traffic offense who is not
in physical custody or even on probation, but whose driver's
license has been suspended, is restrained of his liberty for
purposes of state habeas corpus, even though the loss of such a
license is not regarded as sufficient custody to invoke the
federal writ of habeas corpus.362 The Court has also swept away
older procedural rules which prohibited habeas attacks on
concurrent or consecutive sentences.363
And although it is true that the Court denies relief more often
than it grants it,364 the Court nevertheless grants postconviction
habeas relief in both death sentence365 and noncapital366 cases
Westlaw through 2014).
361. See, e.g., Parris v. State, 208 S.E.2d 493, 494 (Ga. 1974). Federal
habeas relief, on the other hand, is not available to a convicted person who
has finished his felony sentence; such a person is not regarded as being in
custody under the conviction or sentence sought to be attacked; see, e.g.,
Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 493 (1989).
362. See supra notes 166-170 and accompanying text.
363. See, e.g., Middlebrooks v. Allen, 216 S.E.2d 331, 331 (Ga. 1975)
(finding habeas petitioner may attack a future sentence to be served
consecutively to the sentence petitioner is presently serving); Atkins v.
Hopper, 216 S.E.2d 89, 90-91 (Ga. 1975) (finding habeas petitioner may
attack a sentence being served concurrently with valid sentence).
364. See, e.g., Brown v. Parody, 751 S.E.2d 793 (Ga. 2013); Sears v.
Humphrey, 751 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. 2013); O'Donnell v. Smith, 751 S.E.2d 324
(Ga. 2013); Humphrey v. Nash, 744 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 2013); Harris v. Upton,
739 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. 2013); Seabolt v. Hall, 737 S.E.2d 314 (Ga. 2013);
Upton v. Hardeman, 732 S.E.2d 425 (Ga. 2012); Walker v. Hagins, 722 S.E.
2d 725 (Ga. 2012); Hall v. Lance, 687 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. 2010); Hall v. Lee,
684 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. 2009); Hall v. Terrell, 679 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. 2009); State
v. Sabillon, 622 S.E.2d 846 (Ga. 2005); Lewis v. McDougal, 583 S.E.2d 859
(Ga. 2003).
365. For a list of seven decisions where the Court has granted relief to a
death row inmate, see Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 198 n.27 (Ga.
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on a regular basis. Some of the Court's decisions granting
habeas relief are recognized as civil liberties landmarks. 67
The steady curtailment of Georgia habeas corpus over the
past four decades does not prove that the legislators who passed
the six restrictive statutes acted in bad faith or that the justices
on the Georgia Supreme Court responsible for the five
deplorable habeas-eroding decisions intended to wreck the writ.
Nor does it prove that Georgia is unique in moving in the
direction of curbing the effectiveness of habeas corpus and
postconviction review. In recent years other states have been
moving in the same direction as Georgia.
More than anything else, the curtailment of habeas in Georgia
and elsewhere bespeaks the growing political influence of the
law enforcement establishment and its law and order political
allies. The best explanation for the retrenchment of habeas
corpus in the federal courts and in the state courts lies in the
extensive, burgeoning political power of this country's law
enforcement establishment and its law and order allies, who
have a vested interest in sapping the vitality of the writ of
1999) (Fletcher, P. J., dissenting).
366. See, e.g., Pride v. Kemp, 711 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga. 2011) (granting
habeas to a petitioner accused of cruelty to children and aggravated assault
on basis of wrongful judicial participation in plea negotiations); Thompson
v. Brown, 708 S.E.2d 270, 271 (Ga. 2011) (affirming habeas petition of
ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Arnold v. Howerton, 646 S.E.2d 75,
76 (Ga. 2007) (granting habeas application on basis of involuntary plea);
Beckworth v. State, 635 S.E.2d 769, 769 (Ga. 2006) (same); Harvey v.
Meadows, 626 S.E.2d 92, 166 (Ga. 2006) (grant of habeas based on a court's
oral warning about consequences of violating a special condition of
probation); Petty v. Smith, 612 S.E.2d 276, 277 (Ga. 2005) (granting habeas
for petitioner convicted of aggravated assault on basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel); Clowers v. Sikes, 532 S.E.2d 98, 99 (Ga. 2000) (grant
of habeas on basis of whether petitioner waived his right to counsel at the
time of making a guilty plea).
367. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 S.E.2d 501, 523 (Ga. 2007)
(granting habeas on the basis of a cruel and unusual punishment claim in
conviction for child molestation sentencing as disproportional); Nelson v.
Zant, 405 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. 1991) (granting habeas relief to death row
inmate convicted in violation of due process because prosecution knowingly
used false material evidence to convict petitioner).
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habeas corpus (and other postconviction remedies) and a proven
record of wielding their political muscle in legislatures to
advance their agenda in the name of "finality," "federalism,"
"comity," "efficiency," and "crime control."
The law enforcement establishment - prosecutorial agencies,
police forces, and the prison industrial complex - and its law
and order political allies have no love for postconviction review
and seek its curtailment for understandable reasons.
Postconviction review is used by criminal defendants to
investigate, review, and (where appropriate) bring to the
attention of the courts and the public the violations of the
federal or state bills of rights committed by members of the law
enforcement establishment - the prosecutors who violate due
process to get convictions, the police officers who exceed their
constitutional powers in investigating crime, and the prison
officials who may violate the rights of the persons in their
custody in a multitude of ways, including physical
mistreatment.
When postconviction relief is granted,
prosecutors
who withheld exculpatory
evidence
or
manufactured false evidence are exposed, as are police who
committed perjury or coerced a confession or planted false
evidence. Cutting back on habeas and postconviction remedies
means less exposure of and less accountability for government
agents who engage in lawless law enforcement. It also means
that the victims of illegal law enforcement are more easily
intimidated, discouraged, and rendered powerless.
There are no large or powerful political lobbying groups who
speak for the writ of habeas corpus or for the rights of the
convicted persons who seek to invoke the writ. Is it any
surprise that legislators and judges veer in the direction of
pleasing, or are sympathetic to the arguments of, the tough-oncrime, well-financed, politically pervasive law enforcement
establishment which seeks to prevent the writ from challenging
the exercise of power by that establishment and which patiently,
step by step, advances its goals?
We must cease obsessing about rules of practice and pleading
that prevent consideration of the merits of habeas claims. A
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postconviction remedy system, which emphasizes procedural
defaults by prisoners and downplays violations of basic rights,
is a system in need of systemic change. Judicial review of the
merits of claimed violations of basic rights must be the norm in
habeas cases, not the exception.
To cut the tightening procedural coils that are suffocating
habeas corpus, something must be done about what Graham
Hughes calls "the fetish of finality." 368 Finality is not an
independent entity; it is a competing interest; it is a question of
degree.
We must jettison the procedures-oriented,
technicalities-based, don't-decide-the-merits jurisprudence that
values finality interests over liberty, treating enforcement of
procedural default rules as of equal or even greater importance
than the protection of basic individual rights. This free country
should not have allowed itself to forget the brilliant observation
of Louis H. Pollak:
Those who advocate curtailment of the writ lay special

emphasis upon the asserted need for judicial finality: at some
point, it is urged, there must be an end to litigation. As a
general proposition there is, of course, much to be said for
the procedural devices which limit the suitor to his day in
court and his right of appeal. But the manifest utility within
their proper sphere, of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and
the rest of that unfriendly but expeditious tribe, should not so
dazzle the beholder as to stimulate their application outside
that sphere. These concepts, like stare decisis, stem from the
principle that "in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule . . . be settled than that it be settled right."

But where personal liberty is involved, a democratic society
employs a different arithmetic and insists that it is less

important to reach an unshakable decision than to do
justice.369
368. Hughes, supra note 11, at 328.
369. Louis H. Pollak, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners: CollateralAttack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 65

(1956) (citations omitted). See also Louis E. Goodman, Use and Abuse of
the Writ ofHabeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313, 313 (1948) ("No honest believer in
liberty will object to the judicial policy of always making the writ [of habeas
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Here in Georgia the list of the bitter fruits of the state
legislature's and the state Supreme Court's finality fetish grows
ever lengthier.
And what a list it is: Refusing indigent habeas petitioners,
including death row inmates, the right to postconviction
counsel. Adding time limitations on applying for habeas relief,
including retrospective ones. Reducing the number of claims
arising under Georgia law that can be raised in a habeas
proceeding. Removing Fourth Amendment claims en masse
from the scope of state habeas corpus. Creating and expanding
procedural rules that operate to block consideration of the
merits of a habeas petition raising valid claims, and establishing
and maintaining a postconviction system in which disposition of
petitions for relief all too often involves denials of relief based
on procedural errors committed by lawyers, without even
examining the validity of the habeas claims. Eliminating
appeals of right from habeas decisions denying relief to persons
charged with or convicted of crime, while preserving the state's
right to appeal grants of postconviction habeas relief. Trying to
force indigent petitioners (or their relatives and friends) to pay
fees and costs which ought to be paid by the government
anyway. Freezing the inmate accounts of indigents who cannot
pay those fees and costs. Eliminating, subject to one narrow
exception, the right of indigent jailhouse lawyers to proceed in
formapauperis in habeas corpus proceedings, thereby excluding
them from access to the writ.
In our rush to fret about compliance with state court pleading
requirements, we are "artificially . . . elevat[ing] procedural

rulings over substantive adjudications in post-conviction
review."370 We overlook the simple truth that "[o]ur system of
criminal justice is not infallible." 37 1 Above all, we should never
forget this: the prosecutors and the police who dominate the
system are not infallible and have a proven history of
corpus] available to prevent unjust restraint of liberty.").
370. State v. Preciose, 609 A.2d 1280, 1294 (N.J. 1992).
371. State v. Nash, 58 A.3d 705, 718 (N.J. 2013).
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misconduct and abuse of power.
We forget about the
innumerable cases where postconviction habeas relief was
granted to innocent persons (including death row inmates)
wrongly convicted of a crime they did commit, or where such
relief was granted to persons, regardless of their guilt, who were
denied a fair trial or sentenced to an unconstitutional
punishment. We have blinded ourselves to the preciousness of
the writ of habeas corpus, to what Justice Frankfurter referred to
as "the uniqueness of habeas corpus in the procedural armory of
our law."3
We cannot seem to remember that "[h]abeas
corpus is one of the precious heritages of Anglo-American
civilization." 373
We close our eyes to the reality that
postconviction remedies provide "a built-in safeguard that
ensures a defendant is not unjustly convicted" and that gives a
convicted person his last chance to challenge the fairness and
the reliability of his conviction. 374 We have forgotten that in
postconviction proceedings "it is not a needle we are searching
for in these stacks of paper, but the rights of a human being." 375
We have also fallen into the dehumanizing trap of underprizing
our constitutional rights. We need to memorize the majestic,
stirring words of the Georgia Court of Appeals written a century
ago:
They [constitutional rights] are the sacred civil jewels which
have come down to us from an English ancestry, forced from
the unwilling hand of tyranny by the apostles of personal
liberty and personal security. They are hallowed by the
blood of a thousand struggles, and were stored away for
safe-keeping in the casket of the Constitution. It is infidelity
to forget them; it is sacrilege to disregard them; it is despotic
to trample upon them. They are given as a sacred trust into
the keeping of the courts, who should with sleepless
372. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.).
373. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963).
374. See Nash, 58 A.3d at 718.
375. Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70
HARV. L. REV. 1, 25 (1956).
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vigilance guard these priceless gifts of a free government.
Whatever their intentions or motives, Georgia's legislators
and jurists are quietly and smoothly, one restrictive step at a
time, ridding this state of the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus.
And any trend of getting rid of habeas corpus, whether by
outright abolishing it or by fettering it with immobilizing
restrictions, is a sobering Orwellian development, not an
occasion for laughing at Marx brothers' buffoonery. Unlike
Captain Jeffrey Spaulding and Signor Emanuel Ravelli, it does
not cheer us up. It is doubleplusunfunny.

376.

Underwood v. State, 78 S.E. 1103, 1106 (Ga. Ct. App. 1913).

